Trugreen Companies, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company v. Mower Brothers, Inc. a Utah corporation : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Trugreen Companies, L.L.C., a Delaware limited
liability company v. Mower Brothers, Inc. a Utah
corporation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. mark Gibb, Richard M. Hymas, Erik A. Olsen. Attorneys for Respondents.
Brian C. Johnson, William B. Ingram, Jacob C. Briem. Attorneys for Petitioners.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Trugreen Companies v. Mower Brothers, No. 20070451 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/295
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRUGREEN COMPANIES, L.L.C., a 
Delaware limited liability company, and 
TruGreen Limited Partnership, a Delaware 
limited partnership, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
MOWER BROTHERS, INC, a Utah 
corporation, KEVIN D. BITTON d/b/a 
SCOTTS LAWN SERVICE, a Utah entity, 
GREENSIDE, L.L.C, a Utah limited liability 
company, KEVIN D. BITTON, an 
individual, JEAN ROBERT BABILIS, an 
individual, RYAN MANTZ, an individual, 
JASON HILLER, an individual, LARY 
GAYTHWAITE, an individual, MATT 
WALKER, an individual, JIM LEBLANC, 
an individual, JAMES CLOGSTON, an 
individual, RICK DEERFIELD, an 
individual, DAVID STEPHENSEN, an 
individual, DAVID VAN ACKER, an 
individual, ISAIAH PLUMLEY, an 
individual, SHANNON CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual, PAUL BROWER, an individual, 
JAMES MURRAY, an individual, 
RICHARD COFFMAN, an individual, 
TAMMY ROEHR, an individual, JESSICA 
SPENCER, an individual, MARGIE SMITH, 
an individual, ALFREDA EGBERT, an 
individual, JASON BECK, an individual, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20070451-SC 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MOV - 9 2007 
OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
On Certification of Question of State Law by the United States District Court, 
in and for the District of Utah, Honorable Paul G. Cassell 
l:06-cv-24PGC 
J.MarkGibb(5702) 
Richard M. Hymas (1612) 
ErikA.01sen(8479) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Brian C Johnson (3936) 
William B. Ingram (10803) 
Jacob C.Briem (10463) 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The caption of this case contains the names of all parties to the proceeding in the United 
States District Court. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page# 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.. 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 14 
Certified Question No. 2 15 
Certified Question No, 1 16 
ARGUMENT 16 
I. The Court should answer in the affirmative to Certified Question No. 2 that 
Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for tortious 
interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations 16 
A. There is authority for permitting TruGreen to recover profits gained by 
Respondents for inducing mass breaches of the Non-Compete Agreements 18 
1. Cases from other jurisdictions have permitted recovery of damages based on 
profits or revenues realized by the interfering tortfeasor in spite of 
recognition of general tort remedies and the adoption of Restatement 
(Second) ofTorts §774A 19 
2. Cases relied upon by Respondents do not address the issue of unjust 
enrichment or they deny the remedy on grounds distinguishable from this 
case 27 
B. Based on the interests and circumstances of this case, TruGreen should be 
permitted to recover the gains realized by Respondents for tortiously inducing 
breaches of the Non-Compete Agreements and interfering with TruGreen's 
economic relations 32 
1. The special interests of this case are comparable to other "business torts" 
which permit restitution of a defendant's ill-gotten profits 33 
2. The damages resulting from Respondents' interference and inducement of 
breaches of the Non-Compete Agreements are not readily ascertainable and 
merit a restitutionary measure 34 
3. Restitutionary damages against Respondents would not create a prima facie 
"windfall" in favor of TruGreen 37 
4. Given the nature of the intentional torts precipitating the respective contract 
breaches, the Court should not restrict TruGreen to strictly a "lost profits" 
contract measure of damages 38 
II. The Court should answer in the affirmative to Certified Question No. 1 that 
Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for a former 
employee's breach of non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee non-
solicitation contract provisions 40 
i i 
A. Some states permit restitution for breaches of non-competition or non-
disclosure covenants 42 
B. Courts often use a breaching party's gains as a proxy for calculating damages in 
cases of breached non-competition agreements 43 
C. The "liquidated damages covenants" contained in TruGreen's Non-Compete 
Agreements operate as a contractual measure of restitution 44 
CONCLUSION 46 
TABLE OF AUTHORITY 
PageJ 
Cases 
Am. Air Filter Co., Inc. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975) 29, 37, 39 
AndersonDev. Co.,L.C. v. Tobias, 116P.3d323,328-30,334(Utah2005) 18 
Barlow v. Intl. Harvester Co., 522P.2d 1102,1107-09,1117-18 (Idaho 1974) 27 
Bastianv. King, 661 P.2d953,957 (Utah) 38 
Burkv. Heritage FoodServs. Equip., Inc., 137 N.Eld 803, 816-17 27 
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 94-95 (Minn. 1979) 25 
CliffordMcFarlandRead & Lundy, Inc. v. Brier, 1998 R.I. Super. LEXIS 68 
(R.I. Super. 1998) 27 
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 
(D.Wyo. 1987) 22 
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 683,691 n. 12 
(10th Cir. 1989) 22, 23, 24, 39 
CookAssocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161,1166 (Utah 1983) 38 
DAndreav. Calcagni, 723 A.2d276 (R.1.1999) 27 
Developers Three v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 N.E.2d 1130,1133 (Ohio App. 1990) 
30,32,37,39 
DiLoreto v. Shumake, 38 Cal. App. 4th 35 (Cal. App. 1995) 28 
Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256,1261 
(10th Cir. 2004) 35 
Dowd&Dowd,Ltd. v. Gleason, 816 N.E.2d 754,770-71(111. App. 2004) 27 
Dubuque Prod, Inc. v. Lemco Corp., F. Supp. 108,123 (D. Utah 1983) 33 
Dunnv. Ward, 670P.2d59,61 (IdahoApp. 1983) 14 
Excel Indus. Elecs. v. Blanco, 1998 Mich. App. LEXIS 1824 (Mich. App. 1998) 27 
Fed. Sugar Refining Co. v. U.S. Sugar Equalization Board, Inc., 268 F. 575, 582 
(S.D.N.Y. 1920) 21,31 
Fowler v. Printers II, Inc., 598 A.2d 794, 806 (Md. Spec. App. 1991) 27 
Globe Leasing Corp. v. Bank of Salt Lake, 586 P.2d 420 (Utah 1978) 18 
/«re£«nz,99P.3d793,794(Utah2004) 1 
Innovative Fin. Servs., LLC v. Urban, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 775 (Conn. Super. 2005) 27 
Intermountain Eye & Laser Centers, P.L.L.C v. Miller, 127P.3d 121, 129 (Idaho 2005) 34 
Kforcejnv. v. Surrex Solutions Corp., 436 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2006) 28 
KW Plastics v. United States Can Co., 131 F.Supp 2d 1265,1269 (D. Ala. 2001) 27, 43 
LencoPro, Inc. v. Guerin, 1998 Mass. App. Div. 10 (Mass. App. Div. 1998) 43 
Lienv. Northwestern Engr. Co., 39 N.W.2d 483,484-86,489-90 (S.D. 1949) 27 
Macke Co. v. Pizza of GaithersburgInc., 270 A.2d 645 (Md. 1970) 44 
Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 982 P.2d 945,951-52 (Idaho App. 1999) 27 
iv 
Marcus, Stowel & Beye Govt. Sec, Inc. v. Jefferson, 797 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1986) 
28,31,37,39 
Medspring Group, Inc. v. Feng, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1270,1279 (D. Utah 2005) 33 
Merager v. Turnbull, 99 P.2d 434,439 (Wash. 1940) 44 
Miller Med. Sales, Inc. v. Worstell, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 6251 (1993) 32 
Natl. Merchandising Corp. v. Leydon, 348N.E.2d771 (Mass. 1976) 
19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 29, 31, 36, 37, 39, 41 
Natl. Micrographics Sys., Inc. v. OCE-Indus., Inc., 465 A.2d 862, 869 (Md. 1983) 43 
North Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 551 P.2d 431,435-436 (Or. 1976) 44 
OmicronSys., Inc. v. Weiner, 860 A.2d 554, 565-66 (Pa. Super. 2004) 44, 45 
Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Assoc, Inc., 642 P.2d 1229,1232-34 (Utah 1982) 18 
Potthoffv. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 363 N.W.2d771,773-744 (Minn. App. 1985) 27 
Prince, Yeates&Geldzahlerv. Young,9A?.1,6.179,186(Utah2004) 42 
Reliance Ins. Co. v. UtahDept. ofTransp., 858P.2d 1363, 1366-67 (Utah 1993) 45 
Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Investors, 471 A.2d735,737 (Md. App. 1984) 27 
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1006-07 (Utah App. 1989) 17, 18, 19, 38, 39 
Sandare Chem. Co., Inc. v. WAKOIntl, Inc., 820 S.W.2d21,23 (Tex. App. 1991) 
23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 36, 37 
Spackman exrel. Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc, 16 P.3d 533, 534 n. 2 (Utah 2000) 1 
Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 395 F.3d921 (8th Cir. 2005) 24, 33, 42 
Sulzer Carbomedics v. Oregon Cardio-Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449,455-56 (5th Cir. 2001) 29 
Try Hours, Inc. v. Swartz, 2007 Ohio 1328 (Ohio App. 2007) 32 
UZ Engineered Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 770N.E.2d 1068, 1083 
(Ohio App. 2001) 27 
Water & Entergy Sys. Tech. v. Keil, 48P.3d 888, 894 (Utah 2002) 33, 42 
Wirum & Cash v. Cash, 837 P.2d 692 712 (Alaska 1992) 44 
Zippertubing Co. v. TeleFlex Inc., 7 57 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1985) 26, 31, 33 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §13-24-4 33 
UtahR.App.P.24(a)(ll)(C) 48 
Other Authorities 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 396 (1958) 33, 42 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 16, 40 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979)15, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 36, 38, 46 
Restatement of the Law, Restitution § 136(1937) 34 
Rules 
Fed. R. Evid. 702 4 
Utah R. App. P. 41 5 
V 
Treatises and Legal Periodicals 
T. Leigh Anenson, Litigation Between Competitors With Mirror Restrictive Covenants: A 
Formula For Prosecution, 10 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 14-17(2005) 39 
Professor Corbin, 5 Corbin, Contracts, § 1025 43 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 559, 588 
(Dec. 2006) 41,43 
Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest, " and the Restatement of 
Contracts, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2021,2021 n. 1 (June 2001) 41 
Palmer, The Law of Restitution § 2.6, 80-81 (1978) 17 
Prosser &Keeton, Law of Torts § 129,1004 (5th ed. West 1984) 17 
VI 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, this matter is before the Utah Supreme 
Court upon a Certification of Question of State Law by the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Supreme Court has accepted the following questions for review: 
Question 1. Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to an award of lost 
profits damages, or instead an award of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, where a former 
employee has breached contractual non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee non-
solicitation provisions? 
Question 2. Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages 
for tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations? 
Standard of Review: When a federal court certifies questions of state law, the Court 
"answer[s] the legal question presented without resolving the underlying dispute." In re Kunz, 
99 P.3d 793,794 (Utah 2004) (quoting Spackman ex rel Spackman v. Bd. o/Educ, 16 P.3d 533, 
534 n. 2 (Utah 2000)). The Court accepts as true the facts described by the federal court. Id. at 
793-94. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES, STATUTES, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
No interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations are 
determinative of the questions of law certified for review. 
l 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Once upon a time, this case was "about honoring contracts [and] the financial 
consequences of knowing and volitional breaches . . . " Order Denying Motion For Preliminary 
Injunction, July 25,2006, (United States District Court for the District of Utah ("District Court"), 
Docket No. ("D.") 112) at 1. Subsequently, and as a predicate to this certification, it has become 
one in which Petitioners (collectively "TruGreen") have explicitly "proven the fact of damages," 
but nonetheless been denied relief because of questions concerning their amount. Order 
Addressing Certification, March 6,2007 (D. 275),1 at 2. 
On July 25, 2006, following extensive fact discovery and briefing by the parties, the 
District Court entered an order denying TruGreen injunctive relief for numerous breaches of 
contract involving several former employees and their new employer/TruGreen competitor, 
Respondent Mower Brothers, Inc. dba Scotts LawnService (hereinafter "Mower Bros." or 
"Scotts"). Order Denying Motion For Preliminary Injunction (D. 112). Beginning in 
November 2005 and continuing through approximately January 2006, these veteran employees 
departed en mass from TruGreen's Utah and Idaho branches at the behest of Mower Bros, and 
its principals, Respondents Kevin D. Bitton and Jean Robert Babilis, and began committing 
serious violations of their respective "Employee Confidentiality/Non-Compete Agreements" 
("Non-Compete Agreements"). Id. at 2. As alleged by TruGreen, these violations included 
employment with Mower Bros./Scotts in the same geographic areas and capacities in which they 
were previously employed with TruGreen, disclosure of confidential information, and the 
recruitment of other TruGreen employees. Id. While evidence presented by TruGreen for 
preliminary injunction '"unmistakably show[ed] a likelihood of success on the merits" and 
caused the District Court to remark that Respondents' actions "undoubtedly caused serious harm 
Submitted herewith in addendum. 
2 
to TruGreen," in the end, injunctive relief was denied on the District Court's determination that 
money damages could compensate TruGreen for its breach-of-contract and tortious interference 
claims. Id. at 1, 5-7. 
Fast forward to February 13, 2007. Following the District Court's request for a "quick 
resolution" by summary judgment and further briefing by the parties, Id. at 10-11, the District 
Court entered an order denying TruGreen summary judgment and granting judgment in favor of 
Respondents on several cross-motions, including the exclusion of TruGreen's expert damage 
witness. Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment, Granting Defendants' Motion to Strike Expert Report, and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
For Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order") (D. 253). Pursuant 
to this order, several TruGreen customer representatives, subsequently employed with Mower 
Bros, and later added as parties to the action, were removed from the case ; TruGreen's tortious 
interference claims against the employee-Respondents were denied; and more recent versions of 
the Non-Compete Agreements were found controlling—despite a prior ruling to the contrary3— 
to eliminate individual breach-of-contract claims. Id. at 1-3. Even so, what remained were the 
following contract and tort claims against the respective Utah and Idaho Respondents, 
substantively intact from the request for preliminary injunction: 
Following amendment to add these additional administrative and technical employees as 
parties, TruGreen specifically did not pursue summary judgment damages but focused instead on 
those employee-Respondents who were the subject of TruGreen's initial request for preliminary 
injunction and remain the subject this current certification. Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (D. 178) at vi n. 5. 
3
 In its July 25, 2006 Order Denying Motion For Preliminary Injunction (D. 112), the District 
Court originally ruled that these agreements "appear to supplement rather than replace" the 
specific provisions subsequently cut off in the February 13, 2007 Summary Judgment Order. 
Compare Order Denying Motion For Preliminary Injunction (D. 112) at 8; Feb. 13 Summary 
Judgment Order (D. 253) at 32 (finding "that the new agreements are the controlling 
documents"). 
3 
o Breach of non-competition provisions as to Respondents Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, 
Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker and Roehr; 
o Breach of non-disclosure provisions as to Respondents Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, 
Stephensen, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker and Roehr; 
o Breach of employee non-interference provision as to Respondents Mantz, Gaythwaite 
and Hiller; and 
o Tortious interference with economic and contractual relations as to Respondents 
Mower Bros., Scotts, Bitton, Babilis, Mantz, Hiller and Gaythwaite. 
o Unfair competition as to Mower Bros., Scotts, Bitton and Babilis. 
Id at 34. 
However, TruGreen's expert witness and report were ordered excluded from trial on the 
basis of Fed. R. Evid. 702 and what the District Court described as the expert's inability to 
explain how "profits earned by Scotts were in fact stolen away from TruGreen." Id at 37. 
Specifically, that TruGreen's calculation of damages, based on marked gains in Scotts' 
revenues,4 were not adequately buttressed to survive potentially confounding intervening causes 
of gains and losses raised by Respondents. Id. at 39. Consequently, the District Court 
questioned whether the entire case should be dismissed and ordered further briefing from the 
parties. Id. at 43. Additionally, the District Court denied TruGreen's claim for punitive 
damages. Id. 
As a result of this order, on February 28, 2007, the District Court convened a hearing on 
the impact of the damage expert's exclusion. It was at this hearing that the District Court 
acknowledged it did not completely understand TruGreen's damage theory of restitution, Motion 
4
 TruGreen Calculation of Claims (D. 169) at 6 (basing calculation of Scotts' revenue gains on 
terms within the employee-Respondents' respective Non-Compete Agreements and the 
assumption 'that courts have considered the gain achieved by defendants as a result of 
defendants' actions as an appropriate basis to determine the amount" of TruGreen's damages). 
4 
Hearing Transcript, February 28,2007, (D. 271)5 at 15:16-18,41:16-45:8, 56:17-57:6, but rather 
'thought [it] was ruling on sort of a lost profit damage calculation." Id. at 50:20-51:6. In 
response to TruGreen's recitation of the summary judgment record and several exhibits prepared 
by Respondents' own witnesses, the District Court tentatively ruled that while Idaho law 
recognized only a "lost profits" measure of damages for TruGreen's claims, Utah remained an 
open question. Id. at 61:8-63:18.6 Accordingly, the District Court concluded that it would 
certify the question of restitution or unjust enrichment damages to this Court, against the explicit 
backdrop "that TruGreen has proven the fact of damages but that questions remain as to 
the amount of damages." Order Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 2 (emphasis added). 
On June 8, 2006, the District Court granted Respondents' summary judgment motion 
with respect to the Idaho employees on the sole basis of lost profits damages (which TruGreen 
did not principally argue in summary judgment) and certified the above questions to this Court. 
Order Granting In Party and Denying In Part Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, 
June 8, 2006 ("June 8 Summary Judgment Order") (D. 286); Order Certifying Questions of Law 
to the Utah Supreme Court, June 8,2007 ("Order Certifying Questions") (D. 287).7 
As this action is thus currently poised, final ruling on the above-certified questions will 
have the actual effect of determining TruGreen's relief; the limited jurisdiction of this Court 
under Utah R. App. P. 41, notwithstanding. As summarized and argued below, a decision to 
sanction or disallow the recovery of Respondents' unjust gains will either permit justified claims 
of breach of contract and tortious interference to proceed, or alternatively preclude TruGreen 
outright from any relief. Against this factual and procedural backdrop and the District Court's 
5
 Docket No, 271 references a minute entry of this hearing. A full transcript of the hearing was 
requested as part of the record transferred from the District Court. 
6
 The District Court remarked, however, "If it were up to me, if I were the one that got to write 
the law, I would say the Massachusetts court [cited by TruGreen] has got it right. That restitution 
ought to be a reasonable measure of damages." 
7
 Submitted herewith in addendum. 
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notion that restitution is justified in this instance, see n. 4, supra, TruGreen respectfully requests 
that this Court answer certification that Utah law recognizes an award of restitution or unjust 
enrichment damages for the breach of non-competition covenants and a competitor's tortious 
interference with contractual and economic relations. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Conscious of this Court's acceptance of facts as described by the District Court, supra, 
but nonetheless faced with the practicality of arguing the merits of restitution on relatively few 
o 
written findings of liability (especially with the respect to Respondents' tortious conduct), 
TruGreen summarizes the following relevant facts as argued in the parties' summary judgment 
memoranda. Where appropriate, TruGreen has attempted to distinguish facts concluded by the 
District Court in its rulings from those disputed by Respondents: 
1. TruGreen is a lawn care company with offices throughout the United States. It is 
the nation's largest provider of residential lawn care and undertakes substantial marketing and 
sales efforts to establish and maintain its customer base. Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D. 
253) at 4. 
2. Employing many full-time individuals, TruGreen utilizes sales representatives 
who are responsible for selling TruGreen programs and services, compiling lists of prospective 
customers, engaging in person-to-person contacts by telephone and neighborhood marketing 
efforts, and following up with customer inquiry leads. Id. 
3. Branch marketing managers at TruGreen plan, direct, and coordinate marketing 
and sales efforts and branch managers have general oversight and control of a branch office, 
including marketing and sales. Id. 
See Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D. 253) at 4 ("Rather than recite the entire backdrop of 
this case, the court briefly recites the facts relevant to this order."). 
6 
4. TruGreen further alleges, and Respondents dispute, that depending on their 
position and degree of responsibility each employee receives an extensive and consistent 
regiment of specialized training, exposure to marketing and financial information, and other 
business practices which TruGreen considers confidential. Id; Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) at viii-xiv, ^ | 5-33; xxii, ^  55-57. 
5. Accordingly, TruGreen requires its employees to sign confidentiality and non-
competition contracts as a condition of their employment. Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order at 
5 (D. 253); Exhibits Al-9 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary 
Judgment (D. 178). 
6. Respondent Mower Bros, is a registered Utah corporation and franchisee of the 
Scotts service mark that operates branches in Utah, Idaho and Oregon. Scotts is a direct 
competitor of TruGreen and offers lawn care services that are substantially similar to that of 
TruGreen. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) at 
xiv-xv, TH| 34 and 36; Memorandum Opposing TruGreen's Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 
201) (offering no objection to the above-referenced facts and paragraphs). 
7. Under the original direction and ownership of Respondent Bitton, Mower Bros, 
first acquired its Scotts franchises in 2002 and 2004. Since late 2004, Respondent Babilis has 
directed Mower Bros.' affairs and been intimately involved in the day-to-day operations and 
development of the company. However, prior to Mower Bros.' acquisition of the Scotts 
franchises, neither Bitton nor Babilis had any experience whatsoever in the ownership and 
operation of a lawn care service business. In fact, the Mower Bros./Scotts franchise entity, as it 
currently operates, has only been functioning since 2005. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xv-xvi, fflj 36, 38-42; Memorandum Opposing 
7 
TruGreen's Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 201) (offering no objection to the above-
referenced facts and paragraphs). 
8. Like TruGreen, Respondent Mower Bros./Scotts has adopted and requires its own 
employees, including each of the respective employee-Respondents, to sign the same non-
competition contracts and restrictive covenants as TruGreen. Order Denying Motion For 
Preliminary Injunction (D. 112) at 10; Exhibits B1-9 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178). 
9. The genesis of this dispute stems from the departure of Respondent Ryan Mantz, 
a former branch manager of TruGreen's Ogden branch, who voluntarily resigned from TruGreen 
on or about November 1, 2005, and within weeks began working for Scotts in Ogden, Utah. 
Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D. 253) at 5. 
10. TruGreen alleges, and Respondents dispute, that Mantz immediately began 
recruiting other TruGreen employees in Utah and Idaho to join him at Scotts with the aid and 
encouragement of Mower Bros, and its principals, Bitton and Babilis. Id; Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xvi-xxii, ^ | 44-51; Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 232) at 11-14. 
11. TruGreen alleges that this encouragement and aid specifically included a written 
offer by Mower Bros, to Mantz, 
[Tjo provide all legal protection and pay all attorney fees and costs should 
[Mantz's] previous employer (Chemlawn / Tru-Green) elect to pursue any 
employment contract issues. 
Exhibit B1 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178). 
12. TruGreen alleges, and Respondents dispute, that under Babilis' leadership, 
Mower Bros, pursued Mantz and other veteran TruGreen employees in spite of their knowledge 
of the Non-Compete Agreements, with the intent to acquire and exploit TruGreen's marketing 
8 
and training expertise previously lacking in the newer and less-experienced Mower Bros./Scotts 
franchises. TruGreen further alleges that Babilis desired to cripple TruGreen by taking out its 
upper management and other key sales employees, thus boosting Mower Bros.' short-term sales 
and customer accounts with hopes of ultimately selling back one or more of its franchises to the 
Scotts corporate entity at an inflated value. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xvi-xxii, ^ 44-57. 
13. Since early 2006 through at least year-end, three of Mower Bros.' four branch 
marketing managers, including the Ogden, Salt Lake City, and Boise franchises, are former 
TruGreen branch marketing managers. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xxi, Tf 52; Memorandum Opposing TruGreen's Motion For 
Summary Judgment (D. 201) (offering no objection to the above-referenced facts and 
paragraph). 
14. Respondent Mantz is also a branch manager of Mower Bros.' Salt Lake City 
franchise and recognized as the Scotts' regional marketing manager. Feb. 13 Summary 
Judgment Order (D. 253) at 9. 
15. Additionally, the top five producers among all Mower Bros.' sales representatives 
for the year 2006 are all former TruGreen sales representatives. Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xxii, Tf 54; Memorandum Opposing 
TruGreen's Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 201) (offering no objection to the above-
referenced fact). 
16. Mantz started working for TruGreen in 1993 and was employed in various 
positions and in various geographic areas for over twelve years. While employed at TruGreen, 
Mantz entered into at least two Non-Compete Agreements. The first agreement, signed on April 
19, 1993, included a six-month post-termination non-compete provision. Feb. 13 Summary 
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Judgment Order (D. 253) at 9-10. The later, signed in 2003, prohibited Mantz only from 
competing with TruGreen during his employment and included additional non-solicitation, 
employee non-interference, and non-disclosure provisions. Id. at 9-10; Exhibit Al to 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178). 
17. Respondent Lary Gaythwaite was hired by TruGreen in 1998 as a sales 
representative in TruGreen's Boise branch. Thereafter, between December 1999 and November 
2005, Gaythwaite held a number of job titles with TruGreen, including branch manager and 
branch marketing manager, and worked in both Utah and Idaho. In November 2005, 
Gaythwaite left TruGreen and accepted a position with Scotts as its Salt Lake City branch 
marketing manager. Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D. 253) at 11. 
18. Respondents Dave Stephensen and Jim LeBlanc were hired by TruGreen in 1994 
and 2001, respectively. Both were hired as sales representatives, with Stephensen starting his 
work in TruGreen's Ogden office and LeBlanc working in the Boise and later Ogden branches. 
Both Stephensen and LeBlanc left TruGreen in January 2006, and soon thereafter started 
working for Scotts in its Ogden and Salt Lake City franchises, respectively. Id. at 11. 
19. During their employment with TruGreen, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen 
each signed at least two Non-Compete Agreements in favor of TruGreen. These agreements 
contain non-solicitation, non-interference and non-disclosure provisions that were very similar to 
the ones contained in the agreements signed by Mantz. Additionally, the non-competition 
provision in Gaythwaite's most recent agreement, signed in 2004, stated that Gaythwaite could 
not compete with TruGreen for one year following his employment in any geographic area in 
which he was assigned duties during the last six months of employment. Also, the non-
competition provision contained in the agreement signed by LeBlanc in 2002 stated that LeBlanc 
could not compete with TruGreen for six months following his employment with TruGreen in 
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any geographic area in which he was assigned duties during the last six months that he was 
employed by TruGreen. Id. at 11-12; Exhibits A3-5 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178). 
20. LeBlanc spent at least the last six months of his employment with TruGreen 
working at its Ogden branch in Clearfield, Utah. After leaving TruGreen, LeBlanc began 
working for Scotts in its Salt Lake City branch. Gaythwaite also spent the last six months of his 
employment in TruGreen's Ogden office, and after leaving, worked for Scotts in its Salt Lake 
branch office in Murray, Utah. There is some testimony, however, that Gaythwaite prepared 
budgets in Salt Lake City during his last six months of employment with TruGreen and that 
LeBlanc made collection calls out of Salt Lake City during his last six months of employment. 
Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D. 253) at 12. 
21. While Stephensen also signed two Non-Compete Agreements in favor of 
TruGreen containing the same restrictive covenants, the later contract stated that Stephensen's 
non-competition covenant was only valid while he was employed with TruGreen. Id. at 12. 
22. Respondents Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick Deerfield, and David Van Acker 
were each employed by TruGreen in its Boise branch as branch marketing manager and sales 
representatives, respectively. Each signed similar Non-Compete Agreements with non-
disclosure, non-solicitation and non-interference provisions, as well as a one-year post-
termination non-compete covenant. Upon their departure from TruGreen in November 2005 
through January 2006, each of these employees began working for Scotts in the same geographic 
area where they previously worked for TruGreen, namely, Boise. Id. at 13-15; Exhibits A2, 6-8 
to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178). 
23. Additionally, as part of Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, and Van Acker's employment 
with Mower Bros./Scotts, each was offered in writing a defense for all "claims made against 
n 
[them] by [their] previous employer" and/or assured that "[ajny legal fees [would be] taken care 
of in the event that action [was] taken against a violation of a non-compete agreement with 
[their] former company," TruGreen. Exhibits B2, 6-8 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178). 
24. TruGreen alleges, and Respondents dispute, that following the mass departure of 
its employees, it suffered a significant loss of critical management and sales personnel, which 
required the transfer of veteran sales representatives from other branches and the hiring and 
training of several new and inexperienced employees. Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction (D. 77) at lvii-lviii, fflf 127-29; Exhibit A to 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Damages (D. 260). 
25. Conversely, Respondent Mower Bros, experienced significant gains succinctly 
articulated in a March 6,2006 email memorandum issued by Mantz to Mower Bros.' ownership, 
including Bitton and Babilis: 
Sales Growth has occurred despite the dramatic drop in Mail Response. 
o As a region we have increased sales revenue 46% over last year. 
o Last year we had sold $617,000 
o This year we have sold $899,950 
o While Inquiries dropped 53% — sales rose 46% — This is a 99% swing in 
improvement! 
o Our sales team has improved immensely over last year. We could 
be going backwards as a business or simply staying flat with 3,700 
less Inquiries. 
o Take time to pat our Sales Managers on the back. They are really 
saving our bacon by teaching these guys how to maximize every 
lead. 
IN SUMMARY: 
While we should be very concerned about our current mail numbers, we are 
dominating last year's results. If we sold this year's [2006] low Inquiries at last 
year's [2005] efficiencies, we would have sold only $288,000. Instead of 
dwelling on crappy response rates, we are getting it done as a team. 
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I want to make sure everyone is aware of the success we are having and warn us 
against just talking about our dire response rates compared to last year. Thank our 
reps and sales managers for not turning in a $228,000 and getting us near to the 
near $900,000 mark through February! 
Exhibit J to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178); 
Memorandum Opposing TruGreen's Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 201) (offering no 
objection to the above-referenced email and content). 
26. As of that same day, March 6, 2006, the top five sales representatives producing 
these results were all former TruGreen employees. Exhibit J to Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178); Memorandum Opposing TruGreen's 
Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 201) (offering no objection to the above-referenced email 
and content). 
27. A later report submitted by Respondents' designated expert on January 30, 2007, 
exhibits the 2006 gains of Mower Bros, by branch and sales representative as follows9: 
Ogden 
TOTAL REVENUE 
Dave Stephensen 
Salt Lake City 
TOTAL REVENUE 
Jim LeBlanc 
Boise 
TOTAL REVENUE 
$1,452,244.93 
$280,744.49 
$1,398,045.50 
$374,705.89 
$777,884.67 
James Clogston $ 194,999.94 
David Van Acker $ 184,079.34 
RickDeerfield $120,764.41 
Exhibits 20, 20.1-4 to Expert Report o/Derk G. Rasmussen (D. 240); Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum on Damages (D. 260). 
9
 A breakdown remarkably similar to that offered in the excluded damage report from TruGreen. 
Exhibit 8 to Calculation of Claims by F. Wayne Elggren, CPA, CFE, CIRA. (D. 169). 
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28. As stated in paragraphs 13 and 14, supra, Respondent Mantz and a former 
TruGreen marketing manager, including Walker, Gaythwaite, and Hiller, presided over each of 
these branches and sales representatives, respectively. Moreover, each former TruGreen sales 
representative (with the exception Deerfield) exceeded in revenue the next highest Mower Bros, 
sales representative by at least six figures. Id. 
29. A discussion with the District Court of these and other facts as they relate to the 
issue of restitution/unjust enrichment damages is included in transcript from the above-
referenced February 28, 2007 hearing. Motion Hearing Transcript, February 28, 2007, (D. 271) 
at 17:5-20:25, 37:5-46:6, 80:2-82:9. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
With due respect to the District Court's statement of the issues, the order of contract first 
and tort second is pregnant with the suggestion that tort damages in this case are dependent upon 
an underlying determination of contract damages. To be sure, all Idaho claims against 
Respondents, including tort claims, were dismissed on the sole basis of Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 
59, 61 (Idaho App. 1983), a contract case,10 and the District Court's interpretation that Idaho 
permits only a "lost profits" measure of damages. June 8 Summary Judgment Order (D. 286) at 
6, 9-11. By disposing of all claims in this manner, however, such negates the recognition of 
separate and independent causes of action against the interfering Respondents whose catalytic 
actions precipitated the contract breaches and not the other way around. As argued below, just 
because a measure of damages (in this case restitution or unjust enrichment) may not be 
available in contract does not mean it is soundly precluded in tort. In other words, answer to 
Certified Question No. 2 is not dependent on Question No. 1. 
Specifically, a case addressing damages for breach of a non-competition covenant ancillary to 
the sale of business (and not an employment contract as here), and involving absolutely no claim 
for tortious interference. 
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Accordingly, TruGreen presents its arguments as follows: 
Certified Question No. 2 
The Utah Court of Appeal's adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A 
(1979) and its recognition of actual and consequential loss damages for tortious interference with 
contractual and economic relations does not foreclose restitution or unjust enrichment as a proper 
measure of damages. Cases from other jurisdictions under similar circumstances have held that 
notwithstanding the considerations of Section 774A, restitution is available for a competitor's 
inducement of massive breaches of non-competition agreements and that a plaintiff may recover 
damages measured by the defendant tortfeasor's gains. Moreover, cases which have declined to 
permit a restitutionary measure have done so on considerations of limited or no consequence to 
this case. 
Based on the facts and circumstances of this case and due to the nature of Respondents' 
tortious actions, the Court should answer that Utah law would permit recovery in favor of 
TruGreen under an unjust enrichment or restitutionary measure of damages. Specifically, 
because (1) the interests harmed by Respondents are comparable to other business torts which 
permit restitution, (2) the actual losses incurred by TruGreen are not readily ascertainable, (3) 
an award of Respondents' ill-gotten gains would not create a prima facie windfall in favor of 
TruGreen, (4) TruGreen's claims against the interfering Respondents sound in tort, not contract, 
and (5) Respondents should not be allowed to speculate that gains will exceed TruGreen's 
losses. 
11
 Order Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 2 ("As a backdrop for the certification 
issue, the court believes that TruGreen has proven the fact of damages but that questions 
remain as to the amount of damages."). 
15 
Certified Question No. 1 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is silent with respect to the use of a restitutionary 
(also referred to as "disgorgement" or '^ unjust enrichment") measure of damages as referenced in 
this case. This oversight is likely the consequence of the rare circumstances in which the theory 
is implicated. Courts have recognized that "classic" compensatory contract damages often fail to 
address the harm caused by a breach of a contract designed to protect legitimate business 
interests such as non-compete, non-disclosure and non-solicitation agreements. In these cases, 
the windfall obtained by the breaching party should be available for the non-breaching party's 
recovery. If not, as in this case, the breaching party gains from its breach. In recognition of this 
principle, Courts sometimes shape a theory of recovery that addresses the ill-gotten gains of the 
breaching defendant by using the breaching defendant's profits as a proxy or surrogate to 
measure damages. This is particularly true where, as in this case, parties attempt to provide for 
recognition of these damages through liquidated damages clauses that would provide the same 
restitutionaiy measure. This Court should consequently recognize the restitutionary measure of 
damages under contract law for the breaches of the non-competition, non-solicitation and non-
disclosure agreements in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court should answer in the affirmative to Certified Question No. 2 that 
Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for tortious 
interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations. 
The rough adherence displayed by Respondents to generally ensconced tort principles 
and Utah's adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A does not easily sidestep the 
1 9 
Section 774A provides that "[o]ne who is liable to another for interference with a contract or 
prospective contractual relation is liable for damages for (a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of 
the contract or the prospective relation; (b) the consequential losses for which the interference is 
a legal cause; and (c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if they are reasonably to be 
expected to result from the interference." 
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question of unjust enrichment or restitution as an available measure of damages for tortious 
inference with contractual and economic relations. Order Certifying Questions (D. 287) at 6-7 
(summarizing Respondents' argument that Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1006-07 (Utah 
App. 1989) "is fully instructive" on the issue of tort damages). While Utah has never addressed 
the issue, precedents from other jurisdictions indicate that courts are reluctant to accept the 
absence of restitution in Section 774 A as an outright preclusion of this remedy in all instances of 
tort damages as Respondents contend. In fact, courts have expressly permitted the same under 
particular circumstances, including a defendant employer's tortious interference with a 
competitor's non-competition covenants. Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts § 129, 1004 (5th ed. 
West 1984) ("There is authority permitting the plaintiff to recover the profits defendant made 
from inducing a breach of contract"); Palmer, The Law of Restitution § 2.6, 80-81 (1978). 
What is clear from these cases—many of which have been inadequately explained by 
Respondents—is that the analysis of unjust enrichment as an appropriate tort remedy in this case 
cannot consist of simply looking to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A or to factually-
1 Q 
confined appellate reviews of a plaintiffs lost profits calculation. Indeed, the cases reveal that 
Section 774A is not dispositive of Certified Question No. 2 and courts do not broadly brush aside 
unjust enrichment as an acceptable measure of damages for tortious interference. A measured 
examination is required of the particular facts and circumstances of the given case, the special 
interests harmed by the tortfeasor's interference, whether the potential lost profits or expectancies 
of the plaintiff are readily ascertainable and thus alternatively viable, whether the court is 
confronted with the peculiar problem of a prima facie windfall in favor of one party, and whether 
Defendants' Proposed Order Certifying Questions of Law to the Utah Supreme Court 
("Proposed Order Certifying Questions") (D. 277) at 8-9 n. 9 and 10 (citing without analysis 
numerous authorities as "recogniz[ing the proposition] that plaintiffs lost profits, and not 
restitution of defendant's revenues, are the proper measure of damages for tortious 
interference"). 
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the court will equate tort with contract and limit the plaintiffs remedy to underlying contractual 
damages. 
As discussed below, the facts and circumstances of this case suggest that unjust 
enrichment is an appropriate measure of damages for Respondents' tortious interference with 
TruGreen's contractual and economic relations. Given the inherent difficulty in quantifying 
damages from mass breaches of non-competition contracts (for which TruGreen preliminarily 
sought injunctive relief), that Respondents' gains are expressly attributed to the solicitation and 
hiring of TruGreen employees, that issues of disclosed confidential information, employee 
solicitation and unfair competition remain, and that TruGreen's damages against the interfering 
Respondents clearly sound in tort, answer to the District Court as to Certified Question No. 2 
should be in the affirmative. 
A. There is authority for permitting TruGreen to recover profits gained by 
Respondents for inducing mass breaches of the Non-Compete Agreements. 
As correctly indicated by the District Court, there is no controlling Utah authority 
addressing the issue of whether unjust enrichment can be a proper measure of damages for 
tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations. Order Certifying 
Questions (D. 287) at 2. In fact, as evidenced by Respondents' citations, the only cases 
addressing the issue of damages for tortious interference involve circumstances materially 
different from those here and specifically do not concern the competing interests of an interfering 
tortfeasor such as Respondents.14 Moreover, because of the nature of these cases, the gains of 
the interfering defendants were not even in issue. 
Defendants' Proposed Order Certifying Questions (D. 277) at 9 n. 10; Sampson, 110 P.2d at 
1000-02, 1007 (attorney's tortious interference with partnership entities to the detriment of client 
partners); Anderson Dev. Co., L.C v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 328-30, 334 (Utah 2005) (city 
residents' interference with developer's third-party contract for purchase of real estate); Penelko, 
Inc. v. John Price Assoc, Inc., 642 P.2d 1229, 1232-34 (Utah 1982) (assignee's interference with 
parking and signage to harm of lessee theater business); Globe Leasing Corp. v. Bank of Salt 
Lake, 586 P.2d 420 (Utah 1978) (bank's interference with leasing corporation's business). 
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Accordingly, there is nothing to suggest a recognition ot lost profits as the exclusive 
measure of damages. See Motion Hearing Transcript (D. 271) at 63:6-7 ("And Sampson 
[supra], while talking about loss to the plaintiff, doesn't seem to foreclose this other theory [of 
restitution]."). To the contrary, as the following authorities indicate, notwithstanding a state's 
basic adherence to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A and other general tort rules, restitution 
of a defendant's gains is not always rejected as an appropriate remedy for tortious interference 
with contractual and economic relations. What is more, in states which have denied unjust 
enrichment, the courts' holdings are based on conditions of limited or no consequence here; 
specifically restricting the plaintiffs tort damages to damages resulting from the underlying 
contractual breach and precluding an undisputedly punitive remedy or windfall to the incapable 
plaintiff. 
1. Cases from other jurisdictions have permitted recovery of damages 
based on profits or revenues realized by the interfering tortfeasor in spite 
of recognition of general tort remedies and the adoption of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 774A 
In the influential case of Natl Merchandising Corp. v. Leydon, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts was squarely confronted with the issue of unjust enrichment and massive 
breaches of employee non-compete agreements at the behest of a competing employer. 348 
N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976). In that case, the plaintiffs business consisted of sending salespersons 
into various geographic localities to sell advertising space printed on plastic covers for telephone 
directories. Id. at 772. In one year, a number of employees broke away from the plaintiffs 
business and thereafter commenced to work for a newly organized competing company in 
violation of their respective non-compete agreements. Id. The plaintiff commenced suit against 
these employees and the competing business for individual breaches of the agreements and 
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tortious interference, which resulted in the entry of a consent decree in favor of the plaintiff. Id. 
At or about this same time, another executive also departed from the plaintiffs employ and 
organized a competing business. Id. Following entry of the above consent decree, the executive 
solicited the management services of one of the enjoined employees and recruited several others 
to sell advertising for his business in violation of their terms of non-competition. Id. at 773. 
Actions for civil contempt and tortious interference were thereafter initiated against at least one 
of the breaching salesmen, the former executive, and his new business. Id. at 772. Specifically, 
the plaintiff charged that the former executive and his business improperly interfered with the 
consent decree, 'Viewed as an agreement" between the parties, and sought injunctive relief and 
damages. Id. 
At trial, judgment was entered against the defendants and the lower court awarded 
damages in amounts representing commissions gained by the breaching salesman as well as 
gross profits generated by the competing business under the enjoined employee's managership. 
Id. at 773. Each defendant was further enjoined from engaging in future activities violative of 
the consent decree. Id. 
On appeal, the defendants argued that the lower court's measure of damages was 
erroneous and excessive. The Supreme Judicial Court however upheld the award, not only as a 
measure approximating the plaintiffs loss in sales (determined as an amount which the plaintiff 
presumptively ccwas capable [of generating], had the interference not occurred," id. at 774-75), 
but also, alternatively, as an amount representing the defendant corporation's gross profits, which 
the Court expressly equated with the defendant's "unjust enrichment." Id. at 775-76. The Court 
15
 Terms of the decree were consistent with the employees' covenants not to compete in that 
each was enjoined "from soliciting or selling advertisements for telephone directory covers, from 
planning, supervising or managing such solicitations or sales, and from engaging in the 
manufacture or distribution of telephone directory covers, either on his or its own behalf or as an 
agent or employee of any person firm or corporation" in their respective geographic territories. 
Id 
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reasoned that "[a]n accounting of profits," or an approximation of the defendant's unjust 
enrichment, joined with an injunction, was a '"well understood feature of actions for 'business 
torts,'" such as unfair competition and trademark infringement, and compared well with the non-
compete interests harmed by the defendants' interference. Id. at 775. However, the Court also 
added, 
While the analogy to unfair competition and cognate torts is convenient, it is not 
necessary, for there is authority both in the case law and scholarly commentary 
for the direct proposition that an unjust enrichment measure is appropriate for 
willful interference with contractual relations. Need and reason combine to 
support this avenue of recovery because [i] it will often be difficult to satisfy 
strictly a conventional tort formula, and because [ii] an intending tortfeasor should 
not be prompted to speculate that his profits might exceed the injured party's 
losses, thus encouraging commission of the tort. Nor should such a defendant be 
heard to say that the unjust enrichment remedy is unfairly "punitive" because the 
plaintiff may recover more than his exact loss, when use of a [conventional] tort 
measure might allow the defendant to retain some part of his ill gotten gains. 
Id. at 775-76 (emphasis added) (citing among other authorities Fed. Sugar Refining Co. v. U.S. 
Sugar Equalization Board, Inc., 268 F. 575, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) ("The point is not whether a 
definite something was taken away from plaintiff and added to the treasury of defendant. The 
point is whether the defendant unjustly enriched itself by doing a wrong to plaintiff in such 
manner and in such circumstances that in equity and good conscience defendant should not be 
permitted to retain that by which it has been enriched.")). 
The Court further questioned a strict equivalence of conventional tort and contract 
damages, "particularly in an aggravated case like the [one at issue] where the defendants contrive 
deceptively to create the opportunity for massive breaches of contract... by a number of other 
persons." Id. at 776 n. 16. 
Since Natl Merchandising, other courts have followed Massachusetts' lead and adopted 
unjust enrichment as an appropriate measure of damages in circumstances involving a 
competing tortfeasor and declined to limit a plaintiffs recovery to "strictly a conventional tort 
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formula" as promoted by Respondents. This, notwithstanding the defendant's specific reliance 
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and general tort rules to shield against damages and 
liability. 
In Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., the defendant tortfeasor 
challenged the district court's approval of "restitutionary damages" by arguing that under the 
Restatement such a remedy was unavailable for tortious interference claims. 885 F.2d 683, 691 
n. 12 (10th Cir. 1989). Both plaintiff and defendant were competing gas pipeline companies 
who entered into a servicing agreement which required the plaintiff to sell, and the defendant to 
buy, specified quantities of natural gas. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline 
Co., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (D. Wyo. 1987), affd in part, refd in part, Colorado Interstate 
Gas, 885 F.2d 683. When the defendant intentionally stopped taking gas from the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff was forced to relinquish certain contract rights it held to purchase gas from a third-party 
supplier and could not ship the gas for other customers. Id. at 1456-57. The defendant thereafter 
acquired these same rights and began purchasing gas from the third-party supplier for sale to 
other customers while the plaintiff remained obligated to maintain a stagnant volume of 
unpurchased gas for the defendant. Id. at 1457, 1469. 
At trial, the plaintiff was awarded both consequential and restitutionary damages for the 
defendant's tortious interference with the plaintiffs third-party contract rights. Id. at 1478-79. In 
particular, the jury awarded the plaintiff restitution for profits received by the defendant for 
transporting the third-party gas to the defendant's customers. Id. In post-trial motions, the 
district court upheld both awards against the defendant.16 Id. at 1479. The court specifically 
16
 The district court however granted a limited remittitur in an amount of profits which the 
defendant did not receive because of a division in ownership of the defendant's gas pipeline. Id. 
("Only one-third of the Trailblazer Pipeline Company is owned by NGPL [defendant]. Forcing 
it to disgorge funds it did not receive would unfairly penalize NGPL. A remittitur of two-thirds 
of... the amount awarded as restitution for profits received by Trailblazer Pipeline Company is 
appropriate."). 
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affirmed that "[d]amages for tortious interference are based in contract, not tort" and stated that 
"[restitution has long been an accepted remedy for tortious interference with contract." Id. 
(citing comment d to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774 and, among several other authorities, 
Natl. Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775-76). Pointedly, the district court offered no alternative 
analysis that restitution of the defendant's profits represented an approximation of any of the 
potential "lost benefits" claimed by the plaintiff under its contract with the third-party supplier. 
Id at 1471. 
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the restitution award was subsequently upheld, in which 
the Court expressly agreed that 'the weight of authority holds that restitutionary damages are 
available for tortious interference with contract." Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 885 F.2d at 691 
n. 12 (citing the same authorities as the district court). 
In Sandare Chem. Co., Inc. v. WAKO Intl., Inc., the Texas Court of Appeals also cited 
Natl Merchandising as authority for its holding that "[a]n unjust enrichment measure of 
damages is appropriate for willful interference with contractual relations"; at least in situations 
where the plaintiffs lost profits are not readily ascertainable. 820 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. App. 
1991). At issue was the appellant-corporation's interference with the business relationship of the 
appellees, one of whom had previously contracted with the appellant for production of a medical 
diagnostic test. Id. Because of the appellant's tortious interference, the appellees were unable to 
pursue their plans to manufacture and market a medical diagnostic test, while the appellant 
proceeded to do so in competition. Id. The appellant-corporation challenged the lower court's 
award of damages for the appellee's failure "to prove the amount of any profit it lost as a result 
of the interference." Id. Like Natl Merchandising, however, the Court of Appeals upheld the 
decision notwithstanding the fact that no direct evidence established an amount of lost profits 
equal to the judgment. Id', Natl. Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775 n. 10. Because several 
23 
intervening causes potentially compromised such a measure, the Court concluded it was 
reasonable for the trial court to have impliedly determined that lost profits were not readily 
ascertainable and thus relied on the appellant's unjust gains. Id. at 24. 
Significantly, in reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals specifically rebuffed the 
appellant's reliance on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A as precluding recovery under an 
unjust enrichment theory. Id. at 24-25. After noting that none of the Texas cases cited by the 
appellant addressed "damages based on the defendant's profits where plaintiffs damages were 
not readily ascertainable," the Court concluded that the Restatement's silence on this particular 
issue did not preclude unjust enrichment against the defendant: 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 77 4A (1979) is a statement of the measure 
of damages generally applicable to tortious interference cases. It does not directly 
address the issue of whether one may recover the profits of the defendant in the 
event the plaintiffs lost profits are not readily ascertainable. If the absence of 
discussion concerning whether the defendant's profits may constitute the measure 
of damages when the plaintiffs lost profits are not readily ascertainable means 
that the Restatement has declined to adopt the rule as we have stated it, then we 
decline to adopt the Restatement section 774A as the measure of damages when 
the plaintiffs lost profit is not readily ascertainable because we find it not to be in 
accord with the authorities, which we find to support the better rule. 
Sandare argues that this court has previously adopted section 774A as the measure 
of damages in tortious interference cases [citations omitted] . . . We have 
examined all of theses cases and find that although the court in each case did rely 
on the Restatement section 774A as the measure of damages, none of the cases 
related to an issue as to whether the plaintiff might recover the defendant's lost 
profits where his own lost profit is not readily ascertainable. 
In Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys.y Inc., the United States Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals similarly ruled that restitution was an appropriate remedy for tortious interference with 
contractual relations; specifically, as to an employer's interference with the non-competition and 
non-disclosure covenants of a competitor's employees. 395 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2005). Like 
Colorado Interstate Gas and Sandare Chem., the Eighth Circuit recognized that general tort 
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rules and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A did not preclude recovery of a tortfeasor's 
ill-gotten gains. 
In that case, the defendant corporation hired several former employees of the plaintiff in 
violation of what the Court determined as non-competition and non-disclosure covenants in 
favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 926. Noting Minnesota's adherence to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 774A, the Court of Appeals held that where Minnesota courts had specifically 
contemplated restitution in cases of breached employment covenants and ancillary fiduciary 
duties, such a remedy was likewise appropriate against the employing tortfeasor. Id. at 925-26 
(citing Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 94-95 (Minn. 1979) 
(holding that ccwhere an employee wrongfully profits from the use of information obtained from 
the employer, the measure of damages may be the employee's gain"). The Court ruled that 
"[w]hen the underlying wrong would have supported a claim of restitution, so should a claim for 
inducing that wrong." Id. at 925; but see Natl. Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 776 n. 16 
(questioning the parity of tort and contract damages, particularly in aggravating circumstances); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A, comment d ("The action for interference with contract is 
one in tort and damages are not based on contract rules"). 
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit concluded 41hat Minnesota courts would allow a 
restitutionary measure remedy in a case in which the interference alleged was inducing an 
employee's breach of noncompetition and nondisclosure covenants and fiduciary duties." Id. at 
1 7 
The Eighth Circuit, however, ultimately rejected the plaintiffs request for damages on 
foundational grounds. Id. at 926-29. Specifically, the court did not find evidentiary support for 
the plaintiffs contention that the full purchase price for the defendant's subsequent acquisition 
was wholly attributable to the defendant's interference in hiring the employees. Id. Such issues 
of causation are not before the Court on this certification. Nonetheless, as summarized in the 
above Statement of Relevant Facts, ^f 25-29, supra, TruGreen argues that it has presented 
sufficient evidentiary basis to support its claim for restitution of Respondents' ill-gotten gains 
during the prohibitory periods in question. 
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In Zippertubing Co. v. TeleFlex Inc., the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled under New Jersey law that plaintiffs were properly awarded compensatory damages in an 
amount determined by the defendant tortfeasor's unlawful gains. 757 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1985). 
The defendant, a supplier to the plaintiff-contractor and subcontractor, was found liable for 
tortious interference after contracting directly with the plaintiffs' customer. Id. at 1404-06. 
Under its original quotation to the plaintiff-subcontractor, the defendant would have earned 
significantly less revenue from the job at issue than what it eventually profited directly from the 
customer. Id. at 1406 (Under its quotation to Surf, Teleflex would have received $1,100,320.00 
and made a net profit of $715,205. . . . Subsequent modifications to the Nab-Teleflex contract 
increased Teleflex's revenue to $3,259,248.00 and its profit to something in excess of 
$2,000,000."). Notwithstanding this significant increase, a jury awarded the plaintiffs 
$2,000,000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 1404. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs "disgorgement" theory for recovery 
of ill gotten profits could not be sustained under New Jersey law and that the lower court's award 
of damages was in error. Id. at 1406. While the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of a loss 
in anticipated profits, they had not attempted to establish the amount of such loss and instead had 
relied on the larger $2,000,000 amount profited by the defendant supplier as a result of its 
wrongdoing. Id. at 1411. Relying on constructive trust principles from early New Jersey 
opinions and other precedent concerning "the analogous business tort of misappropriation of 
business name," the Court upheld the award as "consistent with the policy of discouraging 
tortious conduct by depriving the tortfeasor of the opportunity to profit from wrongdoing." Id. 
(approving the lower court's jury instruction "to award such damages as would deprive the 
defendant of any unlawful benefit of its unlawful conduct"). 
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2. Cases relied upon by Respondents do not address the issue of unjust 
enrichment or they deny the remedy on grounds distinguishable from 
this case. 
Similar to the appellant in Sandare, the majority of cases relied upon by Respondents as 
authority for "limiting damages to lost profits" do not address whether a plaintiff can 
alternatively claim unjust enrichment or restitution as a remedy for tortious interference. 
Defendants' Proposed Order Certifying Questions (D. 287) at 8-9 n. 9. Many are limited in their 
opinion to strictly an analysis of lost profits where unjust enrichment was not claimed by the 
1 O 
plaintiff as a damage remedy and consequently not discussed by the court. What is more, due 
to the nature of many of these cases, the amount of the defendant's gains was not even in issue or 
of potential relevance.19 Other cases preclude the plaintiff from recovery on other grounds20 As 
15
 KWPlastics v. U.S. Can Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (plaintiff claiming 
only lost profits resulting from defendant's tortious interference with prospective business 
relationships); Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 982 P.2d 945, 951-52 (Idaho App. 
1999) (plaintiff seeking damages for general decline in sales from experienced replacement); 
Dowd & Dowd, Ltd v. Gleason, 816 N.E.2d 754, 770-71 (111. App. 2004) (claim based on 
plaintiffs expert report of out-of-pocket and lost profits damages); Burk v. Heritage FoodServs. 
Equip., Inc., 11*1 N.E.2d 803, 816-17 (Ind. App. 2000) (review of preliminary injunction and 
plaintiffs failure to provide any damage evidence at all); Fowler v. Printers II, Inc., 598 A.2d 
794, 806 (Md. Spec. App. 1991) (plaintiff seeking to recover only the profits lost on eight 
specific customer accounts solicited by defendant); Excel Indus. Elecs. v. Blanco, 1998 Mich. 
App. LEXIS 1824 (Mich. App. 1998) (plaintiff presenting only evidence of overall decrease in 
sales); UZ Engineered Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 770 N.E.2d 1068, 1083 (Ohio 
App. 2001) (plaintiffs calculation of past and future losses attributable to defendant's tortious 
interference); Clifford McFarland Read & Lundy, Inc. v. Brier, 1998 R.I. Super. LEXIS 68 (R.I. 
Super. 1998) (plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for lost profits resulting from solicited 
customer and decrease in profit margin); Lien v. Northwestern Engr. Co., 39 N.W.2d 483, 484-
86, 489-90 (S.D. 1949) (plaintiff recovering lost profits it "might have made" on materials sold 
directly to defendant by owner in contravention of exclusivity agreement). 
19
 Innovative Fin. Servs., LLC v. Urban, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 775 (Conn. Super. 2005) 
(solicitation of employee by plaintiffs client for bookkeeping services); Barlow v. Intl. 
Harvester Co., 522 P.2d 1102, 1107-09, 1117-18 (Idaho 1974) (employees and franchisor's 
disparagement of dealership owner resulting in termination of franchise and closure of business); 
Rite Aid Corp v. Lake Shore Investors, 471 A.2d 735, 737 (Md. App. 1984) (lessee's 
interference with contract of lessor to sell property resulting in third-party's withdrawal from 
contract); Potthoffv. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 771, 773-744 (Minn. App. 1985) (former 
employer's interference resulting in termination of plaintiffs new employment); D'Andrea v. 
Calcagni, 723 A.2d 276 (R.I. 1999) (minority owners' interference resulting in termination of 
plaintiffs employment). 
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discussed supra, the fact that these cases, like Utah, generally recognize or adopt the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 774A does not dispose of the question of restitution. 
Likewise, the cases which do confront the issue of unjust enrichment present facts and 
circumstances distinguishable from this case and make other considerations at odds even with 
Section 774A (for example, equating tort with contract damages). Although these courts decline 
to award unjust enrichment, each appears limited to the facts of the particular case and does not 
appear to impose the blanket prohibition suggested by Respondents. 
In the decision of Marcus, Stowel & Beye Govt Sec, Inc. v. Jefferson (a case specifically 
distinguished by Sandare, 820 S.W.2d at 24), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled under 
Texas law that a plaintiff sales broker could not recover the full amount of profits received by the 
defendant from interference with the plaintiffs exclusive brokerage agreement. 797 F.2d 227 
(5th Cir. 1986). Pursuant to that agreement, the plaintiff was authorized to act as the exclusive 
loan broker of a business for the sale of its mortgage portfolio and entitled to a specified sales 
commission. Id. at 229. When the defendant began actively soliciting purchasers and ultimately 
completed sales transactions in favor of the business and to the exclusion of the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff sought recovery against the defendant for tortious interference. Id. at 239-30. 
Specifically, the plaintiff sought damages based on the defendant's profits rather than the 
plaintiffs contract damages. Id. at 230. 
In denying the plaintiff this relief, the Fifth Circuit observed that because the defendant 
under its own agreement with the business received twice the commission that the plaintiff 
would have received, the profits of the defendant materially exceeded the damages suffered by 
the plaintiff. Id. at 231 (respective agreements providing that plaintiff and defendant would earn 
20
 Kforce, Inv. v. Surrex Solutions Corp., 436 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff precluded from 
pursuing separate cases against breaching employee and interfering employer); Di Loreto v. 
Shumake, 38 Cal. App. 4th 35 (Cal. App. 1995) (plaintiff precluded from pursuing emotional 
distress damages for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage). 
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one-half and one percent commissions). Because both damages and profits were directly 
determinable by the parties' respective agreements, the Court expressly limited the plaintiffs 
recovery to contract damages notwithstanding the claim's foundation in tort. Id. (citations to 
Texas authorities omitted). Consequently, under the general contract theory that "the injured 
party [be placed] in the same economic position it would have been in had the contract not been 
breached," the Court rejected a disgorgement of the defendant's profits and limited the plaintiffs 
recovery to the lost commissions specified in its own agreement. Id. (further commenting on the 
argument of efficient breach and the availability of punitive damages for "particularly egregious" 
conduct). However, as distinguished by Sandare, supra, the Court specifically reserved any 
opinion on "whether Texas courts would permit recovery based on [a] defendant's profits where 
[the] plaintiffs loss could not be directly determined." Id. at n. 5 (citing Natl. Merchandising, 
348 N.E.2d 771, and the Massachusetts' court "need" in looking to the defendant's profits 
"given the difficulty of determining the plaintiffs losses"). 
Since Marcus, Texas law has also clarified that the measure of damages for breach of 
contract and tortious interference with contract may not necessarily be the same. Sulzer 
Carbomedics v. Oregon Cardio-Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449, 455-56 (5th Or. 2001) (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A, comment d). 
hi Am. Air Filter Co., Inc. v. McNichol, the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
also declined to apply unjust enrichment against an interfering tortfeasor under general contract 
principles. 527 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975). In a suit initiated against a former employee and his 
new employer, the plaintiff charged the two defendants with breach of contract and tortious 
interference, respectively, for violations of a restrictive covenant in an employment contract. Id. 
at 1298. Pointedly, the new employer had no knowledge of the restrictive covenant prior to its 
hiring of the employee. Id. at 1299. Applying either Kentucky or Pennsylvania law, the Court 
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of Appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to impose an accounting for profits on the defendant 
employer. Id. at 1300. 
However, in reaching this decision, the Court expressly confined its opinion to the 
plaintiffs "pecuniary losses" despite noting a divergence of potential tort remedies comparable 
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A. Id. ("In this case, there are no injuries alleged 
other than pecuniary losses resulting from McNichol's employment with Scanlan."). Like 
Marcus, the Court determined that "ffln these circumstances [of a single employee's breach and 
an employer's unknowing interference], the measure of damages for interference with 
contractual relations [would] be identical to that for breach of contract." Id. (emphasis added). 
Consequently, the Court reasoned: 
To compel defendant to disgorge these profits could give plaintiff a windfall and 
penalize the defendant, neither of which serves the purpose of contract damages. 
Id. (further noting ccthat a defendant's profits are not the measure of a contract plaintiffs losses") 
(emphasis added). 
In Developers Three v. Nationwide Ins. Co., the Ohio Court of Appeals also declined to 
adopt an unjust enrichment measure of damages in what the Court determined was a claim for 
tortious interference. 582 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (Ohio App. 1990) ("we can best characterize 
plaintiffs claim as one for tortious interference"). At issue was the plaintiffs sale of certain 
options to the defendants for purchase of real estate. Id. at 1131. The plaintiff, represented by a 
dissatisfied partnership interested, claimed the defendants wrongfully induced the plaintiffs 
partners into breaching fiduciary duties and selling the options. Id. at 1133. In its action against 
the defendants, the plaintiff explicitly disclaimed a measure of damages based upon its lost 
profits or lost expectancy and argued that irrespective of amount restitution of the defendants' 
Providing i4the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract" as only one of the available 
damages for tortious interference. 
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profits was justified. Id. at 1132. The defendants, however, challenged the appropriateness of 
this remedy and argued that because the plaintiff did not have the same ability as defendants to 
develop the property in question, the plaintiffs actual loss was much less than the defendant's 
gain. Id. 
In reaching its decision to deny the plaintiff relief, the Court of Appeals considered at 
length the pros and cons of allowing an award of damages based upon a theory of unjust 
enrichment. Id. at 1133-36 (citing among other authorities Natl. Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 
775-76; Fed. Sugar Refining, 268 F. at 582-83; Zippertubing, 757 F.2d at 1411-12; Am. Air 
Filter, 527 F.2d at 1300). Ultimately, however, the Court held that it was "reluctant to abandon a 
purely compensatory damage formula unless policy and precedent clearly supported] an unjust 
enrichment theory of recovery," which the Court concluded in that particular instance did not. 
Id. at 1135 ("We conclude that neither supports such a recovery in this instance.")- Specifically, 
similar to Marcus, the Court reasoned that in appropriate cases, punitive damages would serve 
the same function as an unjust enrichment recovery, and that precedent, such as Natl 
Merchandising and Zippertubing, did not squarely confront the particular "windfall" problem 
before the Court; namely, "of a plaintiff recovering the defendant's profits that [undisputedly] 
exceed the plaintiffs actual loss."22 Id. Consequently, the Court decided that the "plaintiffs 
Though Natl Merchandising did in fact address the flipside argument that "[n]or should a 
defendant be heard to say that the unjust enrichment measure is unfairly 'punitive' because the 
plaintiff may recover more than his exact loss, when use of a [conventional] tort measure might 
allow the defendant to retain some part of his ill gotten gains." 348 N.E.2d at 433. And 
Zippertubing did uphold a complete disgorgement of profits notwithstanding the fact that 
because of outsourcing to the defendant the plaintiffs would have contracted for significantly less 
lost profits. 757 F.2d at 1406; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A, comment c 
(commenting that "[a] major problem with damages [resulting from interference with contract 
relations] is whether they can be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty," and that "due 
weight [may be given] to the fact that the question was [only] 'made hypothetical by the very 
wrong' of the defendant."). 
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correct measure of damages in this tortious interference action" was the plaintiffs loss and not 
the defendant's gain. Id. at 1136 (emphasis added). 
Since the Developers Three decision, however, the Ohio Court of Appeals has limited 
this ruling and recognized that in certain circumstances, "an accounting of the tortfeasor's 
profits" would be appropriate. See Try Hours, Inc. v. Swartz, 2007 Ohio 1328 (Ohio App. 2007) 
(finding "support in Ohio for using an accounting of the tortfeasor's profits, gained through 
misappropriation of trade secrets, breaches of fiduciary or confidential relationships, and 
breaches of non-competition agreements, in calculating a business's damages"); Miller Med. 
Sales, Inc. v. Worstell, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 6251 (1993) ("We do not disagree with the 
contention that plaintiff would be entitled to the higher amount of either plaintiffs lost profits or 
defendant's gain."). 
B. Based on the interests and circumstances of this case, TruGreen should be 
permitted to recover the gains realized by Respondents for tortiously 
inducing breaches of the Non-Compete Agreements and interfering with 
TruGreen's economic relations. 
TruGreen seeks damages incurred as a result of Respondents' inducement of massive 
breaches of the Non-Compete Agreements and interference with TruGreen's economic relations. 
See Amended Complaint (D. 115) at fflj 126-138. At the heart of this contention is Respondents' 
ability to purloin a ready-made management and sales force and within weeks create an 
efficiently operated business model fashioned in the mold of TruGreen. See Statement of 
Relevant Facts at ^  9-15, 24-29, supra. As alleged, this interference has resulted in a realization 
of significant revenue gains to Respondents and correspondingly diminished sales performance 
by TruGreen. See id. at ^ fl} 24-26; Exhibit J to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Summary Judgment (D. 178) ("Thank our reps and sales managers [i.e., former TruGreen reps 
and sales managers] for not turning in a $228,000 and getting us near to the near $900,000 mark 
through February!"). With respect to all Utah-related claims, the contractual covenants 
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negotiated by TruGreen as protection against this very occurrence remain at issue before the 
District Court, as do the overarching tort claims precipitating their mass breach. Order 
Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 1. Like the above cases that affirm restitution damages, 
here, the following considerations merit an affirmative response to Certified Question No. 2. 
1. The special interests of this case are comparable to other "business torts" 
which permit restitution of a defendant's ill-gotten profits. 
As the facts and history of this case demonstrate, an award of unjust enrichment would be 
well aligned with the remedies available for similar business torts. See Natl Merchandising, 348 
N.E.2d at 775 ("an approximation of the defendant's 'unjust enrichment'—often joined with an 
injunction, has been a well understood feature of actions for 'business torts' such as unfair 
competition (passing off) and trade name, trademark, and copyright infringement"); see also 
Storage Tech., 395 F.3d at 925; Zippertubing, 757 F.2d at 1411. Under statutorily prescribed 
remedies and other authorities, damages for misappropriation of trade secrets, for example, can 
include both actual losses and the defendant's unjust enrichment. See e.g. Water & Entergy Sys. 
Tech. v. Keil, 48 P.3d 888, 894 (Utah 2002) (relying on Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-4)23. Where 
contractually defined "confidential information" is only one step removed from a "trade secret," 
see Medspring Group, Inc. v. Feng, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1279 (D. Utah 2005), there is 
authority that the same damage remedy applies. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 396 
(1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, after the termination of the agency, the agent... has a duty to 
account for profits made by the sale or use of trade secrets and other confidential information"24); 
see also Dubuque Prod, Inc. v. Lemco Corp., F. Supp. 108, 123 (D. Utah 1983) (with respect to 
"Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriate and the unjust 
enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss." 
24
 See also comment g, "Trade secrets and other similar private information constitute assets of 
the principal. Their subsequent use by a former agent is as improper as the use of other assets, 
and, whether or not the use is in competition, it is the basis for a restitutional claim . . ." 
(Emphasis added). 
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a business tort, a plaintiff may recover "profits retained by the defendant... by reason of the 
breach of confidential information and unfair competition"). Furthermore, and important to 
circumstances here, case law permits an employer to protect against and recover for the loss of a 
broader range of customers than simply past and existing contacts when additional and 
correspondingly broader protectable interests are at issue, including confidential information and 
employee investment. See e.g. Intermountain Eye & Laser Centers, P.L.L.C v. Miller, 127 P.3d 
121, 129 (Idaho 2005) ("that employers are entitled to protect themselves from competition for 
their existing or past customers cannot necessarily be extrapolated to mean those are the only 
customers that an employer can protect"). Accordingly, as captured in the Restatement of the 
Law, Restitution § 136 (1937), when "[a] person who has tortiously used a trade name, trade 
secret, franchise, profit a prendre, or similar interest of another, [he] is under a duty of restitution 
for the value of the benefit thereby received." (Emphasis added). 
Here, TruGreen's claim may be viewed as one for impairment of goodwill, exploitation 
of confidential information and overall interference with the legitimate expectations of TruGreen 
in preserving an experienced management and sales force against the predatory onslaught of a 
competitor. Such interests lie close to the business torts mentioned above and would merit 
application of a similar restitutionary measure for Respondent's tortious interference. See Natl 
Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775. 
2. The damages resulting from Respondents' interference and inducement 
of breaches of the Non-Compete Agreements are not readily 
ascertainable and merit a restitutionary measure. 
The fact that TruGreen may be unable to quantify with ready precision the damages 
resulting from Respondents' interference and inducement of breaches of the employee Non-
Compete Agreements does not render TruGreen's damages illusory or insignificant. Order 
Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 2 ("[T]he court believes that TruGreen has proven the fact 
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of damages but that questions remain as the amount of damages"). Indeed, the difficulty of 
measuring such pecuniary losses expressly formed one of the bases for TruGreen's preliminary 
request for injunctive relief. See Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 
F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2004) (listing among other factors an "inability to calculate damages" 
as supporting a determination of irreparable harm for preliminary injunction); Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs} Motion For Preliminary Injunction (D. 77) at 23. This 
reality of circumstance is neither unique to TruGreen nor unusual of restrictive covenants in 
general, as evidenced by the parties' respective contracting language and cases of this Court 
which have addressed the issue: 
In the event of breach or threatened breach by me of any provision of this 
Agreement, the damages which TruGreen might suffer would be difficult or 
impossible to measure, and therefore, TruGreen shall be entitled to an injunction. 
. . Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting TruGreen from pursuing any 
other remedies available to it for such breach or threatened breach including, but 
not limited to, the recovery of damages from me in an amount equal to the 
revenues gained by or from the breach. 
Exhibit A5 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) 
(Non-Compete Agreement of Respondent Jim LeBlanc executed in favor of TruGreen) 
(emphasis added). 
In the event of a breach or threatened breach by me of any provision of the 
Agreement, the damages which SLS [Scotts Lawn Service] might suffer would 
be difficult or impossible to measure and, therefore, SLS shall be entitled to an 
injunction . . . Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting SLS from 
pursuing any other remedies available to it for such breach or threatened breach 
including, but not limited to, the recovery of damages from me in an amount 
equal to the revenues gained by or from the breach. 
Exhibit B5 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) 
(Non-Compete Agreement of Respondent LeBlanc executed in favor of Respondent Mower 
Bros./Scotts) (emphasis added); see also Systems Concepts, 669 P.2d at 427-28 (recognizing for 
purposes of injunctive relief "irreparable injury" as "[wjrongs . . . which occasion damages that 
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are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard," including misappropriation 
of confidential information and goodwill). 
More than creating a potential for injunctive relief, where the lost profits suffered by 
TruGreen "are not readily ascertainable,"25 this Court would be justified in following the 
reasoning of Sandare and Natl Merchandising and permitting a restitutionary measure of 
damages for Respondents' tortious interference with TruGreen's contractual and economic 
relations (Utah's past recognition of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774 A notwithstanding). 
Sandare, 820 S.W.2d at 23-25, Natl Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 776 ("Need and reason 
combine to support this avenue of recovery [under an unjust enrichment measure], because it 
will often be difficult to satisfy strictly a conventional tort formula"). Unlike the circumstance of 
Marcus, 797 F.2d at 229-30, the adjudicator of TruGreen's tort claims cannot look to the 
interfered contracts or other written instrument for a ready measure of lost profits damages. 
(Although both TruGreen and Scotts do seemingly agree that "the revenues gained by or from 
the [underlying] breach[es]," supra, would be an adequate substitute). Notwithstanding that 
calculating such damages in this case is expressly recognized as an "extremely difficult" 
undertaking, this reality should not be construed as a continued basis for denying TruGreen relief 
or adding insult to injury in favor of Respondents. June 8 Summary Judgment Order (D. 286) at 
9. Indeed, due weight must be given to the consideration that the Certified Question before this 
Court was only "made hypothetical by the very wrong" of Respondents and not the other way 
around. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A, comment c. 
25
 Though the District Court presumptively concluded that TruGreen's damages are in some 
degree calculable, it by no means made a determination that damages were "readily 
ascertainable" in denying injunctive relief. See Order Denying Preliminary Injunction (D. 112) 
at 1 (holding ;cthat injunctive relief is not warranted here because money damages [in some 
form] can compensate TruGreen for any breaches."). In fact, the District Court has expressly 
declared otherwise. See June 8 Summary Judgment Order (D. 286) at 9 ("The court recognizes 
that calculating damages in these types of cases can be extremely difficult"). 
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Consistent with authorities such as Natl Merchandising and Sandare, therefore, policy 
and precedent support an unjust enrichment theory of recovery in this instance. 
3. Restitutionary damages against Respondents would not create a prima 
facie "windfall" in favor of TruGreen. 
Although Developers Three indicated that compelling a defendant "to disgorge [its] 
profits could give [a] plaintiff a windfall and penalize the defendant," 582 N.E.2d at 1134 
(quoting Am. Air Filter, 527 F.2d at 1300), other courts equally consider that "a defendant 
[should not] be heard to say that the unjust enrichment remedy is unfairly 'punitive' because the 
plaintiff might recover more than his exact loss, when use of a [conventional] tort measure might 
allow the defendant to retain some part of his ill gotten gains." Natl Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d 
at 776. 
What is more salient to this case, however, and equally distinguishable from cases like 
Developers Three, is that an award of restitutionary damages would not create a prima facie 
windfall in favor of TruGreen. Again, unlike Marcus, 797 F.2d at 231, there is no underlying 
instrument to cap liability at something TruGreen "would have received" absent Respondents' 
interference. And it is far from undisputed that Respondents' success is wholly attributable to 
some detached source or Respondents' unique capabilities. Contrast Developers Three, 582 
N.E.2d at 1132 (argument that plaintiff did not have defendants' ability to develop the property 
in question). Rather, the immediate success of Respondents (at least according to regional 
marketing manager Mantz) is wholly attributable to former TruGreen sales managers and 
representatives now employed with Respondents. See Exhibit J to Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) ("Thank our reps and sales managers for not 
turning in a $228,000 and getting us near to the near $900,000 mark through February!"). 
Moreover, "once a defendant has been shown to have caused a loss, . . . the reasonable 
level of certainty required to establish the amount of a loss is generally lower than that required 
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to establish the fact or cause of a loss." Sampson, 770 P.2d at 1007 (quoting CookAssocs., Inc. 
v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis in original). Here, TruGreen has 
already established (for purposes of this certification) that Respondents have caused a loss and 
consequently it is Respondents ;twho must assume the risk of some uncertainty" in fashioning an 
appropriate remedy. Id. (quoting Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Utah); Order Addressing 
Certification (D. 275) at 2 ("[T]he court believes that TruGreen has proven the fact of damages 
but that questions remain as the amount of damages"). As the above-stated facts indicate, 
TruGreen has adequately claimed a rational basis between the unprecedented gains of 
Respondents and the departure of its management force and veteran sales employees. See 
Statement of Relevant Facts at ^ 25-27, supra. And in applying an unjust enrichment measure 
there is nothing unreasonable in taking the gross '"tainted" sales of Respondents under the 
management of individuals like Mantz as TruGreen's damages. See Nat. Merchandising, 348 
N.E.2d at 774-75 (damages measured as a percentage of sales26 made by defendant under the 
breaching employee's managership). 
4. Given the nature of the intentional torts precipitating the respective 
contract breaches, the Court should not restrict TruGreen to strictly a 
"lost profits" contract measure of damages. 
Especially pertinent to this case is the Natl. Merchandising puzzlement that the same 
measure of lost profits damages should always apply to one who tortiously induces a breach of 
contract as to one who actually commits the breach; "particularly in an aggravated case like the 
present where the defendants contrive deceptively to create the opportunity for massive breaches 
of contract... by a number of other persons." 348 N.E.2d at 776 n. 16. After all, at least with 
respect to consequential damages, the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A is 
clear: 
26
 Under Natl. Merchandising, there is further authority that this percentage of sales or profit 
margin of the defendant tortfeasor can be based on that of the plaintiff. 348 N.E.2d at 775 n. 9. 
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The action for interference with contract is one in tort and damages are not based 
on the contract rules, and it is not required that the loss incurred be one within the 
contemplation of the parties to the contract itself at the time it was made. 
Commend d (emphasis added); see also Sampson, 770 P.2d at 1007; Colorado Interstate Gas, 
661 F. Supp. at 1479 ("Damages for tortious interference are based in contract, not tort."). 
Given the sheer number of departed employees and management personnel, this action is 
not, suffice it to say, a case of Am. Air Filter and a single departed salesman employed in 
ignorance of a restrictive covenant. 527 F.2d at 1299-1300 (restricting damages against the 
unknowing employer to the same contract damages measured against the breaching employee). 
And "the purpose of contract damages" heavily considered in that case becomes less relevant in 
light of the fact that TruGreen never had an opportunity to contemplate in contract the size and 
scope of the induced employees' mass breaches and departure. Id. at 1300. 
The consciousness and scope of interference displayed by Respondents merits 
recognition of a damage measure independent of the contract breaches induced. Even more so, 
considering that punitive damages in this case are uniquely unavailable to "counterbalance" the 
preclusion of an unjust enrichment theory. See Developers Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1135 (citing 
M*rcwy, 797 F.2d at 232). 
In summary to Certified Question No. 2, therefore, the counsel of Natl. Merchandising is 
well taken in this case that an intending tortfeasor like Respondents should not be prompted to 
speculate on profits exceeding TruGreen's losses or that alternative relief will be unavailable. 
348 N.E.2d at 776; see Statement of Relevant Facts <|[ 12, supra (disputed testimony regarding 
Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D. 253) at 43-44 (District Court's denial of punitive 
damages); but see T. Leigh Anenson, Litigation Between Competitors With Mirror Restrictive 
Covenants: A Formula For Prosecution, 10 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 14-17 (2005) (addressing 
the hypocrisy of a defendant employer's own use of restrictive covenants in its employment 
contracts as potential justification for an award of punitive damages for tortious interference); 
Exhibit B5 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) 
(mirror restrictive covenants executed by Respondents). 
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Respondents' intention to sell back Scotts franchises at an inflated value). Based on the interests 
and circumstances described above, the Utah Supreme Court should answer that TruGreen be 
permitted to recover the gains realized by Respondents for tortiously inducing breaches of the 
Non-Compete Agreements and interfering with TruGreen's economic relations. 
II. The Court should answer in the affirmative to Certified Question No. 1 that 
Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for a former 
employee's breach of non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee non-
solicitation contract provisions. 
That contract damages are generally compensatory and not restitutionary is Hornbook 
law. The actualities of current contracting practices, however, have prompted modem courts to 
venture beyond compensatory damages in fashioning remedies. Contracts have become more 
dynamic as parties search for new ways to minimize risk. This evolution in types of contracts is 
prompting a sea change in the contract theory of damages. This phenomenon has happened 
before, most notably with respect to the reliance interest. The First Restatement of Contracts 
recognized only three theories of damages: expectation, benefit conferred, and specific 
performance. Reliance, now recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344 and 
duly accepted, was not. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in 
Contract Law, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 559, 561-566 (Dec. 2006). 
Although the Restatement (Second) of Contract espouses the "classical" compensatory 
and expectation measure of damages, it does not preclude other measure of damages. It is the 
other measures of damages (including the damages spoken of in terms of "unjust enrichment," 
"disgorgement" and "restitution") that more ably track the changes in contract law designed to 
protect legitimate business interests; namely non-competition, non-disclosure and non-
solicitation agreements. 
A breach of these agreements indicates that the breaching party has done exactly what it 
contracted not to do. Often, as in this case, this breach is "opportunistic" or "efficient," meaning 
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that "the defendant, by electing to breach, is attempting to improve on the terms of the 
contractual exchange, managing either to give less or take more than the parties had agreed." 
Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest," and the Restatement of 
Contracts, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2021, 2021 n. 1 (June 2001). Compensatory or expectation damages 
fail to acknowledge the nature of these breaches due to the difficulty of determining damages. 
Any assumed or illusory restrictions against employing a restitutionary or disgorgement measure 
of damages based on the breaching party's profits only exacerbates the problem. By failing to 
employ a disgorgement measure of damages, the courts reward the breaching party by allowing 
it to retain all benefits in excess of its damages. Why then is the disgorgement remedy not seen 
more often in contract law? It is not because the Courts lack the authority to do so or contract 
law forbids it. It is because "in most cases either there is no gain to be disgorged, disgorgement 
is unnecessary, or disgorgement is inappropriate for special moral or policy reasons." Eisenberg, 
supra, at 599. A 'Violation of [a] covenant not to compete" is a "perfect example of this form of 
[opportunistic] breach" where disgorgement would be justified. Id. at 2049-2050. 
Consistent with these arguments the Court should respond to Certified Question No. 1 in 
favor of TruGreen. As evidenced by the parties' protracted litigation on enforceability, the 
legitimate business interests which underlie these Agreements fall in line with the same interests 
justifying restitution in cases of tortious interference and other "business torts." See e.g. Natl 
Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775. Moreover, while many cases appear to consider only a 
plaintiffs "lost profits" as the sole measure of damages for breach of a restrictive covenant, 
courts have attempted to fit the proverbial square peg of "lost profits" into the round hole 
occasioned by a breach of one of these non-solicitation, non-compete or non-disclosure 
agreements. In so doing, they have attempted to mold the lost profits measure to fit the situation 
in different ways such as recognizing a breaching party's gains as a proxy or surrogate for 
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estimating these losses. Instead of attempting to shape a lost profits measure of damages to 
reflect the unjust gains of the Defendant, the Court should just recognize a 
restitutionary/disgorgement measure of damages. For these reasons and the fact that the parties 
mutually recognize a calculation of damages as the "revenues gained by or from" the respective 
breaches, the Court should answer that disgorgement, restitution or unjust enrichment damages 
are available for a former employees' breach of restrictive covenants. 
A. Some states permit restitution for breaches of non-competition or non-
disclosure covenants. 
Similar to the special interests justifying restitution damages for "business torts," supra, 
courts in some jurisdictions recognize restitution as an appropriate remedy for breaches of non-
competition and non-disclosure covenants. Storage Tech., 395 F.3d at 925 (stating under 
Minnesota law that "breach of some covenants and duties attendant on the employment relation 
entitled the aggrieved employer to restitution"). Specifically, courts in these cases have held that 
;cwhere an employee wrongfully profits from the use of information obtained from his employer, 
the measure of damages may be the employee's gain." Id. (quoting Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 94-
95). This assessment is in accord with existing Utah law in similar contexts which permit a 
measure of damages based upon the defendant's unjust enrichment for compromised 
confidential information and trade secrets, and breaches of fiduciary duties. See Water & 
Entergy Sys., 48 P.3d at 894; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 94 P.3d 179, 186 (Utah 
2004); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 396 ("after the termination of the agency, the 
agent [which would included an employee]... has a duty to account for profits made by the . . . 
use of... confidential information."). 
Here, breaches of the employee non-disclosure covenants and non-competition covenants 
(of which protection of confidential information is a legitimate interest) remain at issue. In 
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accordance with the above authorities, therefore, there is justification for the Court to allow a 
restitutionary remedy for Respondents' breaches of contract. 
B. Courts often use a breaching party's gains as a proxy for calculating 
damages in cases of breached non-competition agreements. 
Several jurisdictions that apply the rhetoric of "lost profits" as the proper damage remedy 
for breach of a non-competition contract actually use the competitor's or breaching employee's 
gains as a surrogate or proxy for estimating a non-breaching party's lost profits.28 Speaking 
about both damages for tortious interference and breach of a non-competition agreement, for 
example, the court in KW Plastics v. United States Can Co. has stated that lost profits could be 
proved through such evidence as: 
(1) a comparison of the experience of the plaintiffs own business before and after 
the interruption of its progress by the defendant's wrongful acts; (2) the plaintiffs 
subsequent experience after the wrongful interference with the business has been 
eliminated; (3) the experience of comparable businesses engaged in the same 
activity; (4) the defendant's subsequent profit from enjoyment of a comparable 
opportunity... 
131 F.Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (D. Ala. 2001) (stating also that "[t]here is no one correct way for 
proving damages") (emphasis added). This willingness to use a breaching defendant's gains as a 
measure of a plaintiff s damage is evident in numerous cases which nonetheless overtly state that 
the proper measure of damages is lost profits. The rationale for using the defendant's gain is 
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 
559, 588 (Dec. 2006) (noting that 'there is a line of cases concerning damages where the 
defendant has wrongfully competed with the plaintiff, in breach of a noncompete agreement... 
[and] courts have awarded the plaintiff damages based on the defendant's profits . . . [or] the 
disgorgement measure [of damages] has been used as a surrogate for the expectation measure."). 
29
 See e.g. Natl. Micrographics Sys., Inc. v. OCE-Indus., Inc., 465 A.2d 862, 869 (Md. 1983) 
(quoting Professor Corbin, 5 Corbin, Contracts, § 1025 ("it is permissible to use the principal's 
sales to estimate the agent's lost profits . . . [as] proof of the sales made and business done . . . by 
the principal or his agent after the breach, may be such as to 'make possible a reasonably 
accurate estimate of the commissions that the agent has been prevented from earning.'"); The 
Lenco Pro, Inc. v. Guerin, 1998 Mass. App. Div. 10 (Mass. App. Div. 1998) ("the trial judge 
would have been justified on the record before us, in calculating [the plaintiff]'s lost profits based 
upon all the profits from all consultants placed by [defendant]."); Wirum & Cash v. Cash, 837 
43 
that it may be difficult to measure a plaintiffs lost profits due to the breach of a non-competition 
agreement and "'a more appropriate measure of damages might be that grounded5 on the 
defendant's 'actual experience for the [post-breach] period rather than one based on 
extrapolating profits from the results experienced' by the plaintiff in the prebreach period." 
Fowler v. Printers II, Inc. 598 A.2d 794, 808 (Md. Ct. 1991) (quoting Macke Co. v. Pizza of 
Gaithersburglnc, 270 A.2d 645 (Md. 1970) (emphasis in the original). 
Here, as discussed, given the nature of the breaches of contract and the potentially 
limitless ability to speculate on intervening causes, damages are extremely difficult to calculate. 
Accordingly, a more appropriate measure of damages might be grounded on Respondents' 
actual gains achieved while employed with Mower Bros./Scotts. 
C. The "liquidated damages covenants" contained in TruGreen's Non-
Compete Agreements operate as a contractual measure of restitution. 
Even in states which seemingly prohibit restitution in non-competition cases, see e.g. Am. 
Air Filter, 527 F.2d at 1299-1301, courts still uphold liquidated damages clauses that award 
disgorgement of the breaching party's profits. 
In Omicron Sys., Inc. v. Weiner, the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the trial court's 
award of an "equitable accounting" of the defendant's gross earnings for breaches of a covenant 
not to compete. 860 A.2d 554, 565-66 (Pa. Super. 2004). In that case, the defendant was found 
liable for breach of a two-year restrictive covenant that prohibited the defendant from leaving the 
plaintiffs employ and working for a competitor. Id. at 557. As part of the breached covenant, 
the defendant agreed that the plaintiff would be entitled to injunctive relief "as well as damages 
P.2d 692 712 (Alaska 1992) ("a court can consider the profit of the breaching party . . . [as] the 
breaching party's profits can be a reasonable basis for estimating plaintiffs damages."); North 
Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 551 P.2d 431, 435-436 (Or. 1976) ("We agree with the trial court 
that [competitor's] profits from such sales are a reasonable basis for estimating plaintiffs 
damages."); Merager v. Turnbull, 99 P.2d 434, 439 (Wash. 1940) ("Those gains [to the 
defendant] may be considered in awarding damages."). 
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and an equitable accounting of all earnings, profits and other benefits arising from such violation 
. . ." Id. at 565. Interpreting this provision as a liquidated damages clause, the appellate court 
upheld the award, holding that the defendant agreed to an accounting of profits when he signed 
the agreement. Id. at 565-66 (further holding that the defendant's gross income was the proper 
measure). 
As indicated supra, in this case, both parties have adopted similarly worded clauses to 
recover "damages from [breaching employees] in an amount equal to the revenues gained by or 
from the breach." See e.g. Exhibits A5 and B5 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
For Summary Judgment (D. 178). Viewing these as liquidated damages clauses, such are 
enforceable under Utah law as long as (i) "revenues gained" by the employee-Respondents are 
reasonable forecasts of just compensation to TruGreen and (ii) actual damages are incapable or 
very difficult of accurate estimation. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 858 P.2d 1363, 
1366-67 (Utah 1993) ("Whether an amount [is] a reasonable forecast is determined by looking at 
the contract, not at the time of its breach, but rather at the time of its formation.") (citing Robbins, 
645 P.2d at 626). Where the District Court has made no finding that these covenants are 
liquidated damages clauses,30 the Court should answer Certified Question No. 1 in the 
affirmative that like Omicron an accounting of the Respondents' revenue gains is an appropriate 
damage remedy provided the above conditions of enforceability are met. See June 8 Summary 
Judgment Order (D. 286) at 9 ("The court recognizes that calculating damages in these types of 
cases can be extremely difficult"). 
Motion Hearing Transcript (D. 271) at 63:4-5 ("Robbins v. Finlay and the liquidated damages 
case that doesn't seem to me to speak to that."). 
45 
CONCLUSION 
Against the District Court's certification "that TruGreen has proven the fact of 
damages"31 and for the reasons set forth herein, therefore, TruGreen respectfully requests that the 
Utah Supreme Court answer in the affirmative to Certified Question No. 2 that Utah law 
recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for tortious interference with a 
competitor's contractual and economic relations. Notwithstanding the conventional tort 
remedies described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774 A, restitution is not precluded as 
an appropriate measure of damages and would be justified in this case of mass interference 
because (1) the interests harmed by Respondents are comparable to other business torts which 
permit restitution, (2) the actual losses incurred by TruGreen are not readily ascertainable, (3) an 
award of Respondents' ill-gotten gains would not create a prima facie windfall in favor of 
TruGreen, (4) TruGreen's claims against the interfering Respondents sound in tort, not contract, 
and (5) Respondents should not be allowed to speculate that gains will exceed TruGreen's 
losses. 
Additionally, with respect to Certified Question No. 1, TruGreen also respectfully 
requests that the Court answer in the affirmative that Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment 
measure of damages for a former employee's breach of restrictive covenants. The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts is silent with respect to the use of a restitutionary measure of damages as 
referenced in this case. Courts have recognized that "classic" compensatory contract damages 
often fail to address the harm caused by a breach of a contract designed to protect legitimate 
business interests such as non-compete, non-disclosure and non-solicitation agreements. 
Moreover, in recognizance of this principle, courts which on their face appear to limit a 
plaintiffs recovery to "lost profits" nonetheless shape this theory to address the ill-gotten gains 
Order Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 2. 
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of the breaching defendant by using the breaching defendant's gains as a proxy or surrogate to 
measure damages. Where the parties in this case have additionally attempted to provide for 
recovery of gains realized by or through the respective breaches, the 'liquidated damages 
clauses" of the Non-Compete Agreements should be conditionally accepted as a restitutionary 
measure. 
Q 
DATED this ^ day of November, 2007. 
IG&HANNI 
Bman C Johnson 
illiam B.Ingram 
Jacob C. Briem 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(ll)(C), copies of the District Court's Order 
Addressing Certification, March 6, 2007, (D. 275) and Order Certifying Questions of Law to the 
Utah Supreme Court, June 8,2007, (D. 287) are submitted herewith. 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
TRUGREEN COMPANIES, L L C , a 
Delaware limited liability company, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
V 
SCOTTS LAWN SERVICE, et al, 
Defendants 
ORDER ADDRESSING 
CERTIFICATION 
Case No 1 06CV00024 
In an effort to provide the parties with further guidance on the certification briefs, the 
court furnishes the following information The court anticipates that it will issue an order within 
the next two weeks granting summary judgment to all the Idaho defendants on all remaining 
claims With respect to Mower Brothers, Scotts, Greenside, Bitton, and Babilis (collectively 
"Scotts Defendants"), the court believer that it will grant them summary judgment on the claims 
against them that allegedly took place in Idaho Consequently, the court anticipates that the 
remaining claims and defendants in this case will be as follows 
1 Breach of Non-Competition Covenant Gaythvvaite and LeBlanc, 
2 Breach of Confidentiality Provision Mantz, Gaythvvaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen, 
3 Breach of Non-interference Provision Mantz and Gaythwaite, 
4 Interference with Contractual Relations Scotts Defendants (as to Utah claims), Mantz 
and Gaythwaite, 
5 Interference with Economic Relations Scotts Defendants (Utah claims), 
6 Unfair Competition Scotts Defendants (Utah claims) 
As a backdrop for the certification issue, the court believes that TruGreen has proven the 
fact of damages but that questions remain as to the amount of damages. The court finds that it is 
unclear whether Utah law would allow for an "unjust enrichment'* measure of damages on the 
remaining claims. Accordingly, the court is prepared to certify to the Utah Supreme Court the 
legal question(s) of whether a defendant who breaches the contract provisions and/or commits 
the torts listed above can be required to account for his profits under Utah law. 
The parties have been directed to provide the court with a proposed order of certification. 
These "briefs" should not argue the merit of these issues but rather should focus on the 
certification vehicle. The format of the Egbert v. Nissan certification order (case no. 2:04-cv-
551, docket no. 277) is illustrative of the type of order the court plans to issue. The parties will 
have until Friday, March 16, 2007, to file their proposed orders of certification, not to exceed ten 
pages in length. Any reply will be due Friday, March 23, 2007, and shall not exceed five pages 
in length. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
9J (U 
Honorable Paul G. Cassell 
United States District Judge 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
TRUGREEN COMPANIES, L.L.C., a 
Delaware limited liability company, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MOWER BROTHERS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER CERTIFYING 
QUESTIONS OF LAW TO THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Case No. 1:06CV00024 PGC 
The impetus for this certification is a dispute over the proper measure of damages for the 
breach of an employment agreement, tortious interference with contractual and economic 
relationships, and violation of Utah's Unfair Competition Act. Plaintiffs TruGreen Companies, 
L.L.C., and TruGreen Limited Partnership (tTruGreen,,) assert claims against four former 
TruGreen employees, Ryan Mantz, Lary Gaythwaite, James LeBlanc, and David Stephensen 
("employee defendants"), along with their current employer, Mower Brothers, Inc., and two 
directors of Mower Brothers, Jean Babilis and Kevin Bitton. First, TruGreen alleges that the 
employee defendants have breached three provisions of the TruGreen employment agreements: a 
non-competition provision, a non-disclosure provision, and an employee non-solicitation 
provision. Second, TruGreen asserts that Mower Brothers, Bitton, Babilis, and some of the 
employee defendants tortiously interfered with TruGreen's economic and contractual 
relationships Third, TruGreen alleges that Mower Brothers, Bitton, and Babihs violated Utah's 
Unfair Competition Act, Utah Code Ann § 13-5a-103 Defendants deny these claims m all 
respects 
With regard to potential damages in this case, TruGreen asserts that an unjust enrichment 
or restitution measure of damages is appropnate for all of its claims The measure of damages 
under an unjust enrichment theory is generally the amount of defendant's profits Defendants 
argue that the appropnate measure of damages is lost profits, which is the amount of profit lost to 
the plaintiff because of the breach, interference, or unfair competition The Court has determined 
that there appears to be no controlling Utah law addressing these damages issues 
Consequently, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the United 
States Distnct Court for the Distnct of Utah certifies to the Utah Supreme Court these questions 
of law, which are controlling in the above-captioned matter now pending before this Court 
1 Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to an award of lost profits 
damages, or instead an award of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, where a former 
employee has breached contractual non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee non-
solicitation provisions9 
2 Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure ot damages for tortious 
interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations9 
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3. Whether "actual damages" under Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(l)(b)(i), the Utah 
Unfair Competition Act, means the plaintiffs lost profits or an award of damages defined by the 
defendant's revenues? 
To provide some context to the three certified questions, some brief discussion is in 
order. The parties disagree over the appropriate theory of damages to be applied in this case. 
TruGreen asserts that an unjust enrichment or restitution measure of damages is appropriate for 
all of its claims, while the Defendants argue that the appropriate measure of damages is lost 
profits. This Court will briefly address the parties' arguments as they relate to the various causes 
of action to clarify the scope of the three certified questions. 
I. Breach of Contract Claims 
TruGreen seeks restitutionary damages against the employee defendants for their alleged 
breach of the non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee non-solicitation provisions in the 
employee contracts. The Defendants contend that any possible damages are limited to 
TruGreen's own net lost profits proximately caused by specific breaches by each particular 
defendant. The Defendants point out that the majority of state courts that have addressed this 
issue appear to limit damages to the employer's lost profits or other consequential losses.' The 
1
 See, e.g., Am. Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1975) (limiting 
damages to lost profits when addressing a breach of a non-competition agreement); The Toledo 
Group, Inc. v. Benton Indus., Inc., 623 N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (applying a lost 
profits measure of damages to breach of non-disclosure agreement); Nationscredit Corp. v. CSSI, 
The Support Group, Inc., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1313 (Tex. App. Mar. 21, 2002) (noting that 
unjust enrichment is not a proper measure of damages for breach of a non-solicitation 
agreement). 
3 
Defendants assert that these courts have chosen to limit damages in this way by applying general 
contract principles recognized in Utah - such as the principle that a non-breaching party is 
entitled to recover its "expectation interest," which involves placing the non-breaching party in as 
good a position as if the contract were performed.2 The Defendants also cite the Utah principle 
that "a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an action for restitution as an alternative to 
an action for damages where there has been a material breach of the contract by the other party."3 
Additionally, Defendants argue that the Utah Supreme Court uses the terms "restitution" and 
"unjust enrichment" interchangeably to describe the equitable remedy that involves restoring to a 
plaintiff the benefit it provided to a party that is not subject to an express contract.4 A court's 
application of such principles to the contract claims in this case, in the view of the Defendants, 
strongly supports a lost profits theory of recovery. 
TruGreen responds that it is not limited to recovering its lost profits but also any unjust 
enrichment by the Defendants. TruGreen first notes the difficulty of using a lost profits measure 
of damages in breach of non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-interference cases. In System 
Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, the Utah Supreme Court held that injunctive relief may be an 
appropriate remedy for the breach of a non-competition agreement given that "the damages that 
may result from the misappropriation of confidential information and goodwill could be 
2
 See, e.g., Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982). 
3
 Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). 
"See Am. Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCIMech., 930 P.2d 1182, 1192-93 (Utah 1996). 
4 
estimated only by conjecture and not by any accurate standard.",:) TruGreen then notes that the 
Utah Supreme Court has generally acknowledged that an injured employer may also maintain a 
claim for damages in addition to seeking injunctive relief.6 Furthermore, the Utah Supreme 
Court has shown a willingness to honor liquidated damage provisions in a non-competition 
agreement, provided the liquidated amount is reasonable, given that "[tjhere is no doubt that the 
harm caused by the breach was one that was difficult to estimate with much accuracy."7 
In addition to the difficulty of using a lost profits measure of damages for breach of non-
competition cases, TruGreen also recounts the deterrent effect of applying an unjust enrichment 
theory of damages. In National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court held that an employee who breached a non-competition agreement and the competitor who 
induced the breach were liable to account for their gains associated with the breach.8 Leyden 
noted that "an intending tortfeasor should not be prompted to speculate that his profits might 
exceed the injured party's losses, thus encouraging commission of the tort."9 According to 
TaiGreen, the deterrent effect resulting from restitutionary damages, coupled with the difficulty 
of using a lost profits measure in breach of non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-
5
 669 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1983) (quoting Columbia Coll. oj Music & Sch. ojDramatic 
Artv. Thunberg, 116 P. 280, 282 (Wash. 1911). 
6
 See Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Dixon, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992). 
7
 Robbins, 45 P.2d at 626. 
8348N.E.2d771 (Mass. 1976). 
9
 M a t 775-76. 
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interferences cases, are more than sufficient grounds to support restitutionary damages for the 
contractual provisions at issue m this case 
While both parties strongly argue their respective positions, they both concede that no 
Utah court has expressly determined the proper measure of damages for breach of these specific 
contract provisions Consequently, this Court respectfully asks the Utah Supreme Court to 
answer the first certified question 
2 Tortious Interference with Economic and Contractual Relations 
The second certified question is whether Utah recognizes an unjust enrichment measure 
of damages for tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations 
Both parties acknowledge that the Utah Court of Appeals has generally adopted Section 774A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the measure of damages for tortious interference with 
contract Section 774A provides that 
(1) One who is liable to another for interference with a contract or prospective 
contractual relation is liable for damages for 
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective 
relation 
(b) consequential losses for which the interference is a legal cause, and 
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, it they are reasonably to 
be expected to result from the interference l0 
Despite their respective reliance on Section 774A, the parties disagree regarding the effect of the 
Utah Court of Appeal's adoption of this section 
10
 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979) 
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The Defendants argue that Sampson v. Richins is fully instructive on this issue.11 In 
Sampson, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed cross-appeals on the amount of damages awarded 
to defendants for Sampson's intentional interference with defendants' economic relations.12 
Sampson upheld the trial court's damages award pursuant to Section 774A, noting that "one who 
is ultimately deemed liable to another for interference with economic relations is liable for 'the 
pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective relation; [or] consequential losses 
for which the interference is a legal cause . . . ."13 Applying Section 774A, Sampson held that the 
trial court's findings regarding damages "must identify actual pecuniary losses suffered by 
[plaintiff] as a result of [defendant's conduct."14 In addition to their reliance on Sampson, 
Defendants point to numerous courts outside of Utah that recognize that plaintiffs lost profits, 
and not restitution of defendant's revenues, are the proper measure of damages for tortious 
interference.15 
Although TruGreen concedes that the Utah Court of Appeals has generally adopted 
Section 774A, it maintains that such an adoption nevertheless allows for the application of unjust 
11
 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
12
 Id. at 999-1002. 
13
 Id. at 1006-07 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979)). 
14
 Id. 
15
 See, e.g., Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov't Sees., Inc. v. Jefferson Inv. Corp., 797 F.2d 
227, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding under Texas law that damages for tortious interference are 
measured by plaintiffs lost profits). 
7 
enrichment damages in some tortious interference cases. First, TruGreen cites comment c of 
Section 774A, where the commentators note that "[a] major problem with damages of this sort is 
whether they can be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty."16 Second, TruGreen argues 
that the fact Utah courts have adopted Section 774A merely supports the idea that the measure of 
damages in tortious interference cases must mirror the measure of damages for the underlying 
breach. In Storage Technology Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Eighth Circuit cited Section 
774A but subsequently found that under Minnesota law, "[a]n employee who breaches a 
noncompetition or nondisclosure covenant can be required to account for his profits."17 The 
court reasoned that "where the interference alleged is inducement of breach of restrictive 
covenants or fiduciary duties, the remedy should mirror the restitutionary remedy available for 
the breach of the covenant or fiduciary duty."18 Also, as was discussed above, TruGreen 
contends that a lost profit measure of damages would encourage competitors and employees to 
speculate that their gains will outweigh losses and thereby encourage the breach of valid and 
enforceable covenants.19 
As far as the Court and the parties can assess, no Utah court has directly addressed the 
measure of damages where former employees and a competitor tortiously interfere in the context 
16
 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A cmt. c (1979). 
17
 395 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2005). 
18
 Id. 
19
 See Natl Merch. Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976). 
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of an employment contract containing non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-interference 
provisions. To determine whether Utah recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for 
tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations, this Court 
respectfully requests the Utah Supreme Court to answer the second certified question. 
3. Unfair Competition 
TruGreen has asserted a claim under Utah's Unfair Competition Act, which limits 
recovery to "actual damages."20 The parties differ over whether this phrases extends to lost 
profits or an award of damages defined by the defendant's revenues. It appears that no Utah 
court has interpreted the meaning of "actual damages" under this statute. Consequently, this 
Court respectfully aks that the Utah Supreme Court answer the third certified question. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has concluded that there is no controlling case law addressing the three 
questions of law discussed above. Because these questions of law are controlling in this case, 
this Court certifies these questions to your Court. The clerk of this Court shall transmit a copy of 
this Order of Certification to counsel for all parties to the proceedings in this Court. The clerk 
shall also submit to the Utah Supreme Court a certified copy of this Order and any other portion 
of the record before this Court that may be required by the Utah Supreme Court. Under Rule 
41(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court orders that each party shall bear its 
own fees and costs of this certification. 
20
 Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(l)(b)(i). 
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SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 8th day of June, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Paul G. Cassell 
United States District Judge 
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THE COURT: We're here this morning on the case of 
TruGreen versus Bitton, et al. Nice to see Mr. Johnson and 
his team again. 
MR, JOHNSON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: That is Mr. Ingram and Ms. Waite-Grover; 
is that right? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And let's see, Mr. Gibb and 
his team. Nice to see you again. 
MR* GIBB: Good to see you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: We have got Mr. Olson, Mr. Hymas and 
Mr. Hull; is that right? 
MR. GIBB: Yes, Your Honor• 
THE COURT: All right. Well, we're here today, as I 
understand it, we had some earlier rulings and then the 
question is what is sort of the fall out from those earlier 
rulings particularly whether the fact that Mr. Elggren, the 
plaintiff's expert, has been excluded, whether that leaves 
us anything left to try. 
I put together a tentative order thinking that, which 
outlines my tentative view on this. I will emphasize today 
that I am tentative on this. That with Elggren out, there 
isn't enough solid evidence about damages to move forward 
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and that we wouldn't — nominal damages, I'm still working 
through the case law, but the law really would be somewhat 
mixed up if we could spend hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in attorney's fees to figure out who gets a dollar in 
damages. At least that is what I'm thinking now. 
If I'm overlooking something, I'm sure that 
Mr. Johnson and his able team will let me know. So why 
don't I hear from you, Mr. Johnson, on all of these issues. 
MR. JOHNSON: This may be a little bit like Sisyphus 
in the underworld* Having read your tentative ruling, Your 
Honor, I'm not sure, even though I think sometimes in a 
moment of arrogance I have some skill I'm going to have much 
success, but I will say a few things. 
Historically, a breach of these kinds of covenants 
non-compete, non-solicitation, non-interference, 
non-disclosure of confidential information have been 
appropriate vehicles for injunctive relief. Why? For the 
very reason we have come, I think, to this juncture. The 
damages are, as the case law says and we cited ad nauseam, 
you have read them, they are notoriously difficult to prove. 
It doesn't mean though that the injury to goodwill 
that is sustained by somebody who is subjected to a breach, 
the injury to fair competition that occurs when these kind 
of covenants are breached, the harm to a party caused by the 
exploitation of its investment in the training of an 
4 
individual is not real. It means that perhaps injunctive 
relief is more appropriate- Well we crossed that bridge 
back at the end of July when this court said well, 
preliminarily, so the court did change its mind. 
Preliminarily I suspect that you could show damages. Urn, it 
seems just as an initial observation sort of unfair for the 
defendants to breach with impunity these agreements. And I 
guess I still remain reasonably persuaded, Your Honor, that 
any jury that looked at this evidence, particularly with 
respect to the five Idaho defendants, conclude they breached 
these agreements. Are able to do that with impunity when 
those agreements were bargained for at arms length. We seem 
to be now sort of lost perhaps, perhaps I'm the one that is 
lost, not the court, not Mr. Gibb and his team, in 
conflating the fact of damages with the amount of damages. 
It is going to be real hard for us to calculate with 
specificity an amount of damages. But I would suggest to 
you that a simple walk through of about three exhibits that 
are the defendants1 exhibits are going to show you the fact 
of damages. That would be one that nobody is seriously 
going to contest, at least I111 be surprised if they do, 
that the named nine defendants that remain had no expertise 
in the lawn care sales industry until they went to work for 
TruGreen. 
Number two, that there was no intervening employment 
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on those individuals' behalf when they left TruGreen and 
went to work for Scotts Mower Brothers. 
Number three, that in 2005, TruGreenrs performance was 
markedly better than it was in 2006, and that in 2006 Mower 
Brothers• performance was markedly better than it was in 
2005. What was the causal link between that and the 
departure of the defendants? Well, I could bring in fancy 
charts, which I have but I won't, that show that those nine 
defendants', Exhibit 20 to Mr. Rasmussen's expert report, 
resulted in 95 percent of the revenue gain that was 
experienced by Mower Brothers Scotts. 
Is any juror going to conclude, faced with that 
evidence, that well, that is just a statistical aberration? 
I don't think so. I don't think -- maybe we're in a 
situation where we have now in a context given every 
inference and their brief fact controversy we have given the 
nod to the defendants. 
THE COURT: Why don't you just walk me through what 
you just did a little bit more, this notion that 95 percent 
of the revenue and so forth. I mean that sounds like the 
kind of thing that, you know, would support a — 
MR. JOHNSON: For Mr. Rasmussen's and I apologize, I 
am sure that the defendants have these documents because 
they're attached as a report. 
THE COURT: Have they had a chance to look at it? 
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MR. JOHNSON: This i§ their own documents. 
THE COURT: They are squinting across the room here. 
Why don't you just show them what they are. I'm sure they 
can fish them out. 
MR. JOHNSON: We can give them copies. I can give 
Your Honor a copy, too, if you would prefer. Heather, do 
you have an extra copy? Thank you. 
THE CLERK: Do you want me to get the easel for that. 
MR. JOHNSON: I'll just hold it. That is okay. In 
Salt Lake in 2006. 
THE COURT: Let me make sure I'm on the same page 
you're on. Are you on Exhibit 20.1; is that right? 
MR. JOHNSON: Right. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: Here are the figures that Mr. Rasmussen 
reports in his expert report. You see that the single 
largest producer of revenue in that office was James 
LeBlanc, $374,705. That is a former TruGreen employee. 
Most everybody else is no where near that amount. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm — so let's see, which employee 
is that, again? 
MR. JOHNSON: Jim LeBlanc on the upper right hand 
side, Your Honor. One of the named defendants. 
THE COURT: Is this — maybe I'm on the wrong page 
here. I have got sales by program sold Boise. 
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MR. JOHNSON: Let mef go to Boise first then, Your 
Honor. That is easy. Boise, for 2006 and Mower Brothers, 
the big producers were David Van Acker, 185,000; James 
Clogston, 194,000; Rick Deerfield, 120,000; and I'm not very 
good at math, that has got to be five or 600,000 out of 777. 
So my hyperbole got away from me. But they clearly produced 
the lion's share of revenue in Boise. I don't think there 
is a material dispute on that. 
If we look at Ogden,. again the lion's share of the 
revenue, or the biggest single producer at any rate is 
Mr. Stephensen produced $280,000 out of what .is about 
457,000, I believe. In Salt Lake, out of 370, excuse me, 
that is incorrect, out of about a million three, LeBlanc 
produced close to 400,000. And everybody else is in the 
much smaller range. 
Now, Mr. Rasmussen's expert report attributes the 
growth that undeniably occurred in Scotts to what? To two 
things. Increased direct sales, and this is in his 
deposition, increased direct sales opportunities for those 
individuals. That just defies statistical probability that 
those guys could get that many more direct sales 
opportunities. I would submit that that is an inference 
that is going to be drawn in anybody's favor it ought to be 
drawn in ours. 
Number two he says well, it is the nine employee 
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defendants that is betrayed by these very exhibits. And it 
is also betrayed by Mr. Mantz's e-mail when he says listen, 
our direct mail is down. The reason we're having a hell of 
a year, pardon my profanity, is what? Is because we have 
got these new sales people from Scotts. I mean from 
TruGreen. Is that enough? Well, I think it is enough to 
get it to a jury. 
And I think, you know, the idea that well maybe there 
was a weather consideration, none of these things, of 
course, are advertising issues. None of those things are 
analyzed in any detail, if .at all, by Mr. Rasmussen and 
certainly the people on the ground. That is like suggesting 
to say that Mr. Smith or Mr. Horlacher, or any one of the 
number of people from TruGreen, aren't competent to testify 
and haven't already in their depositions testified about 
this stuff or in their affidavits, is like saying that 
somebody has a better feel for what is going on in Iraq 
sitting in Washington D.C. than some general on the ground. 
They are going to know better than Mr. Rasmussen whether 
weather effects their performance or not. In fact, I think 
that was repudiated, if I'm not mistaken, by a number and I 
would have to go to a page, I'm out of order in my argument, 
Your Honor, but I'm reasonably sure that I can cite you to 
pages where they actually considered that and discounted 
that. 
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So, yeah, damages are very difficult to prove in these 
cases.. And particularly in those non-painting a barn kind 
of contracts where you have interest like fair competition 
and injury of goodwill. But I don't think that the fact 
that we can't specify an amount at this kind of obvious 
evidence precludes us from going to trial on that issue. 
We're going to offer at trial, we would offer, Nick Smith, 
who has testified in his affidavit as to, you know, and 
maybe the court's concern is well is there a causation, is 
there — yes, clearly these people are great sales people 
and they went over and this gets to the measure of damages, 
they went over and they generated similar revenue which we 
now clearly lo.st, you have seen the numbers, they're now 
generating that revenue for Mower Brothers not for TruGreen. 
But is that enough in the court's mind or does the court 
instead want to say listen unless we can show a real 
specific, that is, that they purloined customers from 
TruGreen to Mower Brothers, that is not enough- In fact, 
they may be gifted sales people. 
"Well, I would submit one that is a question for a 
jury. Two, I think it is betrayed by the evidence we have 
shown you. And three, I think although defendants 
consistently maintain well, while Utah doesn't allow a 
restitutionary measure, that is because Utah hasn't really 
considered it. And in fact in one case in Idaho, as I 
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recall, I believe that the Dunn versus Ward case in a 
non-competition agreement that did involve admittedly a sale 
of a business that they did use that measure of damages. 
Why? Because they are notoriously difficulty to measure. 
And we have a protectable interest in not only in our 
existing customers, but I think we have a protectable 
interest in the universe of customers that are in the 
geographic areas that we protected ourself. And I think 
that is borne out in case law which we have cited in our 
briefs. 
THE COURT: So what is your damages measure? I mean 
I, you know, is it restitution? Is it lost profits? I mean 
what — 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, it is lost profits. I guess we're 
limited to the 2,477 customers that defected, that even 
Rasmussen admits, from TruGreen — from TruGreen to Mower 
Brothers. If it is what I think is much more appropriate a 
restitutionary measure, it is their gain. And I believe 
that cases that have —• jurisdictions that have considered 
the issue have concluded, and I'm going to quote from the 
American Express case, the loss of fair competition which 
results from breach of contract of a covenant not to compete 
is irreparable injury because damages are difficult to --
difficult to compute. In that case, they use the 
restitutionary measure precisely for that reason. What 
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would that be in this case? I think the gain to Mower 
Brothers which can be shown through their own documents and 
through their own expert, Mr. Rasmussen. 
Frankly, I do not — I guess the court on a separate 
note having not, you know, I understand the court's initial 
reaction to what nominal damages am I really vindicating any 
kind of right here if as the court has concluded these are 
really fact specific inquiries. You know, this is a fact 
specific inquiry. There is no over-arching declaratory 
relief I'm granting the plaintiff in this case because every 
one of these covenants not to compete enforceability turns 
on the individual defendant involved, I think that is the 
court's predisposition — 
THE COURT: Geographic area --
MR. JOHNSON: Again, I understand that. 
THE COURT: All of that. 
MR. JOHNSON: I would say that with respect to at 
least the five Idaho defendants where I don't think there is 
any kind of issue that we have a — we have an interest of 
enforcement as against them. If for no other reason that it 
is going to have a prophylactic or chilling effect on 
activity that otherwise is going to be really encouraged by 
the opinion in this case, you know, we're not going to --
we're not going to be able to look any employee in the eye 
and say these things are easily enforceable because we're 
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not going to get injunctive relief in this district court 
and it is difficult although perhaps a better lawyer could 
have more brilliantly proven damages, I'm suggesting that it 
is a very difficult task. And to get a judgment for nominal 
damages, if that, if the court is not persuaded to use these 
numbers and give us restitutionary relief, to give us 
declaratory essentially relief for nominal damages against 
those five and perhaps at least the other two which I think 
we could have gotten on summary judgment in Utah and go to 
trial on the remaining two in Utah, that is — that is a 
tremendous value to TruGreen in dealing with a large work 
force. 
And the flip of that is going to be, you know, we're 
in a situation where instead what is going to happen is I 
think people will now think they can breach these contracts 
with relative impunity and it certainly has a deterrent 
effect in so far as at least the five in Idaho and the four 
in Utah are concerned if not a more inchoate deterrent 
effect akin to the one that would result from enforcing 
capital punishment on a more regular basis. Pardon that 
metaphor, Your Honorf but I think it is true. 
We would like that vindicated in this case. And I 
believe that the case law is relatively clear, particularly 
the Utah case of Internal Management which is pretty much on 
all fours with this case. It is a non-compete case where 
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there was an issue about causation and we couldn't, in that 
case, there was an inability to show diverted customers 
which is I think the lost profits theory the defendants rely 
on. The court none the less granted nominal damages in that 
case and vindicated that interest at least in so far as 
those defendants are concerned. 
I am sympathetic to the idea that a lot of money gets 
spent litigating the -case when there is no real damage. But 
in my defense, that is why I moved for injunctive relief in 
the first instance, Your Honor, And I think fairness may, 
under this circumstance, where it looks to me like every 
inference, every disputed fact has been resolved in favor of 
the defendants maybe we ought to look at it in another way. 
I don't think there is any difficulty at all. You know, I 
would love to be able to argue, I don't want to waste your 
time, the Wayne Elggren issue with you. Because I think 
that maybe we got the raw end of the deal, Your Honor, to be 
frank. But I don't want to consume needlessly this court's 
time because I'm --
THE COURT: I'll hear you on that briefly. I mean 
my — 
MR, JOHNSON: Okay, Well, if I'm -- I would -- I will 
step down and just let Heather argue that, she knows it 
better than I do. But I do think that in spite of the fact 
that even without Wayne, I think that Heather will explain 
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the math better, but without Wayne, the amount of damages 
may be more difficult to prove. But the fact of damages is 
not difficult to prove certainly based on those exhibits and 
based on Mr. Rasmussen's own math which tracks Mr- Elggren's 
math. And what Mr. Smith and others from TruGreen will do 
is simply testify I'm on the ground with the guys in Iraq. 
I know that weather makes no difference. And the court says 
well why didn't you do this in your summary judgment papers? 
Well, primarily because we were interested in the result on 
liability, Your Honor. The evidence is in the record, and 
it is in the briefs. And with that, I'd like Heather to 
address the Wayne Elggren issue. 
THE COURT: I'll be glad to hear from her in a second, 
but I have a couple more questions for you. 
MR. JOHNSON: Fine. 
THE COURT: One problem I'm having, I'm trying to get 
my hands around this, is I'm not completely clear on what 
your damages theory is. I think you have spelled it out a 
little bit. But once I get a handle on that, it might be 
helpful for me to see you layout, you know, the defendants 
are saying look you're telling us what you have got a 
foundation for, but you're not telling us specifically what 
the evidence is. And it might be helpful to say okay we're 
going to call Smith and he is going to say this and we are 
going to use this, defendants you know financial report Y 
15 
here and — 
MR. JOHNSON; Okay, What I would say as to that, Your 
Honor, beyond that simple exercise that I just showed you, 
which I think is sufficient to get me to a jury, what I 
would do at trial is call Mitch Smith and Mr. Gershkoff to 
establish that the employed defendants were exposed to 
information while they conclude, "and that is all they do is 
conclude, they don't deny they ever received it, they just 
conclude it was not confidential, that they were exposed 
essentially or attended the training that is identified in 
Exhibit K. That they were involved, that is Mr. Smith and 
Mr, Gershkoff as well as many of the management defendants 
that defected in the past and future performance analysis of 
TruGreen, that is the day-to-day revenue stuff that comes up 
with the flash reports, the cancellation numbers, the 
performance of each individual person. And that there is --
I would have in Horlacher's deposition already, I believe, 
but they would testify that there is a causal connection 
between their departure, that is the employee defendant's 
departure, the nine that remain, and the lost revenue to 
TruGreen, That is Exhibit 93 which these guys, if granted, 
have moved to strike, 
THE COURT: Now let me -- this is where I am having 
trouble. How4 can they say that there is a causal 
relationship? The nine — the employees that left, could 
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have left it is, you know, employment at will. 
MR* JOHNSON: Sure. But had they left and not worked 
for them, we wouldn't be here. They went to work for a 
competitor in contravention of their agreement. 
THE COURT: But the point is that what I would have to 
hear from is the fact that they went to work for a 
competitor now created the loss, right? Just the fact that 
somebody leaves does not create damages you can recover for. 
What you have got to show is one more bit of information. 
They went over to --
MR. JOHNSON: I guess I would disagree with the court 
on that. I understand that is the real technical lost 
profit theory. But if there is all these other inchoate 
interests that we can protect which cases that have dealt 
with these things identify, that is the loss of goodwill 
which is what is measured by gross revenue. The loss of the 
protection for a fair competition which we have bargained 
for in these agreements. I don't think we have to show 
anything other than their services now. I mean I grant you 
there is a 13th Amendment that prohibits involuntary 
servitude, but they have taken those skilled in that 
expertise and gone somewhere else. And that has damaged us. 
That has damaged us. And anybody that looks at the revenue 
they produced for our competitor and understands that they 
honored their employment agreements, they would either not 
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be working for — they certainly would not working for the 
competitor and they might be working for us, understands 
that that revenue at least is more assessable to us because 
it is not of the defendants and in some cases would be ours 
if they had honored their agreement and stayed in our 
employ, I understand the difficulty that the court has with 
this, but that — that is why these things — let me just 
step off comparing parenthetically, I would have been more 
comfortable, and I have to be careful because I don't want 
to sound like a complainer or a whiner, if early on in this 
case we would have said, you know, counsel, I just have 
problems with the public policy underlying these agreements. 
I am not sure they're enforceable because they tend to 
retard or restrain competition, but that is really not the 
road that we embarked on. And, you know, mia culpa, mia 
culpa, mea maxima culpa. I made some errors in this case 
I'm sure. 
THE COURT: I may have led you down the wrong path 
because when I ruled on the injunctive relief I thought you 
all were going to prevail when we got later on. 
MR. JOHNSON: I donft think we have fallen down on the 
liability issue much. At best we're going to trial. I do 
think on a number of these defendants maybe that was just an 
abundance of caution on the court's part. I don't think we 
should be hamstrung because all that we can show, and I used 
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all in quotes, is that people that worked for us are now the 
humongous producers for the defendant and the defendant's 
own witnesses, their own expert and their own sales manager/ 
at least the testimony of their sales manager Ryan Mantz 
said the reason we're doing so well is because these people 
have come over. The court's question seems to be well how 
do you tie that to their departure from you? And what I 
have said to you is we have a lot of more, like I say, 
inchoate interests that we can protect that those cases 
identify. And goodwill which translates into lost revenues 
is one of those. That is why a restitutionary measure in 
these cases, I think, is more appropriate. 
THE COURT: If they had gone to Hawaii, which is let's 
stipulate not a competitor with your clients here in Utah, 
the fact that they left wouldn't entitle you to anything? 
MR. JOHNSON: No, you're right. But I also would not 
have a chart that showed them generating that kind of 
revenue from my competitor. That revenue would still be in 
play, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Suppose they had gone to Hawaii and, you 
know, Stephensen generated $280,000 in profits for the 
Hawaiian Lawn Mower Company. 
MR. JOHNSON: They are not in the universe of 
customers that I'm entitled to protect geographically. 
THE COURT: Now what I think that maybe my 
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hypothetical is getting at, they're not in Hawaii, they're 
closer by, but you have got to show that it is not like 
Hawaii. That they're actually, you know, stealing people 
away and dollars away from your — from your company. 
MR* JOHNSON: Well, I think, as I said, I think the 
conclusion is, in some respects, is inescapable. When you 
see that on day one in 2005 being day one, we have a very 
good year, these people work for us and we have a lot of 
revenue. On-day two, this is 2006, they don't work for us. 
We don't have the same revenue and suddenly Mower Brothers 
has the revenue. Not only that, the revenue is attributable 
to those people who used to work for us. And not only that, 
their own sales manager says the reason we're doing so well 
is these people work for us. Not only that, the owner of 
the business says the reason we hired these people, is why? 
Because we needed their marketing expertise. 
Not only that, we know that the only marketing 
expertise they ever got was when they went to work for us 
because they had none beforehand. That is unambiguously 
agreed in everybody's deposition, and it is also 
unambiguously agreed that nobody worked any place else after 
they left us and went to work for them. I think that is 
enough. If I'm on a jury, I'm buying that unless the judge 
says I'm not going to let you get it, which is essentially 
what has happened here. 
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THE COURT: Let me ask you another question about 
Smith. I have just had a quick chance to go over this 
morning your motion on, you know, the Exhibit 93. And 
you're planning to call Smith. But it seemed to me you're 
planning to call Smith as an expert witness. My question 
is, was he disclosed as an expert witness and, you know, 
that is why we have reports and the whole sort of expert 
witness apparatus. 
MR. JOHNSON: He was disclosed as an expert witness 
and to be fair to the defendants, if I'm not mistaken, Mark, 
you have moved to similarly to Mr. Elggren to strike him as 
an expert, didn't you? 
MR. GIBB: That is correct, 
MR. JOHNSON: I don't know that it has ever been 
disposed of by this court. 
THE COURT: So I mean one — 
MR. JOHNSON: He was identified as an expert and 
summary of what he intended to testify was provided. 
THE COURT: Was the summary the same thing that I am 
seeing here? 
MR, JOHNSON: No, not at all. His testimony was to be 
about acquisitions, I believe. I would have to go get -• I 
hate not to be so conversant with every fact in this case, 
Your Honor, but I'm pretty sure that his testimony was to be 
limited until we decided to try to use him under 701 to 
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acquisition prices. 
THE COURT: But the -- it seemed to me your pleading 
that just came in this morning is going to try to use him as 
a 702 expert witnesses on damage calculations and that that 
would not be permissible based on what I know about the case 
because there is no report and no depositions. 
MR. JOHNSON: I would stipulate that if he is being 
treated as an expert under 702, that is a right read and 
that is something that if we're going to talk about, if I 
might defer to Mr. Ingram because he handled that part of 
this case. 
THE COURT: Maybe I should hear first from 
Ms. Waite-Grover on the Elggren issue and then Mr. Ingram on 
the Smith issue. 
MR. JOHNSON: That would be helpful. 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: Your Honor, TruGreen argued in its 
motion to reconsider, we believe that the court has erred in 
both of its reasons for excluding Mr. Elggren's testimony. 
The first reason as we understand it from the court's 
order for excluding Mr. Elggren's testimony as unreliable 
was that the idea that his methodology assumed --
methodology assumed the conclusion. And in so saying the 
court pointed out its contention that TruGreen had not 
explained how Scott's gains are a result of TruGreen's 
employees1 actions or breaches. And that also Mr. Elggren's 
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methodology assumes the conclusion. 
We would like to first point out that the issue of 
causation is a separate issue. And that Mr. Elggren, as our 
damage expert, assumed causation. We believe that the case 
law entitles him to do so. While it may be advantageous to 
a party to have their damage experts speak both to causation 
as well to the damages, the fact of damage and the amount of 
damage Mr. Elggren is nonetheless entitled to limit his 
testimony simply to an analysis of the numbers which is the 
amount of damages. 
Doing so does not make it fatal to the reliability. 
The fact that he assumed causation simply means that at 
trial, in the event that it is not ultimately proved, this 
court would have less weight or less credibility with the 
jury. Thus — 
THE COURT: Well, what do you assume though? I think 
— I think in theory that is correct, but I'm wondering how 
that works in practice. It is sort of like saying well, 
okay, I'm going to assume causation. I'm going to assume 
that 30 percent of the revenues, you know, that Scotts got 
was stolen away and now let me do the math ah-ha 30 percent 
is, you know, $3 million or something. I mean isn't the key 
question in this case has always been what percent of the 
revenues were stolen away from Scott and handed over to 
TruGreen, And that is what I thought Elggren was trying to 
23 
get at. 
MS, WAITE-GROVER: And he was doing that. He came up 
with a figure of 30 percent of retention that he believes 
was attributable to the methods adopted by Scotts after the 
arrival of the TruGreen employees. Specifically, one of 
those methods was -- was to cancel the call-in practice that 
Scotts adopted prior to the TruGreen employees coming over. 
Essentially a practice whereby the Scotts' employees would 
call the customer prior to actually performing the service. 
If you would like me to walk through 'the math on that, I 
have prepared a chart that I think is a little bit more 
simply explains it. 
THE COURT: I'll be glad to look at that. 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: First, I will point out that there 
was two pieces of evidence in the record that Mr. Elggren 
used to come up with the 30 percent figure. Number one, was 
financial data submitted by Scotts; and then the second was 
an analysis of the trends at Scotts as evidenced by 
Mr. Mantz's March 2006 e-mail. And those are the two 
documents from which Mr. Elggren formed a basis for his 
30 percent figure. 
He noted based on Ronny Mantz's e-mail, that Scott's 
had had a past record of having 50 percent of their 
customers at risk at every phone call. Meaning every time 
they called a customer before performing a service, they had 
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a chance that half of the customers were going to say no 
thanks, I'm done. He noticed that Mr. Mantz also pointed 
out in these e-mails that in 2005, 53 percent of the 
customers at Scotts were signed up on this call ahead 
program. 
So if you look at rows A, B and C of the chart that I 
just handed you, that shows that of the 53 percent of 
Scotts* customers that were signed up for the program, half 
of those were at risk of cancellation every time a phone 
call was made. Which means an overall 27 percent of the 
customers at Scotts were cancelling based on this call ahead 
program. 
Then if you look at row D, E and F, you will look at 
the numbers for 2006. As reported in Ryan Mantz's e-mail, 
in 2006, they had managed to change it so that only eight 
percent of their customers were signed up at the call ahead 
program. So if that 50 percent risk factor is still there, 
that means that of those eight percent signed up on the 
program, only four percent would ultimately cancel. 
So if you look at Row G, and you are comparing the 
cancellation rate from 2005 and 2006 associated with this 
call ahead practice, you come out with a net savings of 23 
percent of your customers. Whereas in 2005, 27 percent 
cancelled. In 2006, only four percent cancelled. That 
drops the cancellation rate 23 percent. 
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Then Mr. Elggren went and looked at Scotts' financial 
records that have been produced for 2005 and he found out 
that the total revenue that Scotts earned in 2005 was a 
little over two million dollars. 23 percent of that 
$2,000,000 is that $489,000 figure that you see in Row I. 
When Mr. Elggren went and looked at the 2006 revenue from 
Scotts* financial data, he determined that the revenue 
attributable to customers carried over from 2005 was 
$1.6 million. And then he compared the amount of that 
revenue on line I with line J. He basically divided the 
customer revenue that was saved by dropping the call ahead 
procedures, the $489,000 figure, by the overall 2006 revenue 
from the 2005 customers and he found out that 489,000 is 30 
percent of 1.6 million. 
So this is how Mr. Elggren came to determine that at 
least one practice adopted by Scotts after the arrival of 
TruGreen people, and I believe at the behest of Mr. Mantz, 
saved the company approximately 30 percent of its revenue 
from pre-existing customers, customers that existed in 2005, 
THE COURT: You started out by telling me that he was 
entitled to assume causation. So I guess I don't have a 
problem with him saying look, I'm going to assume that 
3 0 percent of this was stolen away from Scotts and if you do 
the math it turns out to be $500,000 or whatever. But your 
side of the case still has to put into evidence somewhere 
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something saying and that 30 percent is reliable Daubert 
satisfying statistically valid conclusion. Arid if Elggren 
isn't going to do it, who is going to do that for me? 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: The math that I just went through 
right here is Mr. Elggren1s method for arriving at the 
30 percent figure and for concluding that 30 percent is a 
legitimate number. I don't think that there is anything 
radical about the addition, subtraction and multiplication 
that I just walked you through there that Mr. Elggren used. 
I mean that is his accounting method for assessing 
30 percent. And I guess I fail to see how that is 
unreliable or some sort of radical or new or untested method 
for doing math. 
THE COURT: Well, the math is all right, but why 
30 percent? I mean you could plug in 40 percent and you 
could get more money or the defense could say, well, make it 
20 percent. Who is going to say 30 percent is the right, 
you know, that this is all safe because of the new Mantz 
procedures. Is Elggren going to say this 30 percent all 
stems from the new Mantz procedures and therefore that is 
the causation link? 
Maybe my question is not very clear. I'm sorry. 
Because you started off by — let me run at that this way 
again. You started off by telling me he is just the math 
guy, he is just calculating damages, he is entitled to 
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assume causation. I agree with you. But then if he is 
assuming causation, what — which witness at the trial for 
TruGreen is going to say let me show you now the causation 
here is going to be a 30 percent loss in revenue. 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: I think that the causation is not 
about the 30 percent number. The causation is about what 
they used to -- what they used to improve that. I mean the 
30 percent is the end. The causation is the middle. 
Mr. -- the causation has to do with Ryan Mantz coming over 
and telling Scotts no, no, no, no we can't do call ahead any 
more because call ahead puts 50 percent of our customers at 
risk at every phone call, let's reduce the number of 
customers on our call ahead program. That is the causation. 
Ryan Mantz saying I have been over here at TruGreen and we 
dropped our call-ahead years ago because we found out it was 
just too risky, we lost too many customers every time we 
made a phone call. And he goes over to Scotts and says this 
is a marketing technique, a sales technique that is going to 
improve performance at our company. That is the causation. 
Mr. Elggren noticed that and we pointed that out to 
Mr. Elggren in the Ryan Mantz e-mail where he described what 
they were doing. That they had a specific plan to reduce 
the number of customers that were involved in this 
call-ahead program. And once that was done, Mr. Mantz 
reported how many people used to be on the call-ahead 
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program and how many people are now. Mr. Elggren then went 
and looked at that e-mail and said 53 percent used to be on 
the program and now only eight percent are, that means that 
there is a net savings of 30 percent. Does that make sense 
to you? The causation is about what Mr. Mantz did. And the 
calculation is about what Mr. Elggren did to link those two 
figures. 
THE COURT: All right. I think I understand the 
position now. 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: Okay. 
As we have gone — based on your previous order, the 
biggest thing pointed out by you is somehow the speculation 
was this 30 percent figure. And it was characterized as a 
guesstimate. And I think that what we have just gone 
through right here with the math shows that the 30 percent 
figure wasn't just pulled out of thin air, it was pulled out 
of the memo by Ryan Mantz as well as Scott's financial 
figures and it was done according to pretty simple 
accounting methods of addition, subtraction and 
multiplication. 
Furthermore, Mr. Elggren explained some of this in his 
deposition where plaintiffs are — or defendants had the 
opportunity to ask some questions about this and to 
understand this figure. So although — so unless there is 
some other degree of speculation by the court, the 
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30 percent figure having substantial basis cannot justify 
the court's decision to exclude his report as somehow 
unreliable. I'll point out that some of the other 
assumptions that were criticized made by -- supposedly made 
by Mr, Elggren that were also criticized by Mr. Rasmussen, 
the defendants' expert, are really not matters -- really not 
issues. First of all, several of them are matters of law. 
THE COURT: Before you get" into the details, you may 
have a good argument. Part of the problem though is the way 
this was presented to me that, you know, the defense said 
hey, here are a whole bunch of factors you haven't taken 
into account and then your response brief said well kind of 
we have done the best we can and it really didn't deal with 
the specifics that they came up with. I mean am I -- was I 
wrong? To some extent 1 was holding you to the procedural 
defect and the way you presented your argument. Was I 
unfair in doing that? 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: I believe so. And if you look at 
the Ninth Circuit case that we cited in our reply brief, 
which I also have a copy of and can give to you and the 
defendants, the court considered precisely the issue before 
this court and that was that there was a damage expert who 
had been called on to testify as to the amount of damage 
incurred by a company as false advertising against another 
company. 
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The damage expert, like the expert in this case, 
calculated damages based on the defendants' gain flowing 
from the bad act, the false advertisement in that case. And 
then the defendants argued that this expert's report was 
unreliable because it failed to take into account certain 
confounding causes* Those confounding causes, if you look 
on Page 143 of this case, are virtually identical to ours. 
These causes were things such as the weather, they point to 
the drought that was going on in California, economic 
recessions that may have been going on in the state, 
marketing changes, changes in the market for the particular 
type of trees and lawn care products sold by the companies, 
other lawful competitive efforts of the defendants and just 
comparison of the two products offered by the company. 
The court looked at this and he said these asserted 
defects in the expert's testimony go to the weight of the 
evidence and not the admissibility of the expert's report. 
We argued to the court that this case is essentially 
identical. 
THE COURT: Here is the difference I see. Mr. Gibb 
and his team said here are all of these false confounding 
variables and these variables go not to the weight to be 
given to the testimony, but to its very admissibility. And 
then in your response brief you essentially punted that 
issue and didn't come back. I mean, I think if you had come 
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back and said well, you know, here are some others, we think 
we do have some responses to that it would be one thing. 
But procedurally, you didn't do that in your opposition to 
their — to their motion at least the way I was 
understanding the pleadings that were coming in. 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: Well, yes, there are two things 
that I can say to that. First, although it may not have 
been specifically addressed in the pleadings, at the oral 
argument motion for summary judgment, I believe Mr. Johnson 
made clear we were disputing some of those facts. 
THE COURT: We typically don't let folks, especially 
in a case like this where we have piles of papers on both 
sides and say well, you know, my rhetorical flourish at the 
oral argument is sufficient to contravene disputed fact 
number 23(a)(2) or something. I mean — 
MS* WAITE-GROVER: Let me first point out one, we 
think that on a motion to strike it is inappropriate to deem 
as undisputed facts that aren't specifically controverted* 
There are only two rules of civil procedure that allow a 
court to do that and the first is Rule 8(d) which addresses 
pleadings, complaints, counter-claims, cross-claims and so 
forth. And then the second, the one cited by the court, is 
Rule 56 which is about motion for summary judgment. 
The motion to* strike is not a pleading and it is not a 
motion for summary judgment and therefore we believe that 
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the court and the defendants in asserting so lack a legal 
basis for deeming those as undisputed. Secondly, even if 
for some reason they are relevant factors that must be taken 
into account, I believe that it is Ninth Circuit case that 
clearly says that it goes to the weight and the credibility 
of the expert's testimony. If you fail to take those into 
account and at trial the plaintiffs are not able to rule out 
all of those confounding or intervening causes, it just 
makes its numbers look less credible because he didn't take 
those things into account. It doesn't destroy the 
admissibility of the report in and of itself because it 
doesn't render it less reliable. 
THE COURT: All right. I think I understand the 
position on that. Is there anything else critical that you 
wanted to tell me before I get to Mr. Ingram? 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: No. I think we were just going to 
point out just as a final detail that some of the other 
alleged defects as indicated by Mr. Rasmussen are actually 
things such as legal conclusions. 
One criticism he makes of Mr. Elggren is that he 
assumes the damages to TruGreen are best measured by revenue 
gains. That is a legal question that was never addressed 
and that has yet to be officially determined by the court. 
And other things are simply non-issues. . Mr. Elggren assumed 
that Mr. Mitch Smith is an expert in lawn care acquisition. 
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He had been designated as such arid until now, even I guess 
at this-point, we haven't officially ruled if he is going to 
be stricken as such. So many of the things that Mr. Dirk 
Rasmussen points out about the report are not actually 
factual disputes or things that relate to reliability, but 
just matters before the court that will ultimately be 
fleshed out in that sense. 
With regards to that, I believe that is all that we 
have to say on that and we urge the court to reconsider 
excluding Mr. Elggren's motion. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Waite-Grover. 
I'm glad to hear from Mr. Ingram now on where we end up on 
Mr. Smith. 
MR. INGRAM: I guess first, Your Honor, I think it is 
important to clarify the scope of Mr. Smith's Rule 72 
designation as an expert witness. It is a limited scope. 
The only scope of that is how is goodwill recognized in the 
lawn care industry. To get to that, you have to go back to 
the contracts which on both the old versions and the new 
versions identify goodwill as something that is going to be 
irrevocably harmed or damage in the contracts. You look at 
Scotts which have the same mirror almost verbatim the same 
language in there. In fact, the Scotts agreement has the 
same restitutionary measure as the old TruGreen agreement 
and that is any breach of any of these companies entitles 
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the employer to the revenues gained by virtue of such a 
breach. 
So the question then becomes well, what is goodwill? 
What is this intangible to the contracts we're talking 
about- So the question becomes then well, it is in both the 
TruGreen agreement, some of Scotts agreement. What is the 
industry recognition of law of goodwill? Mr- Smith's expert 
testimony is based upon 21 years experience in the lawn care 
business, over 45 acquisitions. And the question is how do 
you measure goodwill in the acquisition of these businesses? 
And the response, goodwill is essentially the existing 
customer revenue base of that company, a dollar for dollar 
measure of revenues essentially, times a negotiated 
multiplier or multipliers that have been done, customer 
base, geography, et cetera, et cetera. 
That is the scope of his expert opinion. It is 
essentially to say that the damage to goodwill is the 
customer revenue generated by these new employees when they 
went over to Scotts. In other words, the goodwill that 
TruGreen lost should be measured by the customer revenue and 
Dirk Rasmussen's report that shows how much money they 
generated on behalf of Scotts, The rest of Mr. Smith's 
testimony is left to just 7 01 lay opinion testimony which is 
as region manager of the northwest region market on a weekly 
basis he receives flash reports, he receives e-mail 
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summaries and these flash reports it shows how many sales 
representatives they have, the revenue that those sales 
representatives generated for the week, and the — or the — 
and then whether or not they're up to budget. And from that 
testimony it is in the record again, that summary judgment 
record where we testified that based upon his analysis of 
those documents, put him and his branch managers to prepare 
the same documents that are saying theirs is going to be a 
significant down turn in TruGreen's performance in 2006. 
There is a budgeting process that happens at the end of 
2005. Who is involved in that budgeting process? Ryan 
Mantz. • It is Larry Gaythwaite, Jason Hiller. And what is 
the standard in that budgeting process? They're held to — 
they're told to hey just pull a budget figure out of the 
air? No. They're expected to provide TruGreen with a 
realistic budgeted figure on what they expect to produce and 
in the deposition of Cory Horlacher which we provided to 
them on damages, he testifies that that budgeting is done in 
large and significant part to our veteran sales 
representatives and the revenues that they have produced in 
the past and we expect them to produce in 2006. 
THE COURT: I mean I think he can testify that our 
revenue is going down or isn't going up as fast as we 
thought it was going to be. But the — but to help your 
case at this juncture, at least as I'm understanding the 
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facts, he has got tof as a lay witness, say and the causal 
factor for that is those competitors over there at Scotts. 
And that is where I am thinking that is outside of the realm 
of 701 lay witness testimony. 
MR. INGRAM: Well, I guess that is where we1re kind of 
-- where something has been conflated I think in the 
defendant's argument. There are two different distinctions. 
One is there is a fact of damages and two there is a 
measurement of damages* And it seems to me we are having a 
situation where because you can't provide me a specific 
measure of damages, you can't show the fact of the damages. 
And what Mr. Smith and what his people can say is they 
can prove the fact of damages. And that is in 2005 we met 
our budget. In 2006 we didn't. In 2006 the reason we 
didn't meet our budget is because I lost my veteran sales 
representatives who were producing — who were my high 
producers in 2005. I lost my managers who were training 
those guys. And instead of selling in 2006, I had to train 
my managers to replace these guys* I had to reshuffle the 
board to make sure I was covered in Ogden for this 
depletion. I had to do all these things. I think the very 
least that establishes the fact of damages. And case law 
said, and I think we said this in summary judgment, once you 
establish the fact of damages, the measure of damages, the 
burden then isn't as great as showing the fact of damages. 
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The case law says defendants haVe to bear some weight in 
inaccuracy or something to do with the measurement of 
damages because after all, why are we even dealing with this 
hypothetical because of the wrong of the defendants, the 
breaches of contract, the departure of the employees. And I 
think one thing the court is struggling with again is just, 
you know, what is the causation? Well, we have talked about 
TruGreen's loss in profits. Maybe we can't at this point 
give the specific measure. I don't think it can ever be 
given a specific measure again, that is why I went for 
preliminary injunctive relief. Lost profits is one thing 
but why the defendants gain? Why restitutionary measure? 
Well, it goes back to what some of the losses are. There is 
discussion well these guys could have gone to Hawaii. How 
can you say you had an expectation that you would produce 
this in 2006 had they gone there? That is one point. But 
the other point in general, too, is look at the competitive 
market here. Scotts was a new franchisee, couple of years 
old, 2005 down in sales, they1re operating at a loss, 
they're operating in the red. In one month, they're able to 
completely skip the learning curve, provide premium guys 
with a ready made management and sales force to turn around 
their business and start making sales. Where did they get 
this learning curve? Was is it from Scotts? Was it some 
process already in place? No, it was from these employees. 
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It was from TruGreen. It was from the benefit was from Ryan 
Mantz's 13 years of experience at TruGreen that cost 
TruGreen money, that cost TruGreen experience here in the 
Utah marketplace not in Hawaii. Scotts is able to within 
months start cranking out numbers showing who is the top 
performers in Salt Lake in Idaho, surprise surprise it is 
Stephensen, LeBlanc, Van Acker. These are attached as 
exhibits to TruGreen's summary judgment motion. 
Causation. Again we look at Exhibit J to TruGreen"s 
summary judgment motion. Ryan Mantz, the new corporate 
development and expansion director subject less direct mail 
more sales. An exhaustive analysis that has never been 
rebutted by defendants, that has never been said is somehow 
inaccurate, but that is March 6th what is he attributing the 
success to? He is not attributing it to the weather. He is 
not attributing it to the processes already in place. He is 
saying hey, we did good last year, we're doing good this 
year, no immense improvements over last year. Our sales 
team has improved immensely over last year. Let's look at 
the other exhibits. Who is this sales team? Well, the top 
five performers are all former TruGreen employers. Take 
time to pat our sales managers on the back. They're really 
saving our bacon by teaching these guys how to maximize and 
relief who are these sales managers. It is Matt Walker. It 
is Larry Gaythwaite. It is Jason Hiller. It is Ryan Mantz. 
39 
Former TruGreen employees. Thank our rep and sales managers 
for not turning in a $228,000 year to date based upon 2005 
deficiencies, and instead getting us to the 900,000 mark 
through February. If this is not causation or the fact of 
damages, Your Honor, I'm not really sure what it is, 
THE COURT: All right. Let's assume you have 
convinced me on that, so there is damage. But then now we 
know that damages have to be proven with some, you know, 
what is the phrase, reasonable certainty or something like 
that. 
MR. INGRAM: Well I think first it is a more strict 
burden to show whether you have been damaged in fact and the 
burden is somewhat, I think, in this case you may be even 
more diminished when you're going into measurement of 
damages and that is in the TruGreen summary judgment motion 
and the -- again --
THE COURT: But the damage could be a dollar or it 
could be you all are asking for $2.7 million. I mean, you 
know, assume you got a jury verdict for $2.7 million. Would 
that just be speculation? I mean --
MR. INGRAM: Well, I'm --
THE COURT: What would be the specific, you know, what 
would be the specific underpinnings for some verdict like 
that? 
MR. INGRAM: Well, the specific underpinnings, I 
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think, are the numbers that have been generated through 
here. We can show how much Mr. LeBlanc sold for Scotts' in 
2006. We can show how much these other defendants sold in 
2006, We can show how these branches performed in 2006 
based upon the numbers. And I guess the issue is well these 
intervening causes go to the amount and should effect — 
should effect the amount or what not. But, again, Your 
Honor, why are we analyzing these intervening factors? Is 
it because TruGreen hasn't been damaged? No. We're 
analyzing these factors because they have created the wrong. 
There has been an increase in revenue and the case law says 
that they have to bear some of the burden for that. They 
have to bear some of the burden to say no, this is not why 
we increased. And where in Dirk Rasmussen's report is it 
saying — is it attributed to other factors. Well — 
THE COURT: Is it all coming down to the issue, talk 
me through here, I think some things are crystallizing. Is 
it all coming down to a restitution notion? That a dollar 
that they get ought to come back to you. Is that — is 
that --
MR, INGRAM: Yes. 
THE COURT: So — 
MR. INGRAM: And I think defendants should bear some 
burden in that- That if there is some inaccuracies 
associated with that, they need to bear some burden in 
showing why there is an actual inaccuracy there because they 
have created the problem. They have — they have brought 
the guys over who generated the revenue for this. They have 
created the problem and I think that Mr. Rasmussen has got 
to have a similar burden than just saying well, he hasn't 
considered the weather, he hasn't considered new products, 
he hasn't considered this. He can go on and on and on about 
these factors. But curiously omitted from this report is 
any quantification of that. It is simply, well, they put 
out more direct mailers in 2006 and that is why they sold 
more. The e-mail of their own witness rebuts that. Less 
direct mail, more sales. And I guess if -- I guess we're 
coming back here we need to keep these things separate, the 
fact of damage and the measurement of damages. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. INGRAM: And the measurement we have got are the 
revenues that these guys generated. Those are hard dollar 
figures. If they're going to show some inaccuracy there, I 
think they need to bear some of that burden. Urn, some of 
these intervening factors from the deposition of 
*Mr. Rasmussen is identified they couldn't have been 
accounted for because more didn't have the daily access to 
them in their records. And maybe Mr. Johnson can clarify 
that a little bit more but — 
THE COURT: I mean the reason — let's go back to the 
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restitution point. Now sitting here right this second, it 
seems to me that if I ruled that yeah restitution is the 
proper measure of damages here, and then as you suggested 
there is circumstantial evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that you all have been damaged, and now, well, okay 
well what would be one measure of restitution? Well, 
Stephensen made $280,000 in sales for them and that should 
have been for you all. But I'm wondering whether I should 
get -- I hate to suggest more briefing here, but what we 
really need then is briefing on whether restitution is the 
right measure of damages because I'm not sure or is that 
stipulated? 
MR. INGRAM: That is briefed. That is basically the 
essence of our damages. Because it is supported by the 
contracts which say, at least in the old agreements and new 
agreements which say the revenue increase, i.e. restitution 
that they -- the unfair competitive gain. Again, this is 
all about unfair competition, the unfair competitive gain. 
The ability of Scotts to skip that learning curve that cost 
TruGreen money and years of experience. And how do you 
measure that? 
And again, coming back down to the measurement, I 
think it is something different from the — from the fact 
again because frankly the guys like Ryan Mantz they're not 
— they're not out there hitting the pavement like these 
guys, I guess, and making the sales. They are not 
attributing a dollar figure to these guys. Does that mean 
that there is no harm? Does that mean that he hasn't harmed 
TruGreen somehow by showing Scotts the methods or his new 
management technique? No, of course there is harm there. 
But how do you measure that? And the case law says, well, 
the defendants have got to bear some of the burden of that. 
Again, the hypothetical is only made a hypothetical by the 
very wrong of the defendant. Ryan Mantz again, you know, 
thank our reps and. sales manager- I'm sorry I sound like a 
broken record here, Your Honor, but I guess --
THE COURT: No, I think I'm getting a feel for your 
position now so I appreciate that. Is there anything 
critical? I should hear from the other side here at some 
point. 
MR. INGRAM: No. 
MR. JOHNSON: If you want that brief, Your Honor, 
we'll be happy to do it. 
THE COURT: Right. Mr. Johnson says he is happy to do 
it, Mr. Ingram. 
MR. INGRAM: I guess so. 
MR. JOHNSON: I'm --
THE COURT: Is it unanimous? 
MR. INGRAM: I'll be happy to spend some time on that, 
Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: It was briefed. I guess I was hoping to 
kind of take a short cut. And as you know, my tentative 
opinion said well, we'll duck that issue. And maybe as I 
think through it with you I want to hear from the other side 
on this, maybe that is the critical issue here because 
restitution is the right measure, it would be my tentative 
thought is you do have some evidence of things that could be 
restitution. 
MR. INGRAM: Again, I guess I think why it wouldn't be 
beneficial again remember one of the problems of having to 
deal with here from the beginning the losses that we have 
heard from the defendants is well, this loss of customers 
and it is even reflected again in Dirk Rasmussen's report. 
I have seen no causation because I haven't seen the shift in 
customers. 
Well, again, what are the critical issues here? Is it 
the customers or is it the training? Is it the know how? 
Is it, again, the ability to skip the learning curve. And I 
think, again at this point, dismissing — conflating 
measurement of damages or putting together a measurement of 
damages and the fact of damages together and then drawing an 
inference in favor of Scotts on- their motion I guess just 
seemed to me not a firm enough basis to grant summary 
judgment. It seems to me if we can show causation, maybe 
not prove causation or at least draw a reasonable inference 
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of causation through the numbers, their e-mails, they are 
all part of the suitunary judgment record, and it is simply an 
issue of measurement which we're saying we have got numbers, 
we can figure this out somehow. Something that should go to 
trial. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Ingram. 
Mr. Gibb, I'm glad to hear from you all on all of 
these subjects* Let me just give you a heads up. The thing 
that I'm thinking where the plaintiffs have made some 
headway on is the theory that damages could be done on a 
restitution basis and we have got evidence in the record of 
sales and so forth that support restitution as a measure of 
damages. So I'm glad to hear -- I don't know how you want 
to structure your presentation, but that is one point I'm 
hoping that you'll touch on. 
MR. GIBB: I'll be happy to, Your Honor. Mr. Olson 
and I are going to divide the time and I think it may be 
appropriate to simply address the exhibits that have been 
proffered to the court and to alert, the court as to how 
they're being misconstrued. In the first instance though I 
must say that the preliminary injunction of the plaintiffs 
did not say that they did not suffer any damages. Indeed 
they submitted a report and a letter from Mr. Elggren 
regarding their damages that he has since abandoned in his 
expert report.. So this has been firmly in front of the 
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court from day one and the plaintiffs have been pleading it 
from day one but have failed to do so with the specificity 
necessary here. 
They have now lost their expert, according to the 
court's prior ruling, because he failed to do what? He 
failed to show that our profit was their lost goodwill which 
is the restitutionary basis that the court is considering at 
this point. 
This is another iteration of Mr. Elggren's improper 
reasoning and calculation in his expert report. They have 
just renamed it as a legal theory at this point in time. 
The court will need to consider several things with regard 
to Exhibit 20 that they have prorfered to the court. 
THE COURT: That is these blow ups here? 
MR. GIBB: That is these blow ups and the ones that 
you were given. It is discussed in Mr. Rasmussen's report 
at paragraphs 195 and 196, and I'll try to read not quickly 
for your reporter here, it says, "Mr. Elggren failed to 
appropriately consider that a certain amount of Mower 
Brothers revenues during the damage period are and were 
attributed to the Mower Brothers employees who have never 
been affiliated with TruGreen. Furthermore, there are a 
certain amount of Mower Brothers revenues that are not 
associated with any particular employee but rather are 
ascribed to advertising sources. From the Mower Brothers 
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data base, I was able to find the revenue generated by both 
the defendants and by employees who worked at Mower Brothers 
but were not previously affiliated with TruGreen. The break 
down of these amounts could be seen in Exhibit 20 which is 
before the court. Based on this analysis, I found that 
65 percent of the total revenue was generated by employees 
who have never been affiliated with TruGreen. As shown in 
Exhibit 20, if Mr, Elggren had analyzed Mower Brothers data 
base, which was available to him, he would have found that 
contrary to some of the underlying assumptions in his 
economic damage calculations, the revenue increases were not 
primarily attributed to the defendant employees, but rather 
to non-defendant employees." 
That is how Mr. Rasmussen created Exhibit 20 and that 
is what he went back and used it for. You have to take 
Mr. Rasmussen at his word that he has done precisely the 
thing that Mr. Ingram just argued. We have gone out and 
taken their restitutionary theory, that Mr. Elggren 
proffered, and come up with the other factors and shown the 
court that even under that theory, and even under that 
theory as calculated by lost profits because you have to 
calculate it by reducing revenues with costs and other 
things, that all of these other factors do not point to 
damages being suffered by these plaintiffs. Indeed, given 
all of the factors that the court has previously ruled were 
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relevant, he has shown in his report, and the plaintiffs 
have not rebutted it, that all of those factors dictate 
dismissal as the court's preliminary ruling suggests. 
THE COURT: Here is — I think you may — you know, 
maybe — I have got a legal question and you're making a 
factual argument. Let me give you this as a way of 
crystalizing it. So Mr. Johnson calls as his first witness 
at trial Stephensen, let's say. So how much did you sell 
last year for TruGreen? I sold 280,000 or maybe it is less, 
you know, but it is some amount. And then he says, okay, 
judge, that is our damage figure 280,000. We want 
restitution. Is he legally entitled to take Stephensen"s 
sales or maybe you would have to make it profits, let's say 
the profit margin on that is whatever so say it is 50,000 in 
profits. Is he entitled to get that legally back to Scotts 
as a restitution for competing when he shouldn't have. 
MR. GIBB: I think the court has answered that in its 
prior order very expressly no. And the reason for that is 
that the court said that the defendants have offered as an 
undisputed fact, and TruGreen has not contested it, that 
various factors would have to be taken into account in 
developing such a calculation and then it lists, on Page 39 
and 40 of the order, factors A through I which would also 
necessarily have to be taken into count when calculating 
that revenue. And it is also — this is all tied together 
because it is also the very reason that Mitch Smith cannot 
say the very same thing that Mr. Elggren attempts to say. 
And that is, I had revenues in 2005. I set a budget in 
2006. And now it didn't get met. And so therefore any loss 
that I get from that is attributable to them, and any gain 
that they realize is my restitution. No. The court knows 
and has previously ruled, correctly we believe, that the 
appropriate measure of damage must consider these other 
factors. And the plaintiffs were under an obligation at 
summary judgment to go ahead and rebut those contentions as 
contained in the report of Mr. Rasmussen. They failed to do 
so. And the court found they were deemed admitted and they 
are now the record on summary judgment before the court. 
So with respect to that issue, even if you start with 
the restitutionary basis, and you have to consider these 
other additional factors. And we did that, even though we 
weren't obligated to do so on summary judgment, 
Mr. Rasmussen went through, and I'll just cite the court 
quickly. 
THE COURT: I mean I'm still — let me just bring you 
back because this is where I'm getting hung up here. I 
thought I was ruling on sort of a lost profit damage 
calculation expert saying, you know, these folks were 
competing and it hurt these folks by X amount and I'm saying 
wait a minute, to do that you have got to take into account 
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dollar, you 
going 
made 
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in sales, we should get that as restitution. I mean where 
is — does the law allow you to do that? 
MR. GIBB: No. 
THE COURT: So help me understand. 
MR. GIBB: No, because there has to be a causation 
basis for that. The court, as it properly found in its 
prior opinion, stated that you have to. go through and show 
how it is attributable to each of the individual defendants. 
And you have to go through and --
THE COURT: See that is the answer they say okay 
Stephensen he is the defendant here, 280,000 in sales, we 
want his sales, they should have been ours, we want them. 
We want them for us. 
MR. GIBB: Um, no. Legally they have to show why they 
are entitled to that from a causation standpoint and they 
have to be able to do that with the facts in the case. 
Mr. Rasmussen has testified at Paragraph 73 of his report 
regarding the causation elements that would need to be 
considered when looking at that measure, and he is also 
analyzed at Paragraph 160 through 191 of his report what is 
wrong with Mr* Elggren's methodology with respect to that 
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issue. Mr. Elggren assumed what the defendants are asking 
you to do and that is namely that there was a restitution 
basis. The only thing they have to prove is this amount 
that Scotts made. And the court properly found that the 
true measure of damage in this case is lost profits because 
you do have to make appropriate reductions. And then when 
calculating lost profits, that you have to calculate these 
other factors- And my other point to you is, even if you 
were to take a restitution basis and say it is that flat 
amount, you are still going to have to reduce it by the 
factors that Mir. Rasmussen considered and then ultimately 
explained it in his expert — expert report. 
Now Mr. Olson is going to talk a little bit more about 
that and I can visit the other parts that I was going to 
talk about were and I can just briefly give you an outline 
of where I was going. First of all, Mr, Mantz*s memo is a 
March 16th memo. So it takes into account from January to 
March 16th of 2006. Mr. Rasmussen's report is for the 
entire year from October, in fact before that, from October 
of 2005, to be safe, through December of 2006. So to the 
extent that the court is looking at data, it should look at 
Mr. Rasmussen1s report with respect to that. 
Urn, with respect to — 
THE COURT: Can we go back to the restitution. I'm 
still hung up on this. And maybe it is because my 
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background, as you all know, is probably more on the 
criminal side of things. 
So in a criminal case, if a bank robber goes in and 
takes $10,000 from a bank and, you know, he is convicted, 
you know, give the $10,000 back. 
MR. GIBB: Right. 
THE COURT: So when -I hear Mr. Johnson and Mr. Ingram 
say okay, restitution, we had a guy working for us, 
Stephensen, let's say, and he was making sales for us. Now 
he is making sales over there and we want restitution. I am 
thinking, okay, whatever he sold over there, they're saying 
just give it back to us and they have got the numbers to 
show what that is. Is there something legally wrong or 
chronologically wrong with that? 
MR, GIBB: Yes. Restitution puts the party back in 
the position it was prior to the damage being incurred. And 
so in order to do that, you have to not only factor what was 
gained over here, but what it cost to do that. And then you 
also have to show that that was causally linked to their 
damage. Because the gain of one party does not necessarily 
mean that this -- that is this other party's damage. And 
therefore you have to show connections for each of the 
defendants as to why this amount of increase is their 
damage. And there are a number of factors that 
Mr. Rasmussen goes through, there is branding, there is — 
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there is number of employees. There is a number of other 
factors that he has talked about in his report regarding 
what needs to be considered. Relative experience of the 
employees- Whether or not their job duties were similar at 
TruGreen and at Scotts. Whether or not they were in the 
same geographic area and other things like that. 
All of those factors need to be considered when 
fashioning a restitution based remedy. Now, they would like 
you to say that we have expert testimony from Mr. Elggren. 
That Mr. Elggren has said based upon the Scotts franchise 
agreement, there is a dollar for dollar correlation between 
goodwill being purchased in a re-purchase by Scotts of a 
franchise under its franchise agreement, and that means that 
that equals goodwill that we have lost. No. They have to 
show that relationship causally, with all of the evidence 
that is currently before the court on the summary judgment 
record, they have failed to rebut it in the summary judgment 
record, and it is now undisputed for that reason. 
THE COURT: See you keep moving into the facts and I'm 
still thinking law here. I'm still thinking that I heard 
from the plaintiffs in their briefs that it is an unresolved 
question of Utah law as to whether you can just, you know, 
award restitution on a competitor, move it over from --
MR, GIBB: Let me let Mr. Olson address that. 
THE COURT: I appreciate — your advocacy is always 
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very gpod but maybe I'm — 
MR. GIBB: If you have questions about the 
reconsideration or --
THE COURT: I'm not trying to — that is to say I'm 
not — - I appreciated the arguments of Ms. Waite-Grover, but 
Irm still not convinced that on that particular piece I 
still think I made the right decision on getting Elggren out 
of here. But maybe you want to take a run at this, 
Mr. Olson. 
MR. OLSON: I'll take my best shot. I think I 
understand your question. I've tried to follow where you're 
going with this and I think Mark is right. I would like to 
focus — he got into the facts. I would like to focus a 
little bit more on the law. 
First, we have — we have addressed the proper measure 
of damages ad nauseam in our briefs. Our summary judgment 
opposition went on for several pages, it was Page 40 to 51 
of our summary judgment opposition where we addressed the 
measure of damages. What is interesting about TruGreen's 
recent briefing, particularly the reply brief, is that no 
Utah or Idaho cases are cited with respect to restitution 
allegedly being a proper measure of damages. 
Utah courts and Idaho courts have already spoken on 
this. They have already stated that restitution is not the 
proper measure of damages both for the contract breaches 
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that we're dealing with, and for the tortious interference 
claims that have been raised- And you know Mr. Gibb 
mentioned that restitution is putting the party back in a 
position that it was in had the breach not occurred. And 
that is reflected in the Polyglycol case which was a 
restitution case in Utah that is cited in TruGreen's reply 
brief. I don't have the — it is actually Page 6 of the 
reply brief. They cite the Polyglycol case which says that 
an action for restitution is appropriate when claiming 
recision as an alternative to an action for damages. The 
problem with that is this is a damages case, not a recision 
case. There has been no attempt to rescind any of the 
contracts they are instead claiming damages. The Dunn case, 
I think, resolves some of the concerns that the court 
mentioned. And I didn't print an extra copy. Frankly I 
didn't expect to get too heavily into restitution today. 
THE COURT: See the thing that — what has been 
crystallized in my mind is I have been trying to avoid, I 
guess, doing the hard work of figuring out what the law is 
on damages, thinking oh, we'll do that when we get to jury 
instructions and so forth. But I think the oral argument at 
least to me has crystallized that I have got to get firmly 
in mind what the measure of damages is before I can rule on 
whether one side or the other has enough evidence on that. 
And it seems to me to be pretty clear that if the measure 
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were dollars you all were earning, could be handed over to 
them and they have got evidence of that and I shouldn't 
grant summary judgment. But if the measure is more figure 
out exactly how much, you know, you were disadvantaged by 
all of this, then you're on a stronger footing for summary 
judgment argument along the lines of my tentative order. 
MR. OLSON: I understand. And I have plenty of other 
things I could talk about, but let's focus on this. 
THE COURT: This is the one that is troubling me the 
most right now. 
MR. OLSON: The Dunn case was kind of an interesting 
case. It is an Idaho Court of Appeals case and it dealt 
with a breach of a covenant not to compete that was 
ancillary to a sale of the business. 
And Mr. Johnson referenced it today and said that the 
Dunn case adopted some sort of restitutionary 
measure. I'm not aware that you'll find the word 
restitution any where in the case and, in fact, it says just 
the opposite- It says that lost profits is the measure of 
damages. 
THE COURT: Is Dunn your best case? 
MR. OLSON: Is Dunn our best case? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. OLSON: Urn, as to the measure of damage? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
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MR. OLSON: For breach of a covenant not to compete, I 
think it probably is our best case. 
THE COURT: Let me — I'm thinking, we have been going 
for a while. I think it makes sense to give my court 
reporter a break. To take 15 minutes. I'll take a look at 
Dunn. I should ask Mr. Johnson and Mr. Ingram what is your 
best case on this that you would like me to take a look at? 
MR. OLSON: Could I just say pages 61 to 62. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. OLSON: Where it talks about lost profits being 
the measure and where the plaintiff's lost profits claim was 
rejected because he didn't focus on his own losses but 
focused on the defendants gains. 
THE COURT: And for your side, was there a case I 
should be looking at? 
MR. JOHNSON: Probably in our summary judgment motion/ 
the National Merchandising case- I don't know if I have --
if we have the citation, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: What is the cite on that case? 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: 348 Northeast 2d 771. That is a 
Massachusetts case. 
THE COURT: All right. Why don't we take about a 15 
minute break. I know we've been going on for a while here, 
but this is an important juncture in the case and is that 
convenient? 
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MR. OLSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, it is. 
MR. OLSON: If I could just add, Dunn is our best case 
on lost profits for breach of contract in Idaho. It is the 
Robbins case that we have cited that in assessing actual 
damages for breach of a non-compete in Utah. It is the 
Robbins case. The tortious interference cases that we have 
cited, they are all cited in those pages of our brief and 
they include, let's see, here it is, in Utah the Sampson 
case which recognizes the restatement of tort section 
774(a). And in Idaho, the Barlow case which adopts that 
same restatement provision. Both of those cases say that 
the loss of benefits under the contract or consequential 
damages caused by the interference is the-measure. And 
those are the cases, Judge. 
THE COURT: They have given my a couple more cases. 
Do you want to give me a couple more? 
MR. JOHNSON: I think the careful reading of the 
Storage Tech, Your Honor, notwithstanding the treatment of 
the expert in that case is eerily similar to the treatment 
of the expert in this case. I think it does support the 
restitutionary measure and I think, Heather, do you have the 
cite? 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: I'll give you a third citation. It 
is the restatement second of tort section 774(a) 
particularly Comment C where it talks about actual losses 
being difficult in certain contract cases. 
THE COURT: Restatement — I'm sorry, 774* 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: A. 
THE COURT: A as in apple? 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: Correct. 
THE COURT: Is there a comment in particular? 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: Comment C. 
THE COURT: Why don't we — if it is convenient for 
you all, I know we have a lot of lawyers here and 
everything, but could you come back at 12:30? Is that — 
MR. JOHNSON: Sure. 
MR. OLSON: That is fine. 
MR. INGRAM: With respect to this, this has been 
briefed pretty heavily. If you go back to summary judgment, 
all these cases are in there including one factor which I 
think is important, which is the reason why restitution 
becomes important is when you have all these competing 
interests and not simply just customer A and customer B 
which is a big factor in lost profits but extraordinary 
training. 
THE COURT: I think I let the lawyers down here 
because when I was doing my first summary judgment ruling, I 
said okay, let's just park damages over here and let's focus 
on liability. And then having done that, now I got some 
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more briefing on causality but I didn't go back to read the 
cases in the briefs as thoroughly as I should have. So in 
20 minutes I'll try to rectify that error just a little bit 
and see you all shortly, 
MR. GIBB: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. 
{Recess.) 
THE COURT: All right* I have had a chance to review 
some of the cases and I apologize to everyone for keeping 
everyone through lunch here. I also apologize because I 
think I have created some difficulty here in an effort to 
mentally compartmentalize when we would address some issues 
and when we wouldn't and I kept thinking that this is a jury 
instruction issue so I can deal with that in a week or two 
but I clearly should have been focusing on it more. And I 
have tried to focus on it during the break. 
As I sit here right now, this is what I am thinking. 
The issue is whether there is some measure of restitutionary 
damages that is gained to the defendant that can now be 
handed over to the plaintiff. And then we're in Idaho and 
Utah so the question boils down does Idaho recognize that 
and does Utah recognizes that. My current thought is Idaho 
does not recognize such a theory based on the Dunn case in 
which there is a sentence that says the measure of damages 
is not the amount of profits made by the defendant, rather 
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it is the amount of profit lost to the plaintiff because of 
the breach. I suppose you could try to distinguish that or 
something but that seems to me to be a pretty good 
indication of the Idaho courts would not recognize the 
theory, 
Utah law, however, seems to me to be an open question. 
Sampson talks about the fact, as Mr. Ingram was pointing 
out, that once the act of damages has been established, you 
can go with the lesser proof on the amount of damages over 
nonetheless you have to have reasonable assumptions or 
projections- And it is still very difficult for me to see 
how the plaintiff is going to do that. But the plaintiffs 
have said way wait a minute, the way we're going to do it is 
the way they do it out in Massachusetts in these cases like 
National Merchandising Corporation versus Layden. There 
they don't even mess around at least with the plaintiffs 
election they don•t have to mess around with showing that 
there has been a loss to the plaintiff. You can simply show 
gain to the defendant and that is enough to move — to move 
forward. 
So the way I see things, the question boils down to 
whether the Utah Supreme Court would follow the lead of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in cases like 
National Merchandising Corporation in recognizing that 
theory. And as I read through the cases, I don't see 
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anything that really gives me much of a feeling for what the 
Utah courts would do with this. I don't see — I see the 
recision case that is Polyglycol being a recision case which 
I think is distinguishable. Robbins versus Finlay and the 
liquidated damages case that doesn't seem to me to speak to 
that. And Sampson, while talking about loss to the 
plaintiff, doesn't seem to foreclose this other theory. If 
it were to up me, if I were the one that got to write the 
law, I would say the Massachusetts court has it right. That 
restitution ought to be a reasonable measure of damages. 
But this isn't a question for me to decide. It is a 
question of what Utah law would be and what the Utah courts 
would recognize. If I were to rule this second, my thought 
is that I would certify to the Utah Supreme Court the 
question of whether it would follow the lead of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court on this theory. I wonder if 
that looks like a cop out because it will slow the case down 
for a while. 
But the problem is if I move forward now, I have got 
to*make a prediction one way or another. If I grant summary 
judgment for the defense on the theory that the Utah Supreme 
Court would not recognize the theory, then plaintiff goes up 
I guess to the Tenth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit would 
probably say I think the same thing I'm thinking. We don't 
know what Utah law is- We have to ask the Utah Supreme 
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Court. 
On the other hand, if I rule against the defense and 
rule in favor of the plaintiff and say I'm going to go with 
the theory that the Utah courts would follow the 
Massachusetts case, then we have a whole trial and all of 
the money attendant to that on a flimsy legal foundation. 
So that is what I did in the last 20 minutes. I think 
Mr. Olson is up to bat and that is where I'm sitting right 
now. I'm glad to hear from either you or Mr. Gibb about 
where we are going. 
MR. OLSON: I'll start. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. OLSON: Okay. I want to stick to these issues and 
then perhaps I'll just quickly respond to some of the other 
issues that we wanted to talk about. I'll try to breeze 
through those. Okay. First, I do want to make clear that 
we have got both contract claims and tortious interference 
claims• 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. OLSON: And even within a contract realm we have 
multiple different claims that have been raised. Some of 
which have already been discarded, some of which are still 
in play. 
THE COURT: And Irm painting with a broad bush here 
but I'm thinking the legal issues are similar regardless of 
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which of the contract claims we're under and I haven't 
really conceptualized whether it is different on a contract 
claim or a tort claim. But I'm assuming similar issues 
would arise on both. The Massachusetts case is a tort case, 
I would take it, and there is still — there are still — 
are there still Utah tort claims alive at this point? 
MR. OLSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: So the Utah — 
MR. OLSON: The Utah tortious interference claims are 
still alive and I think those can be disposed of for the 
same reasons as the Idaho cases in light of the restatement 
of torts. I guess what I would like to do is maybe separate 
out the different contract claims and separate out from 
those contract claims the tort claims. Because I do think 
different legal principles will apply. And in the event the 
court is going to go ahead and make some certification, 
certainly we don't think that would be necessary and I will 
explain why, but it should be narrowly limited to what is 
left, I guess- It can't be decided based on the law that we 
have. 
First as to -- let me just start with the tortious 
interference claims. And pointing specifically to Sampson V 
Richins, which is the Utah Supreme Court case, excuse me, 
Utah Court of Appeals, not Supreme Court, 770 P2d 998, it 
addresses on Page 1006 and 1007 the restatement second of 
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torts. Now the reference that was made by Ms. Waite-Grover 
is to comment of that restatement that says that damages are 
difficult to prove. We understand that damages are 
difficult to prove. They still need to be proven with some 
degree of reasonable certainty. And it is the restatement 
section itself that dictates what that measure is and it 
says, in this case, that it recognizes the restatement 
provision that says damages are limited to the pecuniary 
loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective 
relation or consequential losses for which the interference 
is a legal cause. 
And then the court goes on to say, referring to judge 
Croft, the trial judge, "thus, Judge Croft's findings must 
identify actual pecuniary losses suffered by Richtron, the 
plaintiff, as a result of Sampson's conduct." Okay. So 
tortious interference in Utah requires an assessment of the 
actual losses as a result of, as it says, so, caused by the 
tortious interference. So we think that is established. 
Nothing in this case would lead to a conclusion that some 
sort of restitutionary measure of damages would apply. 
THE COURT: I haven't had a chance to work through all 
of the case lav/ supporting the Massachusetts approach to 
this, but I'm assuming the Massachusetts approach to this 
was not crafted in ignorance of the fact that the 
restatement talks about losses and so forth. 
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MR. OLSON: Certainly. And courts are entitled to 
take different sides of issues. But unfortunately, for 
TruGreen's position, we are stuck with what the Utah Court 
of Appeals and Supreme Court have said with respect to these 
issues. And since that statement has been made by the Court 
of Appeals, we think that the court should follow it. 
Again, with respect to the tortious interference 
claims, and the Barlow case and the other case that we have 
cited on damages brief, or excuse me, in our summary 
judgment opposition in Idaho it also recognized this 
restatement provision which again focuses on the pecuniary 
loss of the benefits of the contract. The benefits of the 
contract aren't some one else's gains. They're the 
plaintiff's losses. And it is that simple with respect to 
tortious interference. 
Going to the contract issues, Your Honor, and again as 
I mentioned, there are several different contract issues. 
The one specific issue that was raised in Dunn was the 
covenant not to compete which is one of the four claims that 
have been raised in this case. As for the covenant not to 
compete, Your Honor has already noted as in Dunn that it is 
limited to lost profits. The reason that causation comes 
into play, with respect to the different damages or excuse 
me summary judgment going the wrong direction to the 
different breach of contract claims, again for breach of the 
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confidentiality provision, the non-solicitation of 
customers, the non-interference of employees, the reason 
that causation is so important is because different damages 
flow from those breaches. 
Let's take an example. We have talked about 
Stephensen. We should probably talk about someone else 
because the court has already determined that he didn't have 
a covenant not to compete. So let's pick one of the Idaho 
guys. Clogston. James Clogston, let's assume, as has 
happened, that he has gone from TruGreen to Mower Brothers. 
He gets to Mower Brothers and, you know, our opinion, again, 
I don't want to delve into facts, but it goes to show how 
causation is important. Mower Brothers business is centered 
on heavy advertising* Mr. Clogston was an inquiry salesman 
meaning that these fliers-would go out to people and they 
would return them or they would call in and say yeah, I want 
to sign up. And Clogston is the inquiry salesman sitting in 
the office, calls them back and makes the sale. Okay? What 
TruGreen has to show is that it would have obtained those 
sales had Clogston not breached his covenant not to compete. 
And what that has to take into account is, for example, is 
as-mentioned in Mr. Rasmussen's affidavit and as the court 
recognized in its summary judgment order, that the court 
would need to take into account would TruGreen have obtained 
that sale? What kind of advertising does TruGreen do.? Does 
68 
it do a sufficient level of advertising that it would have 
obtained that customer? And so on with the other causation 
factors. Those have to be taken into account before the 
court can say that that particular sale to a particular 
customer by James Clogston would have been obtained by 
TruGreen if not breached. And that is the analysis that 
Mr. Elggren failed to do and it is this precise same 
analysis that TruGreen's lay witnesses cannot replicate. 
Mr. Elggren has not attempted to do it even though 
Mr. Rasmussen, as illustrated by his expert report, laid out 
the framework for being able to do it, that it can be done. 
They just haven't done it. This isn't an issue of damages 
being difficult to compute. It is an issue of damages not 
having been computed and the proper assessment not having 
been done. 
So I would like to submit, I suppose, the issues 
relating to the measure of damages with that unless the 
court has any other questions relating to the cases or any 
of those issues. 
THE COURT: So I mean you — if we're in 
Massachusetts, you would lose. Is that a premise we both --
MR. OLSON: As to tortious interference? 
THE COURT: As to tortious interference. 
MR. OLSON: Perhaps. Perhaps as to tortious 
interference. But that is a completely different issue. 
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And again, tortious interference they have to show that the 
actual interference with a contract resulted in this damage. 
In Massachusetts perhaps it is a little bit different. But 
here, you have to show that that tortious interference 
caused you an item of damage which has not been shown. And 
again procedurally we're here on summary judgment. It was 
their burden to come forward with some evidence showing such 
a loss on summary judgment. And what Your Honor has heard 
today, as has been stated in TruGreen's latest briefing, is 
not what damages have been shown, it is what damages we hope 
or we think we might be able to show, our witnesses may have 
the wherewithal to show- And it is a little too late for 
that. We have to have something now and it has to have been 
presented already. 
Urn, there hasn't been any alternative damages theory 
that TruGreen has come up with. The restitution theory that 
we have been dealing with today is the same one that 
Mr. Elggren attempted. We have not seen any evidence that 
would permit any lay witness to be able to replicate it. 
Urn, one issue I would like to point out so that the record 
is clear, is that TruGreen*s own -- TruGreen has made some 
statements in its briefs just recently, now that it is 
starting to actually try to focus on its own losses, 
TruGreen has made a statement in its reply brief, this is on 
--on Page 14 and Page 15 of its damages reply brief, that 
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TruGreen has suffered certain iost sales or lost revenues 
from 2005 to 2006. But I would like to point out, and it 
has been mentioned today, is that there is no evidence in 
the summary judgment record, that TruGreen lost sales and 
lost customers from 2005 to 2006. In fact, TruGreen*s own 
evidence suggests the opposite. 
Mr. Omas, O-M-A-S, however you say his name, he stated 
in his deposition, this is one of TruGreen's own witnesses, 
that TruGreen had more customers at its Boise office in 2006 
than it had in 2005. This is his testimony on Page 55 and 
56 of his deposition. So the evidence shows that if 
anything, TruGreen gained customers from 2005 to 2006. 
Briefly, with respect to Exhibit 93, and I won't; waste 
a lot of time on that, Mr. Johnson did indicate that their 
evidence of a causal connection between breaches and losses 
is Exhibit 93, We have moved to strike it. The reason 
being is number one it has never been offered on summary 
judgment, it has never been authenticated. It was prepared 
by someone else. It was never submitted in an affidavit in 
this case and the court shouldn't consider it. 
THE COURT: Is there — I didn't see in your pleadings 
a Daubert type challenge or Kumho Tire type challenge and 
frankly it occurs to me that that is the more central 
problem with that document rather than, you know, some 
question, some technical question of foundation or 
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authentication or something like that. 
MR. OLSON: Well, I think that is true. They would 
need an expert to be able to come in and tie together the 
allegations of that document. Whatever they are, we're not 
certain what it alleges. But it -- it purports to be a 
comparison between TruGreen employees and our employees, or 
former TruGreen employees. An expert would need to come in 
and lay some foundation for it and show how that creates 
some sort of causation of damages. 
THE COURT: I didn't see that in your pleadings yet 
and I'm wondering whether that — does that come up in a 
couple of weeks at the final pretrial, something by way of a 
motion in limine? 
MR. OLSON: Well — 
THE COURT: The way I see that document is, you know, 
from your perspective, and obviously the plaintiff has a 
different perspective, and some sales person says by golly 
look at all the people that left. I bet we would have made 
$2.7 million more if they were here and writes that down. 
The -- and the sales person is just speculating, let's 
assume. We wouldn't admit Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 93 
with that number written down because it would be simply 
speculation. 
Now, if a qualified expert said by golly having 
considered all of the relevant factors, I think it is 2.7 
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million and writes that down, then we would be in a 
different situation. So the real question is whether the 
person writing down the numbers had a sufficient evidentiary 
or sufficient expertise to reach that conclusion. That 
seems to me to be the issue presented there. 
MR. OLSON-: I understand. The 7 02 challenge to that 
really goes through the motion to exclude Mitch Smith as an 
expert. To the extent Mitch Smith is being used to bring in 
that document, certainly he is not qualified to opine as to 
how that creates some sort of damages theory. There has 
been no damages theory that has been presented to us or 
damages calculation in initial disclosures or on summary 
judgment that relates to that document. It is a document 
that has been thrown in in the last minute. And the best we 
can say in looking at it, not knowing which expert is going 
to be attached to that document that is going to use it, is 
simply that it has never been authenticated. We don't even 
know what it is or what it is purported to show. So I hope 
that explains why we havenlt made that sort of challenge. 
Certainly if they come forward with a new expert, we will 
make that challenge. It just hasn't been identified yet. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. OLSON: One issue, Your Honor, that hasn't been 
addressed at all today, is the new Utah employees. And I 
don't know if you want any argument today --
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eternal, hoping for some sort of a resolution of the matter 
without the court's intervention. And it seemed to me 
leaving that out there for a while might be desirable. 
MR. OLSON: I understand. We're happy to do that. 
Just finally, and just 20 more seconds, ultimately where 
we're left with in this case is nominal damages. The 
statement that has been made, I think Mr. Ingram mentioned, 
that we can figure it out somehow, relating to the amount of 
damages. I think Mr. Johnson conceded we don't know what 
the amount of damages is. It is difficult. It is 
imprecise. It is tough to put a finger on. The result in 
those cases, and those situations, is an award of nominal 
damages. And that is what the court stated in the Turtle 
Management, case where the court said, quote, if the amount 
of damages has not been proven, end quote, nominal damages 
is the measure. 
So at best, they're entitled to nominal damages in a 
ceise like this where it is not a matter of damages being 
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difficult to prove, it is a matter of not having any witness 
who can come forward and testify to some specific amount of 
damages that was caused by any specific breach of contract 
or tortious action. 
THE COURT: Let's go back to what the state of the law 
is on the restitutionary theory of damage. Your break down 
is helpful. We need to think about torts and we need to 
thing about breaches of contract. The Massachusetts case is 
a tort case and I guess Sampson is a tort case, is that --
MR. OLSON; I'm sorry, which one is a tort case? 
THE COURT: Their case, their best case is a 
Massachusetts tort case. And then you come back with 
Sampson which is a — is that a -- that is a tort case, 
right? 
MR. OLSON: Right. And the other two Idaho tort cases 
that recognize that same restatement provision which are the 
Barlow case and the Safeco case which all recognize lost 
profits. Particularly the Nora v Safeco Insurance case 
which recognizes lost profits is the measure, Barlow 
recognizes the restatement. Those are both tortious 
interference cases in Idaho. 
THE COURT: This Massachusetts case is a 1976 case and 
it collects a bunch of law review articles talking about 
what seems to be the hot new theory, you know, lost profit, 
you know, restitution. I'm wondering whether this is 
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something that was all in vogue 30 years ago, but, you know, 
the law professors didn•z carry the day in the intervening 
three decades or something. Do you have any — 
MR. OLSON: I can only guess. I haven't read the law 
review articles in any detail, but I do know that the 
tortious interference cases that we have cited all happened 
after the Massachusetts case* So, you know, the fact that 
there is one Massachusetts case that goes that way, I would 
say, is not sufficient for the court to go that direction 
particularly the Utah Idaho cases that we have. So I think 
if there is going to be any certification, it certainly 
wouldn't relate to tortious interference which has been 
established already• 
THE COURT: I haven't had a chance to review all of 
the defendants cases and my instinct is, and I'm sure 
they'll let me know if I'm wrong, the cases they have got on 
restitutionary damages are tort cases because there, and 
that is maybe when I was talking to Mr. Gibb, I'm thinking 
kind of criminal. And tort law, of course, is separate from 
criminal law but it does bear some relationship. And the 
theory being just as the bank robber has to give his money 
back, there is an argument, as articulated by the 
Massachusetts court, that a tort feasor ought to give his 
money back. And that is — maybe that is the analogy. The 
analogy would not work very well in a contract situation 
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because I mean there we're just protecting economic 
expectations and BO forth. 
MR. OLSON: Right. But I understand the similarity 
there. Unfortunately, it has just not been — well, I 
shouldn't say unfortunately. Fortunately --
THE COURT: Fortunately for you. 
MR. OLSON: That is right. It is — that has been 
rejected by Utah and Idaho. And then going to the — 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. OLSON: Going to the contract cases then, if you 
want a break down of those, we did need to look at what is 
left. 
THE COURT: No. I think based on our discussion now, 
it doesn't sound like the analogy is going to work in 
contract cases at all so we don't need to get there. 
MR. OLSON: Okay. Great, thank you. 
MR, GIBB: Your Honor, just one thing that I would 
point out. Under traditional court tort analysis, you have 
a duty, a breach, you have causation and then you have 
damages. And so the measure of damages is determined after 
you show that there was damages that were proximately caused 
CLS a result of that breach. Causation still occurs whether 
it is a tort or a contract because in a contract case you 
have got a breach that then proximately causes damages. So 
in both of those contexts, causation is a critical analysis 
77 
to make in both sets of circumstances. And if the court 
finds that there indeed has been no evidence of causation 
presented on summary judgment, the court can show or can 
state, as a matter of law, that the claims should be 
dismissed as to both types of claims no matter what the — 
under either of those traditional analysis. 
THE COURT: The problem I'm having is I think 
Mr. Johnson, aided by Mr. Ingram and Ms. Waite-Grover, make 
a pretty persuasive case that hey the jury could find, based 
on all of the evidence we have got, that there was at least 
we suffered some damages. Where they're having more 
difficulty is all right is that one dollar or is it 2.7 
million dollars. 
MR. GIBB: Exactly. 
THE COURT: When we get there, what the Massachusetts 
court says that I found persuasive on quick read is we don't 
want to create a world where tort feasors can say well, um, 
I'll make a ton of money if I do this, and I'll bet they're 
not going to be, you know, my gain will exceed their loss so 
I'm going to go ahead and commit the tort. It will be some 
kind of efficient tort and — 
MR. GIBB: I guess I would suggest the situation here 
is a little different in the — from the perspective that we 
have now had full summary judgment relief on the issue of 
whether or not there is evidence of causation or not. The 
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evidence that they presented on summary judgment as they 
argued it in their memorandum was that Mr. Elggren was their 
causation evidence with respect to that. And they have now 
had to switch because Mr. Elggren was — was excluded from 
trial, but they argued in their summary judgment memorandum, 
I believe it was in their reply memorandum, that you can 
infer that from his report. With the report excluded, they 
are now faced with the full analysis from Mr. Rasmussen that 
is unrebutted that goes through all of those causation 
factors and finds that there is no causation that has been 
demonstrated in this case. 
THE COURT: Well, I mean I have to say I do think we 
have switched course a little bit because Ms. Waite-Grover's 
position today was well he just assumed causation that is 
why you let him in. And I do think that a couple of weeks 
ago it was more along the lines you4re describing. It may 
be I misunderstand the — 
MR* GIBB: I believe in the deposition testimony he --
the quote from Mr. Elggren is I said I did not address 
causation and that is in his deposition at 201 and 202. It 
is not that he assumed it, it is that he never even 
addressed it. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think I understand 
your position. 
MR. GIBB: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gibb. 
MR* INGRAM: Your Honor, first of all, there is a 
concern between distinguishing between the torts and the 
breach of contract. I think the case that is especially 
illustrated why both the tort and the contract are 
intertwined is the Storage Tech case which is not a 30 year 
old case, it is from 2005. There at issue you have tortious 
interference and breaches of non-compete covenants and 
employee non-compete covenants. And there is a direct 
citation to the restatement 774(a) which is the same 
restatement relied upon in both Utah and Idaho and 
determining the proper measure of damages from the tort. If 
you read the Storage Tech case. 
THE COURT: Tell you what, give me just a minute here 
and have me focus in on the language, I have got it right 
here in front of me- This is the Eighth Circuit predicting 
what Minnesota would do. And they predicted that Minnesota 
would allow a restitutionary remedy in a case in which the 
interference alleged was inducing employee's breach of 
non-competition and non-disclosure covenant. And that is 
the restitutionary remedy of the type we have been talking 
about. 
MR. INGRAM: And the reason why they're intertwined, 
if you read that case carefully, one of the big things at 
issue was non-disclosure of confidential information. And 
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that, that in and of itself, takes you to the next step as 
well. Why is restitution not a proper measure of damage of 
breach of contract case? Well, in an ordinary contract you 
don't have all of these legitimate business interests that 
we have been talking about. This is not an ordinary 
contract. These are special contracts. That is why we have 
been arguing at length over whether or not there is a 
legitimate protectable interest in there. And in the cases 
in both Utah and Idaho where they're -- not Utah but just 
Idaho and some other cases we have been talking about lost 
profits with those contracts, the only legitimate interest 
at issue in those cases is really addressing was the 
solicitation of customers. What you have is an easy 
recognition of customer A to customer B. And what they're 
not addressing are these other legitimate interests like 
non-compete or, excuse me, the non-confidential information, 
extraordinary training. Those types of cases, based upon 
the Storage Tech case, actually lend themselves to 
restitutionary measure of damages. Why? Because in those 
cases you can't simply say it — you can't simply point to a 
loss to TruGreen because of the breach of its -- the loss of 
its confidential information and loss of competitive 
advantage. What you have instead is again this jump of a 
learning curve. It is not so much that TruGreen is so down, 
although they are down, it is that the defendants have been 
81 
able to overnight make this jump based upon this training, 
this confidential information. That is why restitutionary 
measure of damages is appropriate to again put the defendant 
-- put them in the place where we were before the breach 
which is the competitive advantage that TruGreen had that 
they had earned through years and years of investing these 
guys, spending money and knowing the Utah market. 
THE COURT: I agree with that. If I were king for a 
day, I would say restitutionary damages ought to be the law. 
But, of course, I am not king, I'm interpreting what Utah 
and Idaho courts would do. And so why don't you tell me 
what you think. 
MR, INGRAM: First of all in Utah you would find 
nothing on the proper measure of damages in a breach of 
non-compete covenant. Absolutely nothing. The only thing 
you will find is injunctive relief. 
THE COURT: So should I certify the question in your 
view or should I just rule in your favor without certifying? 
You want me to rule now? 
MR. INGRAM: I would like you to rule in our favor. 
Go ahead. 
THE COURT: I mean, what — what would — is there 
anything in, I mean, can I just say by golly I read some law 
review article and it sounds like a nifty theory to me and 
I'll bet the Utah courts will buy into this nifty theory. 
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MR. INGRAM: Yeah, we can find a basis for the measure 
of damages in Utah and tort claim at 774(a) . It is the same 
restatement cited in the Storage Tech case which then takes 
the added step of applying that to a breach of non-compete 
covenant where you have all these other interests at issue. 
Not just some ordinary contract. Jm, couple that with the 
fact Utah never ruled on what the proper measure is damage 
breach of non-compete and they never addressed the proper 
measure of damages in light of all of the legitimate 
protectable interests like confidential information, like 
training. 
So frankly it is wide open. You have got to look at 
the case of these other states. Coupled with the fact if 
you look to Utah law, well, um, if you can show misuse of a 
trade secret, for example, Utah statute provides, and this 
is in TruGreen in the TruGreen summary judgment brief, Utah 
statute provides that the proper measure of damages both 
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff and the restitutionary 
measure of damages for the misuse of that trade secret. I 
think that gets you where I'm going which is in a sense of 
pointing us in the right direction which is the reason why 
restitutionary measure of damages is simply because you 
don't have customer A to customer B problem which naturally 
lends itself to a natural loss theory like competition, 
confidential information, misuse of training, misuse of the 
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investment that TruGreen has made, also lends itself to a 
more restitutionary measure of damages. If you look at the 
Dunn case, too, for example, urn — 
THE COURT: Dunn is squarely against you. It says the 
measure is not the amount of profits made by the defendants. 
MR. INGRAM: That case involves the sale of a business 
and non-compete covenant is ancillary to that sale. So 
consequently, you don't have the protectable interests like 
we1re talking about in this case which is the special 
investment in employees, the confidential information. What 
you have in the Dunn case and in the case that it cites to, 
is the purchaser of the business paying a sum of money to 
buy that goodwill, and that is kind of -- that is where 
they're going with those. But it is definitely not an 
employee case where you are talking about training and 
legitimate, you know, confidential information not types of 
interests. Urn — 
THE COURT: So let me just, hear you a little more on 
certification. What is that? I mean I kind of hear you 
saying it is an open question and we think on the open 
question we have got the better of the argument. I mean are 
you opposed to the certification? In favor of it? 
Ambivalent? 
MR. INGRAM: Maybe I'll let Mr- Johnson speak to that. 
THE COURT: I fm glad to hear him. 
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MR. JOHNSON: My thoughts oh that are as follows, Your 
Honor. I do think in Utah, although there is — it is one 
way to analyze it is to, I think, defendants sort of boast 
of that as well, it is silent. I do think that all of the 
indicators are, given the restatement, section 707(4) and the 
fact that they haven't been presented with that kind of 
case, that they probably would go that direction. Do I want 
to spend the court's time and my time on an uncertainty? 
No. So if I'm not going to get it now, I would rather be 
certified then try and go through three years and then 
appeal. Does that make sense to you? Do you follow? 
THE COURT: As a practical matter, I know we're 
talking about -- I have certified I don't do this all the 
time* I have been on the bench four and a half years now 
and I have done it twice. And they both have been 
situations like this where all of a sudden we're close to 
trial and here is an issue, and you know, I am - and I'm 
thinking what it will do is slow the case down for about a 
year. Obviously they have their processes for briefing and 
so forth, and we would have an answer in a year. And if 
they say — I mean I am still — if they say that the tort 
theory restitutionary measure of damages works, then I think 
you definitely are up and running. 
MR. JOHNSON: And I think personally I believe your 
instincts are correct. And I just assume you say it now. 
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But if I have a choice between saying it in summary judgment 
or saying it as a law of the case before we try it or going 
through the risk of, you know, I guess certification is not 
the best remedy but it is better than spending an awful lot 
of money only to find out that somebody second-guessed you* 
Do you follow me? 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR, JOHNSON: No one is going to second guess on an 
issue like this issue of state law in the Utah Supreme Court 
once it speaks. I do — I would just say in passing, that 
I'm not as comfortable with reading the language in Dunn 
which granted it is sort of like a movie review. You read 
the movie review, this movie is great, but there is an 
ellipses after that that says and there was a comma that 
said not really. Like the Borat movie, I can't remember 
what the line was he kept saying in Borat, but where he 
would pause, he never got at it. But that case is limited 
to a pretty precise set of facts. And Idaho, like Utah, I 
mean yeah you can read it and maybe that is an indicator of 
how the Idaho Supreme Court would go given a case where you 
have the inchoate protectable business interest at play 
here. But I'm not so sure they would. I think the states 
that have seen those kind of cases, like the Minnesota case 
and the Idaho case, I mean the Minnesota case and 
Massachusetts case, are cases that do go to the 
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restitutionary remedy. Keeping in mind that boy these are 
hard to prove. The problem is you — your instincts tell 
you has been exacerbated by the defendant not the plaintiff. 
And am I going to set a policy here and encourage people to 
commit torts who is the guy in Chicago, the guy that taught 
torts there, who was always, you know — 
THE COURT: Epstein. 
MR. JOHNSON: Epstein is the efficient tort feasor 
theory. I think that is the problem. And I'm not sure the 
Idaho court case, although the language is pretty broad, 
given the narrow controversy of that case, ought to be read 
that broad. So I would like it certified on that issue. 
And I'm not stipulating that the Idaho court is entirely — 
can be read entirely comfortably that way. I think it is a 
very narrow case. 
THE COURT: Occasionally a federal district court will 
certify some question and then it will get back something 
from the State Supreme Court saying you idiot, didn't you 
read --
MR. JOHNSON: Maybe we ought to brief it first then. 
THE COURT: Well, I mean I don't know. You can spill 
a lot of ink, but I'm sitting here looking at the paragraphs 
and it starts out saying the measure of damage for the 
breach of an anti-competition clause is the amount that the 
plaintiff lost by reason of the breach. 
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MR, JOHNSON: But in that case, again it is ancillary 
to a sale of business, in that case I believe and I don't 
have in front of me, that they used as part of that measure 
the gain to the breaching party in that case, 
THE COURT: But that — they said the gain was that 
they thought there was some equation between the gain to the 
defendant — 
MR. JOHNSON: And that is because it is one of those 
very easy to show a lost profit damage. It is a much 
tighter case than the inchoate business case which I think 
has arisen here and in Minnesota and Massachusetts, 
THE COURT: I don't think I can say a dollar that they 
gained was a dollar that you lost. I think in this case 
there was the flavor of that. They may be — I don't know 
maybe every dollar they gained was at your expense but maybe 
not. And that is the problem I am — 
MR. JOHNSON: But you would — I think the court might 
concede it is not a case where somebody's goodwill has been 
confiscated, where somebody's competitive advantage has been 
destroyed. It is simply a commitment that was made in 
connection with the sale of business. And we have one of 
these very same cases right now in Idaho, set for hearing on 
the 2 6th, and it is ancillary to a sale of business. They 
are much easier cases. 
THE COURT: I see. I mean you were wondering — you 
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made a good point earlier this morning when you talked about 
what kind of a message does this send about the 
enforceability of these agreements- I did notice one of the 
Utah cases had a liquidated damages clause and maybe that is 
another way --
MR. JOHNSON: That could be the solution. 
THE COURT; Where you are an employer and TruGreen, 
Scotts has similar -- maybe that is the way to do these. 
Although part of the problem there were some obviously some 
drafting problems by your clients on some of these. 
MR. JOHNSON: Although my fingerprints are on many of 
these difficulties of the case, they're not on the drafting 
of the clause. 
THE COURT: The clause said while employed byf you 
know, we agree not to compete while we are employed and then 
they left. I mean that seemed to me to be something. I 
think we had differences of opinion on how that should have 
been interpreted, but I think we could both agree that could 
have been written a lot more straightforwardly so — 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. I agree with that. If Your Honor 
has no more questions, I will submit it. 
THE COURT; Okay. 
MR. GIBB: Just two cases I wanted to discuss and then 
just briefly some traditional damage analysis, Your Honor. 
In Dunn the court notes that Dunn failed to present evidence 
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at all showing any loss of business, loss of customers or 
loss of profit to his own business attributable towards 
breach. In addition, although Dunn presented some proof of 
profits, he failed to show any relation between those 
profits and Dunn's losses. 
Now, I'm also interested to hear them argue Storage 
Tech, because that was very well discussed in the court's 
prior order. And I know it was some interest as well that 
that case involved, according to the court's prior opinion, 
claims of interference with contractual relations, breach of 
contract, corporate raiding, conversion, misappropriation of 
trade secrets, and breach of fiduciary duties. 
But, in that particular case, the Eighth Circuit found 
that Storage Tech failed to produce evidence supporting any 
amount of damages or restitution. The dispute arose because 
of the hiring of those employees. But the court found that 
even if it were to adopt either of those, that he should be 
excluded for the quoted reason which is the first and most 
apparent problem with Norton's testimony is that he 
attributed the entire value of the New Speed acquisition to 
employees and trade secrets wrongfully appropriated from 
Storage Technology. Even though New Speed had other assets 
and employees, Norton did not attempt to value the people or 
the technology supposedly belonging to Storage Tech by any 
means other than by ascertaining what prices they paid for 
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New Speed. 
I think we are really very close, if not identical, to 
that certain situation because they had failed to do, on 
summary judgment, the very things that are discussed in the 
Storage Tech case. And like the expert there, this expert 
failed to do so and they are left without evidence at 
summary judgment to show those very important things. 
Now under traditional damage analysis you have two 
scenarios really, Your Honor. You can try to show it from 
contract that we got that they did not realize on. In other 
words, a customer contract that they wouldn't realize on and 
shown lost profits as a result of that. And then to show 
causation and all of the other factors that they're required 
to. They failed to do that here. 
With respect to how they have tried to go and do that, 
•like in the Dunn case, they have gone and just simply said 
profits are ours. But they have shown no correlation 
between those two. They have shown no causation between 
those two and they haven't attempted to rebut 
Mr. Rasmussen's sworn statement which is now before the 
court. 
Moving to certification, we will be happy to have the 
court certify it if that is what it feels it needs to do. 
We can assist the court if the court would like with short 
briefs on what we think the text of the certification order 
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should be to the Supreme Court. But in any event, in our 
view, if the court were to certify to the Supreme Court, it 
should only certify obviously the Utah issues regarding Utah 
employees and in the remaining claims that remain before the 
court. 
THE COURT: That is right. And it would be limited to 
a tort, to the tort issue not a — 
MR. GIBB: Well — 
THE COURT: Or do you see both? I think I would 
certify whether Utah law recognizes in a tort action a 
restitutionary measure of damages that is gained to a 
defendant being handed over to a plaintiff. 
MR. GIBB: Well, I guess what I would say is what 
should be rather than suggest the outcome, the certification 
question is what is the appropriate measure of damages if in 
an interference case involving non-competition and other 
covenants or whatever. Do you see what I'm saying there? 
MR. OLSON: Your Honor, if I could just interject, and 
I'm sorry to tag team with Mr. Gibb, but I think that the 
issue that appeared to be left after our discussion was not 
the tort cases, because again it is triggering and conceded 
that section 774(a) has already been decided in Utah, 
already been established what the measure of damages is in 
these tortious interference cases. What the court 
recognized was that in the Utah breach of contract context, 
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Lt was unclear when we have the Robbins case which is this 
liquidated damages case, how exactly damages would be 
calculated. That was my impression on what was left. 
THE COURT: Maybe I need to be — Sampson was a tort 
case, right? 
MR. OLSON: That is right. 
THE COURT: So it seems to me — I don't think that 
plaintiffs have any case law that says you would recognize 
the restitutionary measure of damages in a contract 
situation. 
MR. OLSON: Well, I agree with that. 
THE COURT: Maybe I should ask the plaintiffs that. 
Do you — you have got a good Massachusetts case on a tort 
claim and Storage Tech is a tort/ as I understand it. 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: We have shown — 
MR. GIBB: I think it is both, Your Honor, Storage 
Tech is. 
THE COURT: Storage Tech is both. 
MR. GIBB: Yeah. It is a breach of contract case as 
well. 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: Storage Tech essentially involves a 
case that is very similar to here. There was an employment 
agreement that had two provisions in it, non-competition and 
non-disclosure of confidential information. One of the 
defendants in there was the employee defendant who had 
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allegedly breached the competition provision and the 
disclosure provision. The other defendant was the 
competitor who had hired this employee in violation of the 
competition agreement and had allegedly used the 
confidential information of the other party of the plaintiff 
including the employee. 
The analysis that the court made in that case, and the 
reasoning that it uses, is really critical. It says where 
the underlying breach would have supported a restitutionary 
measure of damages, the tortious interference measure of 
damages will mirror that. And I think that pleads very well 
into the restatement which Storage Tech did cite. Because 
the restatement essentially says when you — when you induce 
someone to breach a contract, you're going to be liable for 
the same thing that the person is liable for because of that 
breach. In the Storage Tech case the court went back and 
said look an employee in Minnesota who breaches a 
non-competition agreement and disclosures confidential 
information, not trade secrets, but just confidential 
information, could be required to account for its profits. 
And that word accounting is essentially restitution. You 
give back what you got, because the profits that you got 
because you disclosed the information, you competed. And so 
then the court went on to say, if that employee who breaches 
that agreement can be required to account for the profits 
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and the revenues gained from the breach, so too will the 
competitor who induces the employee's breach of the 
non-competition and nondisclosure agreement. 
What we do know about Utah and Idaho law is both 
recognized generally speaking restitution with respect to 
contract damages. You can get an expectancy measure' of 
damages, but in certain circumstances you could get 
restitution. It is within the jurisprudence of both states, 
essentially. Second, what we also know about both Utah and 
Idaho law, is that if you do something akin to 
non-disclosure of confidential information, which is the 
misappropriation of the trade secrets, you're not only 
liable for your actual losses, but under the statute you can 
be liable for a restitution of the gains that you get 
because you misappropriated the trade secret. And then 
third, with respect to the non-interference provisions at 
issue in this contract — 
THE COURT: Before you move on, are all of the — I 
thought all of the — are all of the trade secret claims out 
at this point now? 
MR. JOHNSON: No. 
MR. INGRAM: No, Your Honor, they're still at issue. 
Breach of non-competition, breach of non-disclosure and 
breach of non-interference covenants, those are all at 
issue. 
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THE COURT: Weren't there some — I'm trying to 
remember my summary judgment order, weren't there -- there 
was ex-appropriation of confidential information or 
something that got tossed out in the earlier order. 
MR. INGRAM: The only thing that was tossed out was 
solicitation of customers. Not -- and I can — 
THE COURT: Okay. It is what it is, I'm just trying 
to get that front-loaded here. 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: And then the non-interference 
provision that still remains at issue in this case is 
essentially interference with other employees which is 
interference with employee contracts. And we think that is 
essentially contractual version of the tortious and 
interfering. They agreed by contract not to interfere with 
their fellow TruGreen employees agreement or employment 
situation and agreement, whereas the Mower Brothers 
defendants just didn't have that contractually imposed duty 
but had the legally imposed duty via tort law. At any rate, 
we think that the reasoning used in Storage Tech, that is 
that the underlying — where the underlying breach was to 
support restitutionary measure of damages justifies 
restitutionary damages for tortious interference with that 
same contract is sound and would be recognized in Utah. The 
restatement mirrors that. It is -- it says you get -- when 
you tortiously interfere you have to pay up what the person 
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who breached the contract would have paid. We think that 
because a non-competition agreement is different than an 
ordinary contract since it is not a contract for the sale of 
goods or the sale or the performance and services, that it 
would justify a restitutionary measure of damages. What a 
person in an ordinary contract is trying to protect is lost 
profits. I'm going to-pay you $100, give me 100 widgets. I 
want to get the 100 widgets that are worth something. If 
I'm going to pay you $100 to paint my fence, you have got to 
pay my fence or I'm out $100. 
What TruGreen and similar employees are trying to 
protect in their non-competition agreement is not just a 
loss of profits, although they may realize that that can be 
an outcome of a breach. But really what they're trying to 
protect is the goodwill, the competitive fairness, and the 
unique services of their employees, all of which are 
abstracting things which we have discussed previously but 
are difficult to pin down to a monetary value unlike a 
contract that is simply about 100 widgets or painting a 
fence. 
So for that reason we think that there is good reason, 
there is good reasoning 'behind applying that measure of 
damages for both the breach of the non-competition agreement 
and the non-disclosure agreement and the non-interference 
agreement and the tortious interference with those two 
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provisions. 
THE COURT: I mean your closing line there was that 
there are good reasons for doing all of this. And when I 
came out here I'm with you on that, I think there are good 
reasons for doing this. But there is a separate question as 
to whether Utah law would follow. I mean is there something 
in the Utah case law that leads you to think that the Utah 
courts have moved in that direction? 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: Urn, I know that they'll get 
injunctive relief for non-competition agreements. I know 
that they'll give — they*11 acknowledge in certain part 
based on Robbins versus Finlay liquidated damages in 
non-competition agreements, and I think that we might need 
to do additional assessment of when restitution is 
appropriate in general contracts. But I can speak to the 
fact that Utah does acknowledge restitution towards general 
contracts, but I fully concede that they have never 
addressed the specific issue of whether restitution is the 
appropriate measure in a non-competition contract. They 
haven't ruled it out either, but they haven't addressed it. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. WAITE-GROVER: It may be appropriate for 
certification. 
THE COURT: All right. Well here is where we are. It 
seems to me three things could happen over the next week. I 
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could rule for the defense and then we're done. And you can 
check with the Tenth Circuit and see if I made a mistake. I 
could rule for you, and then we would be moving forward for 
a trial. Or I could certify this to the Utah Courts for 
clarification. And you all — 
MR. JOHNSON: In the words of Meatloaf, two out of 
three ain't bad, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And the problem is you all are spending a 
lot of client money here. This is what 1 would propose to 
do. I'm going to work on this today and tomorrow and maybe 
give you a phone call, both sides, with the same information 
as to which of those paths I'm heading so you would know by 
the end of the day tomorrow what the situation is. The 
problem is if I rule for the plaintiff, then we have got a 
final pretrial conference and trial and we have got a lot of 
work that we need to do on this so you need to know that 
rapidly. One of the other two courses then the trial isn't 
looming quickly. Does that — does that make sense as a 
plan of attack here? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Does that make sense as a plan of attack 
here? 
MR. GIBB: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. So I'll give you a call 
tomorrow. And I guess if we're done, if it is one of these 
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options that is going to put the trial off, we don't have to 
really think through anything. If the option is to rule — 
well, I really don't see how I could rule for you. 
I think Ms. Waite-Grover is exactly right when she 
says the Utah law really isn' t there. I mean I think I 
would be walking out on a limb to rule in your favor on that 
theory. And I'm not sure I would be doing you any favors 
because you could spend a lot of money. Hang on one second. 
All right. Well, I'll let you know tomorrow. But 
sitting here right now, my thought is that we're not going 
to have a trial because I'm either going to certify it or 
rule for the defense. That is sort of the two things that I 
am thinking about. But why don't I do this. I'll let you 
know by 5:00 tomorrow what exactly what the situation is so 
that there won't be any unnecessary expenditure of funds 
over the next few weeks if we are not going to have a trial. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. I 
appreciate the arguments of counsel today and I'll try to 
get you a ruling as quickly as I can tomorrow. 
MR. GIBB: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. OLSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, 
(Whereupon, the hearing concluded at 1:38 p.m.) 
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